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ABSTRACT
A Virtuous Cycle: 
Tracing Democratic Quality through Equality. (August 2010)
Ashley Dyan Ross, B.A., Texas A&M University; M.A., Louisiana State University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon
This dissertation asks the question: How do democracies improve in quality? 
Building on previous scholarship, the author offers a theoretical framework that traces 
democratic quality through equality of outcomes. The quality of democracy may be 
conceptualized as a virtuous cycle where the procedural aspects of democracy 
motivate politicians to expand equality. This broadening of substantive opportunities 
outcomes, in turn, deepens democracy by developing individual-level political 
participation. The theoretical framework is applied to the context of public services 
with the expectation that quality democracies with high government capacity more 
broadly distribute basic public services and that this pattern of provision cultivates 
political participation. 
The first empirical analysis tests if the quality of democracy and government 
capacity are associated with reduced service inequalities for a sample of 75 countries. 
It is found that while equalities of education and sanitation services are significantly 
related to democratic quality, healthcare is not, nor is government capacity shown to 
iv
play a significant role. To further explore this, the Mexican states are analyzed for the 
years 2000 to 2004; the results show that capacity in terms of tax collection efforts is 
associated with lower inequalities in education services in states with high electoral 
competition.
The second empirical analysis turns to the local level of government - where 
services are delivered. Using original data from interviews and government records of 
four Mexican municipalities, the author examines the aspects of democracy and 
government capacity that are correlated with lower inequalities of public services. The 
findings highlight that intense electoral competition and institutionalized channels of 
citizen input as well as capacity in terms of sound collection of municipal taxes and 
innovations in municipal funding are characteristics of governments with broader 
distribution of basic public services. 
The third empirical analysis tests if public services are related to individual-level 
political participation. Employing survey data from Latin America and Africa, the author 
finds that “good” public service evaluations are associated with greater likelihoods of 
voting in high quality democracies - those with intense electoral competition - but 
limited government capacity. This offers evidence that in a developing context, public 
services enable political participation.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I understand democracy as something that gives 
the weak the same chance as the strong.
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi 
The study of democracy has moved from analysis of democratization or the 
transition from an authoritative to democratic regime to the exploration of the causes 
and consequences of deepening democracy. This is largely because over 78% of the 
world’s nations are considered democratic in one form or another (Freedom House
2009).1 Therefore, our concentration as political scientists and policy-makers has 
shifted from how to become a democracy to how to deepen democracy. From regions 
such as Latin America where democratic practices have ebbed and flowed to cases 
where democracy is struggling as in most of Africa or newly emerging as in Iraq, the 
most important question we can ask is: How can we improve the quality of democracy?
                                                          
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Politics. 
1 Freedom House 2009 reports: 89 of 193 countries are “free” and 62 are “partly free”, totaling 78% free 
or partly free regimes. Freedom House also reports 119 countries are classified as “electoral 
democracies”.
2To explore pathways to improving democracy, we must begin with a good 
understanding of what we mean by “quality of democracy”. Unfortunately, while is it 
clear that studying this is important, what we understand as quality of democracy is 
much more muddled. Scholars and citizens have varying ideas of what this term means.
There is not a scholarly consensus regarding the definition of quality of 
democracy. Broadly there are two perspectives: procedural and substantive. The 
procedural approach focuses on the most fundamental institutions and practices 
necessary for democratic politics, including contestation, participation, and basic 
political rights. The substantive perspective emphasizes the importance of 
incorporating outcomes into our conceptualization of democratic quality, particularly 
underscoring the importance of social, political, and economic equality. While both 
approaches agree that there is a basic set of criterion to assessing the quality of 
democracy, they drastically diverge on the specifics, particularly with treatment of 
substantive outcomes. 
Scholars are not the only ones that have divergent ideas of what democracy 
means. Popular conceptions of democracy are just as varied. The World Values Survey 
(5th wave: 2005-2007) reports that individuals view democracy in political, economic, 
social, and religious terms. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents that 
considered the item in question to be an “essential characteristic of democracy”.
Topping the list is civil rights and liberties, specifically equal political rights for women 
3as men, people choose leaders in a free election, civil rights protect people’s liberty 
against oppression, and people can change laws in referendums. Following these 
characteristics, individuals identified rule of law and economic characteristics to be 
essential elements of democracy, including punishment of criminals as well as 
economic prosperity, state aid for unemployment, and taxing the rich to give to the 
poor.  What individuals consider to be not essential characteristics of democracy is 
equally revealing about popular meanings of democracy. A third of respondents 
considered army takeover of government in the case that the government is 
incompetence and religious authorities’ interpretation of law as unessential to 
democracy, showing a prioritization of rule of law as well as a value of separation of 
church and state.
Figure 1: Popular Ideas of Democracy
Percent respondents who say item is essential for democracy
Note: World Values Survey 2005-2007; Number of respondents ranged from 67,430 to 72,697
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4Both scholars and citizens recognize that defining the quality of democracy 
involves consideration of the procedures or the necessary conditions and institutions 
for democracy as well as the outcomes of these. We can group such items as rule of 
law, popular election of leaders, and the changing of laws with referendums along with 
political contestation and popular participation can all be considered basic aspects of 
democratic institutions and practices. Civil rights and liberties, women’s equality, and 
redistributive economic practices such as state aid for unemployment and the 
reallocation of wealth can all be considered under the umbrella of equality. What 
becomes confounding is how we mesh procedural criterion with substantive outcomes, 
explicitly equality, in assessing democratic quality. We know that the inclusion of basic 
democratic rules and behaviors are required in our conceptualization of democratic 
quality. For example, examining the extent to which free and fair elections exist in a 
country is fundamental to democratic quality. What is unclear is whether or not we 
must also consider substantive outcomes. Is a small gap between the rich and poor, for 
example, absolutely necessary for a country to be a high quality democracy? 
Some scholars argue that substantive outcomes are needed to fully understand 
and measure democratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2005; O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell 
and Iazzetta 2004); others maintain that they confuse cause and consequence (Hill 
1994). I contend that both procedure and substantive may be incorporated into our 
conceptualization of democratic quality without losing the distinction between the two. 
5And I offer a basic framework tracing one to the other that is empirical testable across 
multiple countries and time points. 
The quality of democracy may be conceptualized as a virtuous cycle where the 
procedural aspects of democracy motivate politicians to expand equality. This 
broadening of substantive outcomes, in turn, improves democracy by developing 
opportunities for political participation. The cycle runs from quality of democratic 
procedures to equality and back again. 
Electoral competition motivates politicians to implement reforms whose 
benefits are inclusive of the larger citizenry. To gain a broader support base in the face 
of high political competition, politicians seek to reduce inequalities in political, social, 
and economic areas of individuals’ lives, which expand their opportunity to be active 
democratic citizens. Sufficient education and health are needed to participate fully in a 
democracy. These are obstructed by poverty, illiteracy, lack of health and education 
services - all of which must be addressed to improve democracy. The broadening of 
social welfare benefits, advancement of civil liberties, and reduction of economic 
inequalities expands opportunities for political participation as substantive outcomes 
are realized, and increased participation feeds back into the democratic process. Higher 
levels of political activity deepen political competition as parties and politicians vie for 
political support. Increased political participation incorporates sectors of society that 
6may have been previously marginalized into the political process, thereby enhancing 
the democraticness of the policy-making process. 
I apply this theoretical framework to the context of public services. I test each 
part of the cycle with three separate but related studies drawing on data from around 
the globe and capitalizing on information from national, state, and local governments 
as well as individual citizens. In all, the findings support that a virtuous cycle exists 
between democratic quality and equality in public services. Electoral competition is 
positively related to reduced inequalities in basic services, and in turn public services 
motivate individual political participation. 
Plan of Dissertation
The dissertation begins in Chapter II with the theoretical foundations of the 
virtuous cycle mentioned above. First we review the procedural and substantive 
components of democracy, with particular emphasis given to the debate within the 
scholarship as to how to incorporate the two in the analysis of democratic quality. We 
explore this debate, and the virtuous cycle framework is offered as a way to bridge the 
gap between the two approaches. The specifics of the theoretical framework are 
outlined, including the components of democracy adopted, the role of government 
capacity in mediating the relationship of democracy and public service equality, and the 
theoretical motivations for reducing inequalities. Because of the endogenous nature of 
7the virtuous cycle, several empirical implications are mentioned, then how I apply this 
framework to public services is detailed, namely the working hypotheses are discussed.
Chapter III tests the first part of the virtuous cycle running from democratic 
quality to equality in public services. Because this hypothesized association builds 
heavily on the findings of work studying regime type and public service spending, we 
first review this literature. Following this, we consider the variables used in the analysis 
to model public service inequalities as a result of democratic quality, government 
capacity, and country wealth. The data used are taken from surveys that offer 
subnational measures of education, healthcare, and sanitation services. An inequality 
measure is built from this information. We then move on to discuss the methods to 
estimate the model and the results of this estimation. While equalities of education and 
sanitation services are significantly related to democratic quality, healthcare is not, nor 
is government capacity shown to play a significant mediating role. To further explore 
the association of democracy, government capacity, and public service equality, we 
explore the results of time-series model using data from the 31 Mexican states for the 
period 2000 to 2004. These findings illustrate that high quality democracies coupled 
with high levels of government capacity are associated with lower inequalities in 
education services. To examine this relationship on the level of government where 
services are delivered, we move on to Chapter IV that offers analysis of public services 
in four Mexican municipalities.
8Chapter IV unpacks the democracy-equality link by examining in-depth what 
specific aspects of democracy and government capacity are correlated with lower 
inequalities of public services. Four Mexican municipalities are analyzed - two large and 
two small municipalities. Using data from interviews and government records on fiscal 
management and public service delivery, we again see that equality in public services is 
linked to high quality democracies with sufficient government capacity. In particular, 
we find that intense electoral competition, institutionalized channels of citizen input 
(beyond traditional voting), and the incorporation of communities into the service 
delivery process are attributes of high quality democracies. High levels of technical 
expertise and experience, sound collection of municipal taxes and user fees, and 
funding innovations are characteristics of governments with high capacity. In all, we are 
given a more nuanced story of the virtuous cycle in Chapter IV. Specific municipal 
institutions and practices directly related to expanding equalities in public services are 
explored.
While the previous two chapters test how democracy affects equality, Chapter V
tests the reverse, examining how public services deepen democracy through individual 
political participation. This chapter begins with a discussion of the theoretical link 
between public services and political participation, teasing out the different effect of 
basic services on individual capacities in the developing versus developed world. Using 
survey data from Latin America and Africa, we test how public service evaluations 
affect the probability of voting and protest. Modeling political participation as a result 
9of services as well as country-level quality of democracy-government capacity and 
individual characteristics ranging from political interest to levels of education, we find 
that “good” public service evaluations are associated with greater likelihoods of voting 
in high quality democracies with limited government capacity. This offers evidence that 
in a developing context, public services enable individuals with the capacity needed to 
politically participate, and this political participation enhances democracy from the 
bottom-up.
In all, this project is an attempt to reconcile the literature on democratic quality 
and move it forward by offering a theoretical framework that may be broadly applied 
to a myriad of substantive outcomes. I have applied it to the context of public services 
and believe that the following studies offer considerable evidence that a virtuous cycle 
indeed exists between the quality of democracy and the equality of public services. It is 
my hope that this study may spur additional analyses that point to democracy as a way 
to reduce inequalities. In this sense we may be able to achieve Ganhdi’s idea of 
democracy as being something that gives the weak the same chance as the strong.
10
CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL LINK BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY 
Democratic theory is highly value-laden. The concept of democracy is 
fundamentally linked to normative ideas. As Sartori asserted, “What democracy is 
cannot be separated from what democracy should be. A democracy exists only insofar 
as its ideals and values bring it into being...in a democracy the tension between fact 
and value reaches the highest point, since no other ideal is further from the reality in 
which it has to operate” (1962: 4). Scholars have struggled to deal with the conflict 
between what democracy is and what it should be, particularly in conceptualizing and 
identifying paths to improving the quality of democracy.
Some scholars approach democratic quality in purely minimalist terms, choosing 
to conceptualize democracy as political contestation, participation, and basic political 
rights. Others have incorporated civil rights and liberties as well as a variety of 
socioeconomic outcomes into their assessment of democracy. I offer a theoretical 
framework that builds on this scholarship to trace the quality of democracy from its 
procedural roots to the substantive opportunities and outcomes it produces. 
Specifically, I follow the virtuous cycle link between democracy and equality and apply 
it to the context of equality of public services. It is my hope that this framework is a 
start to reconciling the divide among scholarship on what democracy is and should be.
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Before outlining how scholars have treated these components of democratic 
quality and my theoretical framework, it is important to clarify what I mean by 
democracy. Following Dahl (1971), I consider democracy to be an ideal form of 
government. Regimes that have opened up to political contestation and participation 
may be thought of as “polyarchies” - to use Dahl’s terminology. Polyarchies are 
incompletely democratized regimes “that have been substantially popularized and 
liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation” (Dahl 
1971: 8). Conceiving of democracy in these terms allows us to conceptualize a scale of
democraticness where polyarchies are situated according to their inclusiveness and 
political contestation - higher levels move a regime closer to the ideal point of a true 
democracy. 
Rather than use the awkward term of polyarchy and be bound to reference of 
levels of democraticness to indicate how close a regime is to the ideal of democracy, I 
adopt the convention of using the term “quality of democracy”. Quality of democracy is 
representative of Dahl’s continuous conceptualization of polyarchies and allows us to 
speak of democracy in terms of liberalization. A higher quality democracy is one with 
higher levels of contestation and participation; a lower quality democracy is lacking in 
these characteristics. Moreover, using the concept quality of democracy to refer to 
Dahl’s polyarchies maintains that democracy in its truest form is an ideal. In other 
words, we may use quality of democracy to speak in terms of grades with the idea that 
12
true democracy - complete inclusion of every citizen in politics and perfect political 
contestation among groups - is rarely if ever attained.2
In adopting Dahl’s conceptualization of democracy, it is evident that I consider 
political contestation and participation as the defining characteristics of democracy. 
Scholars agree with this (Hill 1994; Vanhanen 2000); however, some add political rights 
and civil liberties to the criteria (Gasiorowski 1996; Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002), and 
others incorporate substantive outcomes as a critical element of the quality of 
democracy (O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005).
The chapter proceeds as follows. First we review the concepts and measures 
that scholars have adopted in relation to democratic quality, paying particularly 
attention to the divide among procedural and substantive approaches. Then we move 
on to discuss the theoretical framework that I have constructed from this scholarship, 
which I refer to as the “virtuous cycle” between democracy and equality. A broad 
outline of this frame is presented with emphasis on its applicability to numerous areas 
of study. Finally, we explore the empirical implications of the virtuous cycle frame, and I 
sketch out the way I apply it to the context of public services. 
                                                          
2 A final point: while some scholars use the term democratization to refer to quality of democracy or 
degrees of democracy (for example Hill 1994), I consider democratization to denote the transition of an 
authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. 
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Quality of Democracy: Concepts and Measures
In conceptualizing the quality of democracy, scholars have delineated between 
the institutions and procedures necessary for a democratic regime to exist and the 
substantive outcomes of democratic politics. Political contestation, popular 
participation in politics, and basic political rights comprise the components of 
procedural democracy. Substantive outcomes involve equality, including the fair 
distribution of income and the broad provision of economic and social welfare. The 
following section explores each component, beginning with political contestation, then 
moving on to political participation, political rights and civil liberties, and finally ending 
with a discussion of equality as the substantive outcome of democracy.
Political Contestation 
Political contestation is the hallmark of a democratic regime. Contestation is 
the extent to which citizens are able to freely organize into competing political groups  
to express their policy and political preferences. Dahl (1971) asserts two requirements 
related to contestation for a regime to be democratic: 1.) citizens have the opportunity 
to formulate preferences and 2.) citizens have the opportunity to signify their 
preferences to their fellow citizens and to the government. Free and fair elections 
satisfy the second requirement while political party competition fulfills the first. 
14
Elections are the vehicle of political contestation in a democracy. Elections are 
the mechanism by which citizens select their nation’s leaders and signal preferred 
policy directions. Elections also allow citizens to recall politicians that they judge to be 
unsuccessful. Moreover, elections give politicians strong institutional incentives to 
respond to public preferences. To be “free and fair” elections at a minimum must be 
inclusive by permitting all adults the right to vote (Dahl 1971). In addition to this 
requirement, elections should be free from corruption and fraud.
While elections are a necessary requirement of democracy, scholars agree that 
they alone are not sufficient to categorize a regime democratic. Healthy political 
competition among groups is also necessary to aid citizens in formulating and 
aggregating their policy preferences and to offer citizens choices in political leadership. 
In short, political competition is needed to make elections meaningful. Political 
competition is most effectively channeled as political party competition because parties 
best aggregate and transmit political preferences (Hill 1994: 54). Parties fulfill functions 
and undertake political activities, such as organizing elections, recruiting candidates, 
and publicizing issues, that we would not want the government to undertake but that 
“must be carried out if we want democracy to exist to any degree” (Hill 1994: 54). 
Therefore, for elections to be meaningful we must have competition among political 
groups, namely parties. 
15
Many scholars have conceptualized political contestation as political party 
competition (Hill 1994; Vanhanen 2000; Altman and Perez-Liñán2002). Hill (1994) 
measures democratic quality as the degree of party competition in the 50 American 
states’ legislatures. He adopts the Ranney index of state party competition that takes 
into account opposition party votes won, seats held in the upper and lower legislatures, 
and governorship terms. Altman and Perez-Liñán (2002) also examine party 
competition as a proxy for quality of democracy. They focus on opposition access to 
power as a key component of competition, arguing that measures of democratic quality 
must take into account opposition access to the legislative process by punishing 
excessive dominance of the ruling party while not rewarding dominance of the 
opposition. They base their measure of the opposition’s access to power on the 
weighted difference between the share of the seats of the government and the 
opposition parties in the lower chamber. 
Political contestation is the most fundamental component of a democracy and 
varies considerably not only among countries but also across time and space. Free and 
fair elections and political party competition make political contestation possible and 
meaningful for individual citizens. A nation would be considered a high quality 
democracy if elections include all the adult population and are free from fraud and are 
conducted in a context of high political competition among political parties.
16
Popular Participation 
While it would seem that contestation is the minimal condition for defining a 
democratic regime and the quality of that regime, scholars argue that consideration of 
participation is also necessary (Hill 1994; Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994; Vanhanen 2000; 
Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002). Certainly, universal suffrage is necessary to make 
elections truly free and fair. Beyond inclusiveness of all the adult population, the levels 
of mass participation are important for democratic politics and our assessment of 
quality of democracy because they shape politics and political responses as well as 
reflect the effectiveness of political institutions. 
On the most basic level, “political party competition is imbued with far more 
policy relevance if the public is active” (Hill 1994: 132). Political competition and 
contestation is meaningless if popular participation is lacking. Voting and political 
activities signal policy preferences and shape political issues to match citizen concerns.
Mass participation also compels politicians and political leaders to respond to 
popular demands and concerns. “Greater participation - whether it is voluntary or 
encouraged by compulsory vote - makes democratic governments responsive to a 
larger share of the population” (Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002: 88). Electoral incentives 
that constrain politicians and make political behavior predictable are stronger when a 
large proportion of the population participates. Politicians that compete in a political 
17
arena where most of the citizenry are active are more compelled to be responsive to 
voter preferences in order to secure future support for themselves or their party.  
Participation is also reflective of democratic institutions. Hill contends, 
“…participation levels are not a product of political culture, of satisfaction with, apathy 
towards or alienation from the political system. The influence, instead, of political 
institutions and laws means that turnout rates are determined by procedural aspects of 
the political regime” (Hill 1994: 12). Political institutions take a variety of forms and 
their outcomes largely depend on their configuration. Dahl (1998) outlines eight 
institutions that are necessary for citizen participation in a democracy: 1.) freedom to 
form and join organizations; 2.) freedom of expression; 3.) right to vote; 4.) right of 
political leaders to compete for support (and votes); 5.) eligibility for public office; 6.) 
alternative sources of information; 7.) free and fair elections; and 8.) institutions for 
making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference 
(Dahl 1971: 3). The manner in which these institutions are configured matters for 
democratic politics. For example, we can imagine a regime where individual right to 
vote, join organizations, and freedom of expression are strongly guaranteed and 
enforced alongside weak institutional incentives to make government policies depend 
on votes. In this scenario, it is likely that voters will be less inclined to participate 
politically because their expressed preferences are not transmitted into policy. We can 
see from this simple example that participation is a result of institutional characteristics 
18
of the political regime. Participation, therefore, is reflective of the quality of 
democracy.
Political participation is a critical factor of assessing democratic quality. Mass 
political activity ensures that politics are relevant to popular concerns and compels 
politicians to be responsive. Levels of political participation are also a yardstick for the 
effectiveness of democratic institutional arrangements. High levels of participation are 
indicative of truly democratic institutions and of high quality democracies. 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
In addition to political contestation and participation, political rights and civil 
liberties are critical components of democratic quality. Although we commonly use 
political rights and civil liberties interchangeably, there are distinctions among the two. 
Political rights “make possible vigorous political participation and competition” and 
include the rights to vote, form political parties, and stand for office (Diamond and 
Morlinio 2005: xi). Civil rights belong to every citizen and are not connected to the 
administration of government (West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2). These 
rights include “personal liberty, security, and privacy; freedom of thought, expression, 
and information; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, association, and 
organization”, to name a few (Diamond and Morlino 2005: xi). Political rights are those 
individual rights necessary to be a democratic citizen; civil liberties expand the 
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opportunities available to democratic citizens. Citizens must have sufficient political 
rights to be able to meaningfully cast a vote. However, having equal social status as a 
minority citizen, for example, is not necessary for democratic politics to take place but 
does expand the political opportunities available to minority citizens and the 
democraticness of society as a whole. Another way to conceptualize political rights and 
civil liberties is that political rights are procedural - needed for democratic politics to 
function - and civil liberties are substantive - contributing to the development of 
democracy. 
There are a myriad of political rights and civil liberties and varying degrees of 
state respect for each, which represent different points on the conceptual continuum 
of democratic quality. When assessing the quality of democracy, we must decide how 
to handle political rights and civil liberties. There are numerous options, but scholars 
have tended to take two approaches - procedural and substantive. The procedural 
approach involves treating political rights separately from or as a component of 
political contestation and participation and classifying civil liberties as a substantive 
outcome of democratic quality. The substantive approach combines political rights and 
civil liberties into one component of democratic quality. 
Scholars that have taken the procedural approach recognize that a certain 
degree of political rights are entailed in political contestation and participation. 
Freedom to form political parties and freedom of speech and organization, for example, 
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must be maintained for a democracy to have high levels of both contestation and 
participation. Some scholars model these freedoms separately from political 
contestation and participation (Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994; Gasiorowski 1996) while 
others (Dahl 1971; Hill 1994; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi 2000) opt to 
exclude political rights as a separate dimension of the quality of democracy with the 
idea that political rights necessary to democratic politics are represented in the 
concepts and measures of contestation and participation. This approach does not 
incorporate civil liberties - as defined above - in the quality of democracy.
Other scholars (Altman and Perez-Liñán 2002), however, chose to evaluate civic 
rights and political liberties as a joint category in addition to political contestation and 
participation, claiming that state guarantees for these are important components of 
our assessment of democratic quality. This approach involves the inclusion of 
substantive dimensions of democratic quality. For example, Altman and Perez - Liñán 
(2002) include political rights and civil liberties in their measure of democratic quality. 
They adopt the Freedom House rating of a nation’s political rights and civil liberties, 
which includes several substantive components. Freedom House scores are based upon 
expert surveys of each nation. The political rights and civil liberties ratings assess a 
nation’s respect for basic political rights such as freedom of speech and assembly as 
well as equality of adult suffrage. In addition to these fundamental political freedoms, 
Freedom House evaluations of a nation’s political rights and civil liberties include the 
following substantive considerations: media independence, religious group freedoms, 
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electoral conduct that expands political rights, accountability of government, 
corruption of political officials, academic freedom, freedom of individuals from war and 
conflict, minority group and women’s equality, freedom of foreign travel, property 
rights, and state control of the economy (see http://freedomhouse.org). While this 
approach creates a rich scale of democratic quality, it is limited in its empirical utility 
due to the numerous outcomes encompassed in the category of political rights and civil 
liberties. It is difficult - and empirically flawed - to take a democratic quality indicator 
based on this approach and test specific substantive outcomes of the same. 
Although political rights and civil liberties are tightly associated with concepts of 
democracy, the empirical treatment of these varies. Some scholars assert that political 
rights are encompassed in political contestation and participation and that civil liberties 
are an outcome of democratic quality. Therefore, they model the procedural aspects 
separately from civil liberties, considering the former as a component of democratic 
quality and the latter as a result of improved democracy. Other scholars deem political 
rights and civil liberties to be a joint component of quality of democracy and include 
empirical measures of these in their ranking of regime type. Regardless of the empirical 
treatment of political rights and civil liberties, it is clear that a high quality democracy 
guarantees basic political rights.
22
Equality
Equality is a critical dimension along which the quality of democracy varies 
(Rueschmeyer 2004). Equality may be understood as the distribution of benefits across 
a population; the broader the distribution, the more equality exists. Political, social, and 
economic equality encompasses the breadth of substantive opportunities and 
outcomes that scholars consider in the evaluation of democratic quality. Political 
equality such as equality of minority group representation and of women’s rights is 
encompassed under the umbrella of substantive political rights and civil liberties. Social 
equality refers to welfare and human development, particularly education, health, and 
individual well-being (Sen 1999; O’Donnell 2004). Sen (1999) terms these “social 
opportunities” and considers the advancement of these to enhance individual 
substantive freedom - freedom from restrictions of poverty and underdevelopment. 
Economic equality involves the leveling of individual and household incomes and 
economic resources (Rubinson and Quinlan 1977; Weede 1982; Bollen and Jackman 
1985; Muller 1998). Scholars recognize that these substantive opportunities and 
outcomes have important consequences for stabilizing and furthering democratic 
regimes. 
Citizens and governments are also deeply concerned with equality. Many 
democratic constitutions acknowledge and guarantee social rights including education 
and health care, and some are explicit about these guarantees such as the Last 
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Constitutional Treaty of the European Union. These constitutional guarantees reflect 
citizen values and policy preferences. The 2005-2007 wave of the World Values Survey 
reports that 49% of respondents answered “equality above freedom” when asked what 
they value more (WVS 5th wave; n=972). Recent events around the globe also reflect 
the importance of equality to average citizens. In our own country, the equity of 
healthcare is one of the predominant topics of political discourse. In developing 
regions, equality has framed presidential elections and protests. The re-elected Bolivian 
President Evo Morales stated in his 2009 inaugural speech that his victory was not only 
for Bolivians but also for all of those that seek social equality around the world. In the 
same year, violent protests in South Africa have erupted over the lack of adequate 
public services such as water, sanitation, and electricity in municipalities.
With the indisputable importance of equality for democracy, scholars have 
incorporated equality into their assessment of democratic quality. As mentioned above 
many studies focus on equality as a result of democratic quality. A recent trend of 
scholarship incorporates equality into the conceptualization and measure of quality of 
democracy. O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta (2004) attempt to do this in their 
book The Quality of Democracy. O’Donnell argues for a conceptualization of democratic 
quality as the distance between political institutions and substantive outcomes. For 
example, if every vote is counted equally but individuals are subjected to extreme 
poverty, O’Donnell considers this poor democratic quality because these citizens lack 
sufficient autonomy to formulate political preferences. This approach focuses on 
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human agency as a fundamental element of citizenship. Human development of 
individual capacities are central to the exercise of political rights in a democracy; 
agency “can only be exercised if the individual has basic conditions or capabilities” such 
as an adequate standard of living (Karl page 187). As Ippolito puts it, O’Donnell’s 
“innovative idea is that the violation of the conditions necessary for agency to exist and 
its impact of the effectiveness of citizenship define the degree or quality of 
democraticness of the political regime” (page 172).
In the second part of the book, Vargas Cullell explores O’Donnell’s 
conceptualization of democratic quality with findings from a citizen audit of democracy. 
The Costa Rican State of the Nation Project (Gutiérrez and Vargas Cullell 1998) was a 
civic forum involving citizen surveys, focus groups, legal analyses, and a panel of 
academic, social, and political leaders to address quality of democracy standards. The 
resulting democracy audit concludes that “the quality of democracy is not a general 
attribute of the whole democratic system but rather the accumulated effect of 
institutional performance and citizen interaction on multiple fronts” (Vargas Cullell 
page 97). For example, the audit revealed that social development, particularly on the 
local level, was associated with quality of democracy for citizens. While Costa Rica’s 
universal health care system and legal recognition of social rights paves the way for 
social development, progress is uneven across localities. Citizens that interact with local 
governments in a context of poor social development and little economic growth 
perceive democratic quality as low while those in more progressive contexts view 
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democracy as of higher quality. In the context of high inequalities, democracy is lacking 
for citizens living in these conditions despite national social and welfare development. 
The point is: equality shapes what democratic quality means in substantive terms to 
everyday citizens.
Clearly, equality is an important component of the quality of democracy. 
Scholars, citizens, and governments recognize that democracy is intrinsically linked to 
political, social, and economic conditions and outcomes. While some scholars chose to 
conceptually and empirically separate equality from democratic institutions and 
practices (i.e. contestation and participation), others have made compelling arguments 
for the incorporation of equality in our theoretical framework and measurement of 
democratic quality. 
At a Divide?
It seems that scholars are situated in two camps with regards to the study of 
democratic quality: procedural and substantive. The first emphasizes the most 
fundamental institutions and practices necessary for democratic politics, including 
contestation, participation, and basic political rights. The second underscores the 
importance of equality - political, social, and economic - for democratic quality. Both 
approaches are critical to fully understanding the quality of democracy and identifying 
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paths to building sustainable democracies, but neither truly advances our study of 
democratic quality. 
Adhering to a truly procedural conceptualization of quality of democracy 
ignores the substantive aspects of democracy that are critical to defining democracy for 
most citizens. On the other hand, incorporating these substantive outcomes into our 
idea and measurement of democratic quality often ventures into murky waters. It is 
becomes very difficult to sort out causes and effects, means to ends. For example, 
while O’Donnell puts forth a compelling argument for why equality should be 
incorporated into our assessment of democratic quality, he fails to provide an empirical 
path to do so. More troubling, it is not clear how governments may improve the quality 
of democracy in specific terms. Furthermore, he neglects to adequately separate out 
the procedural aspects of the democratic quality - institutions, contestation, 
participation - and instead prefers to lump, as Przeworski, et al (2000) puts it, “all good 
things together”. While we are given an innovative conceptualization of democratic 
quality, we have no practical way to put it to use and cannot escape problems of 
endogeneity.
Furthering complicating the divide scholarship has created among procedure 
and substance is the conflict that arises between defining and assessing quality of 
democracy solely in procedural terms and the recognition that equality is the means to 
improve the quality of democracy. Many scholars (Dahl 1971; Hill 1994; Przeworski, 
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Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi 2000) choose to study democratic quality in terms of 
procedure rather than substance - and for good reasons. Procedures - contestation, 
participation, political rights - are more easily measured than substantive outcomes. 
Moreover, endogeneity problems arise, such as those discussed above with O’Donnell’s 
argument, from incorporating substantive outcomes, namely equality, into the 
concepts and empirics of democratic quality. However, the choice of procedure over 
substance does not address the fact that many of these same scholars explicitly or 
implicitly acknowledge that expanding equality improves democratic quality. Dahl, the 
founder so to speak of procedural democratic concepts, asserts that “the procedures 
ensuring equal opportunity to participate are dependent on the substantive 
equalization of resources” (Gordon 2001: 27).3
Given this conflict and the state of the scholarship on democratic quality, we 
must ask - are we at a divide? Must we make a choice between the procedural and 
substantive approaches? Not necessarily. Diamond and Morlino (2005) offer us a 
solution. They define quality of democracy in procedural and substantive terms, making 
a clear distinction between the two. They offer five procedural dimensions: 1.) rule of 
law, 2.) participation, 3.) competition, 4.) vertical accountability, and 5.) horizontal 
accountability. In addition, they offer two substantive dimensions: 6.) respect for civil 
and political freedoms and 7.) progressive implementation of greater political (and 
underlying it social and economic) equality. The final dimension links democratic 
                                                          
3 In reference to A Preface to Economic Democracy (Dahl 1985).
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procedure and substance: 8.) responsiveness. Government responsiveness ensures that 
public policies correspond to citizen demands and preferences. 
Diamond and Morlino give us a framework that incorporates both procedure 
and substance into our assessment of democratic quality without muddling one with 
the other. But, we still have a problem - how do we empirically trace the concepts? A 
series of comparative studies are offered by the editors to empirically assess their 
conceptual framework of democratic quality. While these cases are illustrative, they fail 
to provide us with clear measurements of the concepts at hand. On this Diamond and 
Morlino admit their shortcomings, arguing that their framework “implies a pluralist 
notion of democratic quality”, that there are “tradeoffs and tensions among the various 
dimensions of democratic quality”, and that “democracies will differ in the normative 
weights they place on the various dimensions of democratic quality (for example, 
freedom versus responsiveness)” (page xii). They assert: “There is no objective way of 
identifying a single framework for measuring democratic quality, one that would be 
right and true for all societies” (page xii). If we are left without a single framework for 
democratic quality, are we back at our divide? 
I contend that we do not have to abandon an empirical exploration of 
democratic quality in both procedural and substantive terms.  If we return to the basic 
assumptions of democratic quality - that contestation and participation are at the heart 
of democratic politics and that equality is a substantive outcome of and contributor to 
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democratic quality - then we can trace the quality of democracy through procedure and 
substantive outcomes. By doing so, we also have a framework that articulates what 
scholars agree upon - expanding equality improves democratic quality. 
Conceptualizing Democratic Quality as a Virtuous Cycle 
I offer a theoretical framework that bridges the divide between procedural and 
substantive approaches by conceptualizing democratic quality as a virtuous cycle that 
begins with the procedural aspects of democracy to produce substantive opportunities 
and outcomes. Building on past scholarship (O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 
2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005), I assert that democracy in terms of political 
contestation and participation results in equality. In turn, expanded equality increases 
individuals’ capacity to politically participate, which contributes to the development of 
democracy. To explore this theoretical frame, I trace the quality of democracy through 
public service provision in three separate but related analyses.
Overview of Theoretical Framework
The quality of democracy may be conceptualized as a virtuous cycle where the 
procedural aspects of democracy generate substantive opportunities and outcomes 
that in turn affect democracy. Specifically, democracy in terms of contestation and 
30
participation affects equality, and equality feeds back into democracy, as shown in 
Figure 2. Democratic competition and participation compels politicians to pursue the 
expansion of equality; these policies are implemented effectively through sufficient 
government capacity. In turn, the broadening of equality improves democracy by 
developing opportunities for political participation. 
Following Dahl (1971), Hill (1994), and Vanhanen (2000) I adopt two procedural 
dimensions to define democratic quality: political contestation and participation. 
Healthy political contestation ensures that citizens have options in choosing political 
leaders and policies, and healthy political participation indicates that citizens are 
engaged in their political system, thereby making democracy meaningful. I choose to 
exclude political rights as a procedural dimension and instead assume that sufficient 
political freedoms are encompassed in participation. Higher levels of participation 
indicate that most citizens have the right and opportunity to be politically active. 
Figure 2: The Quality of Democracy as a Virtuous Cycle
Government Capacity
        DEMOCRACY          EQUALITY
    Procedural approach              Substantive approach
              Political Participation
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I contend that the translation of democracy into equality is conditioned by 
government capacity. Democracy is limited in what it may achieve by its state’s 
capacity (Tavares de Almeida 2004: 213). In other words, government capacity is 
needed for effective policy implementation. Policies are made by politicians and 
political leaders whom in a democracy are cued by citizens’ expressed preferences. 
Without sufficient government capacity, policy outputs do not become the intended 
outcomes and citizen input is lost. On this Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (1997) 
note, “The greater the state’s capacity to implement policies effectively, the greater the 
degree to which citizens’ mobilization and participation will translate into influences on 
social outcomes, certeris paribus.” (1997: 328). While is it important to include 
government capacity in the theoretical framework, it is equally important to 
conceptually separate government capacity from democratic procedures. Making the 
mistake to include the former as a component of the later bases democratic quality on 
“performance criteria that often have little or nothing to do with democraticness” 
(Plattner 2005: 79). 
In sum, the first part of the virtuous cycle links sufficient and high levels of 
democracy and government capacity to greater equality. In a competitive democracy 
with high levels of participation, policies to address inequalities, particularly those of 
education and basic standards of living, emerge. The quality of government capacity 
determines how effectively these policies are implemented and ultimately how 
effectively inequalities are reduced. 
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Why equality as the result of democracy and government capacity? Equality is a 
broad concept that may be applied to a myriad of specific opportunities and outcomes 
that are of concern to scholars and policy-makers, including economic disparities, 
political discrimination, and gaps in standards of living. Beyond this utility, it is clear 
that equality is important to government leaders and citizens. Surveys (World Values 
Survey) and anecdotal evidence points to the reduction of poverty, lack of education, 
and poor sanitation and water conditions as chief concerns of average citizens all over 
the world. Finally, expanding equality is a clear path to improving the quality of 
democracy. Diamond and Morlino (2005) note: “For those who lack effective political 
skills and resources - be it because of poverty, illiteracy, discrimination, or other forms 
of marginalization - democracy is always liable to be seen as lacking quality. Leveling 
such inequalities, giving a voice to the voiceless, and bringing all citizens more fully into 
the arenas of civic participation and political competition remain the most enduring 
and difficult challenges for the deepening of democracy.” (2005: xi).
How democracy is translated into equality brings us back to political 
contestation and participation. Policies to reduce inequalities are the results of political 
choices that stem from citizens’ expressed preferences. No government will 
independently reduce inequalities because these policies are redistributive and costly.  
Breaking from the “endogenous, self-reinforcing political process” of inequality 
requires: (1) the powerful to “see that it is in their interests to implement reforms 
whose benefits are more inclusive”, or (2) “the balance of power in the political process 
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shifts in a manner that enhances the relative power of other groups” (Echeverri-Gent 
2009: 635). While electoral competition may encourage the former, the latter generally 
is accomplished when the poor, lower classes or autonomous groups such as trade 
unions and political parties representing this social stratum - usually the left - are 
mobilized (Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1997; Diamond and Morlino 2005). 
Huber, Nielson, Pribble, and Stephens (2006) find that a left-leaning balance of power 
in the legislature is associated with lower inequality. Similarly, Beal (2009) argues that 
the presence of a large high skilled labor force induces welfare spending in 
democracies. 
Reducing inequalities in political, social, and economic areas of individuals’ lives 
expands their opportunity to be active democratic citizens. Sufficient education and 
health, the ability to mobilize, and the freedom from clientelistic influences4 are all 
needed to participate fully in a democracy. These are obstructed by poverty, illiteracy, 
lack of health and education services - all of which must be addressed to deepen 
democracy (Diamond and Morlino 2005). These obstacles pose serious challenges to 
political participation in developing countries. And it is particularly in this context that 
the reduction of inequalities has the greatest effect on expanding political participation. 
In the developed world, many of these obstacles have long been overcome. While 
                                                          
4 Ippolito (2004) in his comment on O’Donnell’s substantive framework for democratic quality notes that 
reducing socioeconomic inequalities are imperative for citizen autonomy from clientelistic handouts. 
Citizens that severely lack resources are likely to be persuaded by clientelistic goods, essentially trading 
their electoral support for economic benefits. Reducing socioeconomic inequalities improves the quality 
of democracy in this context by giving citizens the opportunity to be free from a patron’s influence and 
freely chose political leaders based on their political beliefs, not economic necessity. 
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equality may be historically linked to political participation in developed cases, today it 
is in the developing world where the expansion of equality can affect political 
participation. 
The broadening of social welfare benefits, advancement of civil liberties, and 
reduction of economic inequalities expands opportunities for political participation, 
and increased participation feeds back into the democratic process. Higher levels of 
political activity deepen political competition as parties and politicians vie for political 
support. Increased political participation incorporates sectors of society that may have 
been previously marginalized into the political process, thereby enhancing the 
democraticness of the policy-making process. In all, expanding equality develops 
political participation, which de facto improves the quality of democracy.
In sum, I contend that there is a virtuous cycle between democracy and 
equality. Democratic contestation and participation - mediated by government capacity 
- are translated into the expansion of social, political, and economic equality. In turn, 
increased equality broadens individual political opportunities that feed back into 
democracy through political participation. Improving the quality of democracy lies in 
the reduction of inequalities and hinges on political participation. 
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Empirical Notes Regarding the Virtuous Cycle Framework
There are several empirical caveats to clarify regarding the theoretical 
framework presented above. One, this framework conceptualizes democratic quality as 
continuous; each component may be expressed - in abstract and empirical terms - in 
degrees. Second, this framework should be understood as a story of improving
democracy, not as a tool for assigning values of democratic quality to nation-years. The 
virtuous cycle is about tracing the quality of democracy through equality. Democratic 
quality is conceived as a process that is about the struggle to determine social and 
economic policies and to shape the distribution of benefits across groups (Diamond and 
Morlino 2005: xxvii), not as a static regime characteristic.
Three, the relationship between democracy and equality as well as government 
capacity and equality is assumed to be curvilinear. High and low levels of democracy 
are theorized to be associated with low levels of inequality. The same applies to 
government capacity. This is due to the nature of equality. By definition equality 
indicates fairness, evenness, sameness.  Undemocratic governments with little capacity 
are likely to produce policy outcomes that are equal in nature but limited in quantity 
and quality. Disparities among society are small because there is little to go around. 
Figure 3 illustrates these curvilinear relationships.
Four, the virtuous cycle framework builds in endogeneity. Participation is 
endogenous to democracy and vice-versa. Democracy in procedural terms includes 
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participation, and the outcome of democracy is ultimately participation as a result of 
expanded equality. It is important to tread carefully with the empirical estimation of 
these relationships. One way to deal with the endogeniety is to model the cycle as a 
system of equations; however, this method requires a greater degree of certaintiy of 
the existing relationships. Because  I am testing this theoretical framework for the first 
time, I choose to model the virtuous cycle in separate pieces and test for reciprocal 
causation.  This method allows us to tease out the causal relationships that exist and be 
more confident in the empirical results.
Figure 3: The Curvilinear Relationship of Democratic Quality and Equality
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Five, expanding equality as a substantive result of democracy conceptually 
means broadening benefits to reach more of the population. We can easily imagine 
benefits as a pie, and distributing the pieces equally means dividing the whole into 
even parts. Conceptually equality is straight-forward; empirically, equality becomes 
problematic. I suggest using subnational data to measure gaps between the benefits 
received by sectors of society as an indicator of equality. Possible data sources include 
state or local government reports, agency reports for regional operations, and 
individual-level survey data that may be aggregated to a geographical unit. Measuring 
equality is important because it allows us to trace the virtuous cycle in practice and 
empirically test its tenants. While previous scholarship has asserted the necessity of 
equality in our assessment of democratic quality (O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 
2004), we were not given a clear method to empirically do so. Measuring equality as 
the difference of benefits distributed across geographical units gives us a way to 
incorporate this substantive outcome into our empirical study of democratic quality.
Tracing Quality of Democracy through Public Services
The purpose of this study is to explore how democratic quality may be improved 
by equality. I trace the quality of democracy specifically in terms of the equality of 
public services. Basic public services including education, healthcare, sanitation, and 
clean water are essential to building the individual capacities needed of a democratic 
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citizen (Sen 1999; Diamond and Morlino 2005). Uneducated, unhealthy individuals are 
unable to fully participate in politics because they lack the political skills and resources 
to do so. Building on past studies that assert an association of democracy and levels of/ 
spending on public services (Sloan and Tedin 1987; Brown and Hunter 1999; 
Przeworski, et al. 2000; Kaufman and Segura 2001; Ghoborah, et al. 2004; Brown and 
Hunter 2004; Avelino, et al. 2005; Stasavage 2005; Huber, et al. 2008), I contend that 
higher quality democracies more equally distribute basic public services. In turn, I 
assert that these services encourage political participation. 
To test how public services contribute to the quality of democracy, I explore 
empirical associations of democracy, government capacity and service equalities on the 
global level using national aggregate data. Because public services are largely the 
responsibility of local governments all over the world as a result of decentralization 
policies, I also examine the same relationships on the local government level using case 
studies. I hypothesize the following:
1. Higher quality democracies distribute public services more equally 
than do lower quality democracies.
2. Better government capacity in conjunction with quality democracy 
results in more equal provision of public services.
I also explore how the provision of public services affects political participation. I 
examine the relationship between evaluations of public services and political 
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participation using individual-level survey data for Latin American countries. I 
separately model this relationship for countries with high democracy and high capacity 
and those with low democracy and low capacity as well as combinations of the two. I 
assume that good evaluations of public services indicates that an individual has 
received the service, consumed the service, and benefits from the service. Poor 
evaluations indicated the opposite. I hypothesize:
3. Good evaluations of public services increases political participation.
These three analyses test the virtuous cycle by separating it into testable, but 
related parts. Approaching the study of democratic quality in this manner gives us a 
comprehensive picture of one way to improve the quality of democracy through the 
provision of basic public services. In the following chapters, we gain traction on how 
democracy and government capacity are linked to equalities in public service provision 
on both the national and local government level. In addition, we explore the individual 
side of the story by examining how public services are related to political participation. 
In all, this project is a rigorous test of the theoretical framework I have offered and
demonstrates that equality is a critical component of democratic quality by tracing the 
outcomes of democracy on public service distribution and the consequences of public 
services on democratic participation. 
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CHAPTER III
A GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC QUALITY, 
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, AND EQUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
Equality, to borrow Hill’s phrasing, represents “the promise of democracy” -
“what we hope will be the consequence of having a truly democratic government”(Hill 
1994: 5). To trace how the promise of democracy is achieved, we turn to the theoretical 
framework offered in the previous chapter - the framework I term “the virtuous cycle” 
between democracy and equality. The first part of the cycle asserts a theoretical 
relationship between democratic quality and equality in terms of substantive 
outcomes. To test this association, we focus our attention on one particular type of 
equality - public service distribution. This chapter presents the first analysis of the 
relationship between democratic quality and public service equality.
To test the virtuous cycle presented in the previous chapter, we begin by 
examining the first link running from democracy to equality. Specifically we start with 
hypothesis 1 and 2 that assert higher quality democracies more equally distribute basic 
pubic services than lower quality democracies and that government capacity is needed 
for high quality democracies to achieve this end. Because the first part of the virtuous 
cycle builds heavily on the literature linking regime type with social welfare spending 
and outcomes, the first section of this chapter reviews this work. This literature 
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generally links democracy with spending on services. I make the case that we should 
consider equality of public services rather than spending. Following this, the model 
used to test the relationship between democratic quality and equality is outlined, 
including variable measurement and methods. Next the empirical results are presented 
of this model as well as an additional model that examines the correlation of 
democratic quality and public service equality over subnationally and overtime. In all, 
the findings support the hypotheses by showing that the quality of democracy is 
positively related to public service equalities and that government capacity does play a 
role in this association in some cases. 
Regime Type and Public Services: Past Research and the Case for Inequality
Studies examining the relationship between democracy and public services have 
soundly linked regime type with spending on or levels of education, healthcare, and 
social services. Higher quality democracies tend to spend more on public services and 
in turn have more educated and healthy populations than lower quality democracies or 
non-democratic regimes. Politicians are motivated by electoral competition to broadly 
distribute public services in order to secure bases of support; higher quality 
democracies are typically more competitive, therefore we see more spending on and 
greater levels of education, healthcare, and social services in these regimes. 
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Why public services? Studies have shown that the provision of basic public 
services is what citizens want (Brown 1999; Grindle 2000; World Bank Report 2004), 
and theorists like Sen assert that it is what individuals need to be effective democratic 
citizens. Basic public services are critical for “effective participation” in political activies 
(Sen 1999). Access to and consumption of public services equips citizens with the 
health and skills needed to participate politically. Basic healthcare, clean water, and 
adequate sanitation ensures that individuals are capable to politically participate.
While studies have soundly linked regime type to spending on or levels of basic 
public services, they have largely neglected a more nuanced story of regime type and 
public services that hinges on the patterns of service distribution. If politicians in 
democracies are truly motivated by electoral incentives, we should see more uniform 
patterns (or lower inequalities) of service provision in higher quality democracies. 
Political candidates provide services in order to secure support; they extend service 
provisions to new groups to expand their support base. This service provision mobilizes 
(via capabilities cultivated by basic services) previously disenfranchised groups, that 
further demand more services. The cycle goes on and on. In high quality democracies, 
this cycle would have occurred numerous times over many years; therefore, we would 
expect to see patterns of more equal service provision in these regimes. To capture this 
story of regime type and services, it is necessary to consider equality of service 
provision. Before further discussing this measure, let’s first review in more detail the 
past work on regime type and public services. 
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Past Research
Analyses of regime type and public services found evidence that democracies 
spend more on and have higher levels of basic welfare. These studies couch democracy 
largely in terms of electoral incentives, linking higher spending on public services to 
electoral pressures. Some conceptualize and measure democracy as dichotomous while 
others frame it as continuous, as in the quality of democracy.
The general logic of this body of literature asserts that elections motivate the 
provision of public services in democracies. Electoral incentives in the form of 
reelection (Mayhew 2004) or party benefits - in the case where reelection is prohibited 
(Solt 2004) - motivate politicians to be responsive to voters who largely want, as studies 
have shown, basic services like education, health care, paving roads, and repairing 
schoolhouses (Brown 1999; Grindle 2000; World Bank Report 2004). Elections, the 
argument goes, compel politicians to widely distribute public goods and services in 
order to broaden their electoral support, and research has shown that democracies 
spend more on and provide higher levels of basic services. 
Lake and Baum (2001) examined a global sample of countries across the period 
1975-1990 and find that democratically-elected governments are associated with 
higher levels of education and health. Similarly, Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2003) find 
that democracy leads to improvements in numerous dimensions of health and welfare, 
including life expectancy and nourishment of the population. Evidence from the 
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developing world has found robust evidence that democracies positively affect 
education and health.
Studies focusing on Latin America specifically support that democracies in this 
developing region tend to place more importance on education and health than do 
autocracies. Examining 17 Latin American countries across the 1945-1980 time period, 
Ames (1987) finds that increased electoral competition is correlated with increased 
social spending. However, he notes that the poor are not always the beneficiaries of 
these expenditures; often middle-class and regional constituencies are targeted by 
social spending. Similarly, Sloan and Tedin (1987) in their study of 20 Latin American 
countries from 1960 to 1980 analyze the relationship between regime type, regime 
age, and policy outputs. Their results show that democratic regimes perform better 
than authoritarian regimes on health and educational measures. Brown and Hunter 
(1999) evaluated social spending for 17 countries in Latin America between 1980 and 
1992 and found that democracies are sensitive to demographic changes in (and 
subsequent pressures from) the electorate. Social spending increased as the population 
above 55 years of age grew. Most recently, Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens (2008), 
analyzing 18 Latin American countries for the period 1970 to 2000, found that 
democracy - regardless of the ideology of the ruling party - positively influences 
spending on education and health. In addition to these findings from Latin America, the 
effect of democracy has been particularly evident in the area of education. 
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Many scholars have explored the link between democracy and education, 
concluding that “directing resources toward education is a particularly effective 
strategy” for broadening electoral support (Brown 1999: 24). Analyzing a global sample 
for the years 1960-1987, Brown (1999) finds that democracies spend more on 
education but the difference between democracy and authoritarianism subsides as per 
capita income levels increase. Once a certain level of income is achieved, countries 
succeed in achieving universal enrollment in primary school. Further exploring income 
differences, Ansell (2008) examines 113 countries for the years 1960-2000 and finds 
that democracies in the developing world are associated with shifts in spending from 
tertiary to primary education while in the developed world democracies target 
spending to higher levels of education. In line with this finding, Brown and Hunter 
(2004) provide evidence that Latin American democracies have spent more on primary 
education, and Stasavage (2005) found that African democracies, particularly those 
governments subjected to multiparty competition, invested more in primary education. 
Studies have also shown that this holds for state governments as well. Hecock (2006) 
analyzed the effects of democracy on the subnational level in Mexico, finding that 
greater electoral competition is linked to higher expenditures on education services.
46
The Case for Inequality 
While research has soundly linked democracy to social program spending and 
increased levels of health and education, no studies have tested how distribution of 
public services is affected by regime type. To fully capture the distribution of services as 
a result of regime type and truly test if democracies generate incentives for politicians 
to expand their electoral base via the broad distribution of public services, I contend 
that we should examine public service equality rather than spending on services or 
levels of service areas.
Public service equality more adequately captures the distribution of benefits 
across the population than spending or levels of services because it takes into account 
subnational variation. Aggregate estimations of social welfare spending or national 
levels of education, for example, do not reflect the pattern of service delivery across a 
nation. It is imperative to that we shift our thinking from national averages to 
subnational patterns of delivery because public services are generally managed, 
financed, and distributed at lower levels of government. 
To illustrate the importance of service inequality rather than service program 
expenditures or aggregate levels of service coverage, consider two countries that were 
reported to have similar expenditures on education and approximately the same 
average female literacy rate but divergent national inequalities - Egypt and Malawi. 
According to the World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI), in 2005 education 
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expenditures as percent of GDP totaled 4.79% in Egypt. For the same year, 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) reported an average of 63% of Egypt’s female 
population was able to read and write. However, this average masked a deep inequality 
in Egypt’s promotion of women’s education. While female literacy peaked at 78% in the 
urban region of Lower Egypt, only 37% of females in the rural region of Upper Egypt 
were reported as literate. Considering that Egypt’s was rated as “not free” by Freedom 
House, it is not surprising to observe such large basic service inequalities. On the other 
hand, female literacy in Malawi was reported in 2004 to average 66% with the highest 
rate of 78% in the Northern region and the lowest rate of 59% in the Southern region 
(DHS). Malawi’s average is nearly equal to Egypt’s female literacy rate and its 
expenditures on education as percent of GDP were comparable at 4.22% (WDI), but its 
service coverage inequality is considerably lower. Although Malawi was rated as “partly 
free” by Freedom House in 2004 due to growing government corruption, its democratic 
institutions set it apart from Egypt at the time. On the Polity scale of democratic 
institutions that ranges -10 (completely authoritarian) to 10 (completely democratic) 
Malawi scored a 6 while Egypt was given a score of -3. This underscores that the 
democratic institutions, particularly contested elections, present in Malawi but absent 
in Egypt ensured that citizens could express preferences about alternative policies and 
leaders. It may be the case that as a result of this electoral connection Malawi 
distributed education services more equally than Egypt, indicating that service 
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inequality rather than expenditures or aggregate levels of service coverage best 
captures the distinct pattern of service distribution by democracies.
The distribution of public services rather than the amount spent more fully 
explains how regime type effects social policy because it captures how democracies 
expand collective options to more fully incorporate all citizens into the process of 
political participation. The quantity of social expenditures and the levels of education 
and health are important outcomes of democratic institutions and practices but do not 
inform our understanding of the manner in which social services are delivered and how 
these patterns may affect political participation. High quality democracies should 
deliver services more equally than lower quality democracies because electoral 
competition should be greater in former context, motivating politicians to spread 
benefits to a larger proportion of the population in order to gain support in the next 
election. This more equal provision of basic services expands opportunities of 
participation for those parts of the population previously marginalized. In turn, greater 
political participation improves the quality of democracy. Focusing our attention to 
inequalities of service provision rather than aggregate expenditures or levels of services 
best explores the linkage between democracy and public services, particularly in cases 
of developing democracies. 
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Modeling the Democracy-Equality Link: Measurement and Methods
To adequately test the link between democratic quality and public service 
equality, we need sound measures that do not conflate one with the other. To this end, 
I constructed a measure of quality of democracy based on political contestation and 
participation. Also, I created a measure of service inequalities for three policy areas: 
education, healthcare, and sanitation. The following section outlines these variables 
and explains the model and methods I use to estimate the effect of democratic quality 
on public service equality. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in 
Appendix A.
Democratic Quality
Following Dahl (1971), Hill (1994), and others, I focus on two aspects of quality 
of democracy: political contestation and political participation. I created an additive 
index of democracy that combines measures of political competition and political 
participation. Similar to Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002), the measure of political 
competition I use reflects the balance of power between political parties in the national 
legislature. To measure political participation, I use voter turnout reports. This additive 
index of democracy is comparable to commonly used measures of democracy, 
including Polity and Freedom House; the correlation between my index and these is 
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approximately 0.50.5 While comparable, my measure is a better choice for this study 
because it has the advantage of including both political competition and participation 
while excluding substantive outcomes. Polity measures democracy based on 
institutional factors and largely neglects political participation; Freedom House includes 
a wide array of substantive outcomes such as gender equality and economic equality 
that could potentially overlap with variance of the dependent variables analyzed. 
Because I have chosen to focus on political competition and participation as the key 
aspects of democracy (as linked to public service provision), I chose to create an index 
of democracy from existing data.
The political competition measure is based on the Database of Political 
Institutions indicator of legislative margin of majority, which is the fraction of seats held 
by government. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total 
seats. With the idea that a perfectly balanced legislature - one where the seats held by 
the political party of the head of state is equal to the seats held by the opposition party 
or parties - is most democratic and reflects a highly competitive political context, I take 
                                                          
5 The additive index of democracy that I constructed is measured at two time points - the election prior 
to the available service inequality data and the election following the service time point. The correlation 
between Polity and my measure of democracy, time 1, is 0.516, time 2, 0.5408. The correlation between 
Freedom House and my measure of democracy, time 1, is 0.4913, and time 2, 0.5579. The low 
correlations are most likely due to the difference in variable components. Polity lacks a measure of 
political participation, which is included in my additive index, and Freedom House includes many 
substantive outcomes that I explicitly exclude from my measure. Regardless of these differences, I am 
confident that I have created a sound and simple measure grounded in democratic theory - one that can 
directly test my theoretical framework. 
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the DPI indicator of the legislative margin of majority6 and subtract it from 0.5 to gauge 
the distance between the government party’s fraction of the seats and a perfect 
balance between ruling and opposition parties. I then take the absolute value, multiply 
it by 2, and subtract from 1 in order to make the scale range from 0 to 1 with 0 
indicating a nondemocratic balance of legislative power (the ruling party holds all seats) 
and 1 indicating a perfect balance of power between the government’s party and the 
opposition party or parties. (Appendix B provides the formula and a specific example of 
the construction of this variable.)
Political participation is measured as voter turnout for legislative elections. The 
data were obtained from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance. Additional sources were consulted for both political contestation and voter 
turnout including the African Elections Database and the Psephos database.
I combine the political competition indicator (ranges 0 to 1) with political 
participation (ranges 0 to 1) to get a measure of democracy that ranges from 0 to 2. On 
this scale 0 indicates no political competition and no political participation, and 2 
represents a perfect balance of political competition in addition to 100% voter turnout.
Note that both the political contestation and political participation variables 
reflect the state of democracy at election time. Therefore the measures of democracy 
vary only for election years. On off-election years, the value of democracy is the same 
                                                          
6 The variable is termed “Margin of Majority” and is “the fraction of seats held by the government”. It is 
calculated by “dividing the number of government seats (NUMGOV) by total (government plus 
opposition plus non-aligned) seats” (DPI Codebook 2006: 14).
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as the previous election. More nuanced measures of democracy would capture aspects 
of political contestation and participation that vary across years, such as political party 
legislative activity and popular attendance at political meetings and events. However, 
due to data limitations, my measure of democracy is restricted to election years. This is 
similar to the Polity dataset as well as Vanhanen’s measure of democracy. See Figure 4 
for the distribution of values of my democracy index.
Figure 4: Distribution of Democracy Values
Equality of Public Services
Measuring the equality of public service coverage requires multiple subnational 
data points in order to assess the difference between the highest and lowest level of 
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reported services in the country. This is problematic because this type of data is 
typically not reported for countries in the developing world where record keeping is 
generally of poorer quality than in developed countries. Considering that this project 
focuses on the provision of basic public services - services that developing countries 
struggle with providing- it is imperative to include the developing world cases to 
thoroughly test and apply my theory. Therefore, I use aggregated survey data to 
generate regional averages of education, health, and sanitation service coverage for 
each country available. I employ the World Values Survey to create an education 
service equality measure. Surveys from Demographic Health Surveys were used to 
generate a health service variable, and data from the World Bank was used to measure 
sanitation services. All measures of service inequality are based on indicators that 
capture policy outcome in order to fully assess the extent of coverage. Figure 5
illustrates education, health, and sanitation inequality measures across the values of 
democracy and government capacity. 
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Figure 5: Service Inequalities 
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Figure 5: Continued
Education Services
To measure education service equality, I use the World Values Survey question 
that reports the highest level of education achieved by the respondent. Overall, the 
level of education ranged from “no formal education” (coded 1) to “university level, 
with degree” (coded 8 or 9 - depending on the time period). Specifically, for the years 
1998-2004, the responses of level of education ranged from 1 to 8: 
(1) Incomplete primary education
(2) Complete primary education
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(3) Incomplete secondary education
(4) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
(5) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
(6) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
(7) Some university-level education, without degree
(8) University-level education, with degree
For the years 2005-2007, the responses were:
(1) No formal education
(2) Incomplete primary education
(3) Complete primary education
(4) Incomplete secondary education
(5) Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
(6) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
(7) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
(8) Some university-level education, without degree
(9) University-level education, with degree
Level of education is an appropriate way to measure education services because 
it captures policy outcomes. The highest level of education individuals have achieved is 
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a definitive reflection of the importance governments place on providing education 
services. I also considered using primary school attendance rates taken from data 
reported by Demographic and Health Surveys, but chose the World Values Survey 
because it covered a wider range of countries from both the developed and developing 
world and more years, thereby offering more variation on the variables of interest.
I aggregated the individual-level education responses to city size in order to 
group individuals within a geographical unit. City size ranged from small municipalities 
with population under 2,000 to large cities with populations of 500,000 and over. The 
categories of city size are:
(1) Under 2,000 inhabitants
(2) 2,000- 5,000
(3) 5,000- 10,000
(4) 10,000- 20,000
(5) 20,000- 50,000
(6) 50,000-100,000
(7) 100,000-500,000
(8) 500,000 and over
While geographical regions would have been an ideal identifier by which to 
group respondents, city size is appropriate because public services tend to be 
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distributed similarly in the same-sized cities.Smaller cities generally have less revenue, 
more basic governance infrastructures and institutions whereas larger cities are 
typically endowed with more resources and, due to their size, must maintain more 
complex infrastructures and institutions. These differences affect the distribution of 
public services, making city size an excellent unit by which to aggregate education 
levels and estimate the inequality of service coverage. 
Once the education level data were aggregated, I created the inequality of 
education service variable by taking the difference between the highest and lowest 
reported values. Country cases were excluded if less than three city units were 
reported. City units were excluded if less than 30 individual respondents were 
reported. A total of 44 country-year observations were created spanning 42 countries 
for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
Health Services
To measure health services, I used data from Demographic and Health Surveys, 
an international project sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development. I 
selected a question that asks female respondents if they have been assisted in births by 
health professionals. This question captures both the availability and quality of health 
services. If available and easily accessed, it is reasonable to expect mothers to use 
health professionals.  Like the education inequality variable, I created the health 
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service inequality measure by taking the difference between the highest and lowest 
reported service in each country. Again, I excluded cases with less than 30 individual 
responses. The Demographic and Health Surveys are disaggregated in three ways - by 
city, by urban and rural regions, and by geographical region (i.e. north, south, east, and 
west). The disaggregation varies by country, but nonetheless reports salient within-
country variation. A total of 54 country-year observations were generated, covering the 
years 1998, 2000, and 2002-2007. 
Sanitation Services
Sanitation service inequality is measured using data from the World Bank’s 
Health, Nutrition, and Population Database that reports the percentage of the 
population that has access to improved sanitation facilities. According to the World 
Bank, proportion of the population with access to improved sanitation refers to “the 
percentage of the population with access to facilities that hygienically separate human 
excreta from human, animal and insect contact. Facilities such as sewers or septic 
tanks, poor-flush latrines and simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrines are assumed 
to be adequate, provided that they are not public.” 
The data are reported for both the urban and rural populations in each country 
for the year 2000. I took the difference between the lowest and highest reported 
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service coverage for each country. Cases were excluded that solely reported one 
population average, typically urban service coverage.
Government Capacity 
Capacity can be understood as the ability to perform and produce. In the 
context of governments, capacity relates to the state’s ability to implement policy. On 
the most basic level, governments must have sound rule of law to carry out policy. To 
engage in contracts and do business, government and contractors must respect rule of 
law. We can think of contracts in tangible forms such as a contract between the state 
and a construction company to build a road. Contracts may also be abstract such as the 
electoral contract between citizens and political leaders. Regardless of the 
conceptualization of contract, it is clear that the rules of the game must be obeyed for 
policy to be implemented. Governments with high regard for rule of law have greater 
capacity and ability to carry out public policy. 
To measure government capacity I adopt the rule of law scale taken from the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators. The rule of law scale ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 and 
measures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
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(Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 2008: 7).7 Sound rule of law is essential to effective 
policy-making. Without respect for the rules of the game by government, business, and 
citizens, the government lacks the capacity to formulate and implement policy. The 
measure is compiled from a variety of expert surveys and international agency ratings 
from sources such as Global Insight, Political Risk Services, Institutional Profiles 
Database, and World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Survey - to name a few. 
These sources offer evaluations of numerous items including tax evasion, respect for 
law in relations between citizens and the administration, protection of financial assets, 
enforcement of government contracts, popular observance of law, and judicial 
independence. 
Estimating the Effects of Democracy and Governance on Service Inequality
The effects of democracy and government capacity on service inequalities are 
estimated using OLS regressions based on data comprised of an unbalanced panel of 96 
countries covering the period 1998-2007.8 Robust standard errors are calculated to 
correct for heteroskedasticity present in the data. Regressions are estimated for each 
                                                          
7  The World Bank’s Governance indicator of government effectiveness was considered as an alternate 
measure of government capacity, but rejected because it captures the quality of public services which 
introduces a measurement of the dependent variable (distribution of public services) as an independent 
variable. Specifically, the government effectiveness indicator measures “perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi 2008: 7). 
8 See Appendix C for the list of country-years included in each analysis. 
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service area - education, health, and sanitation - in order to explore the possibility that 
democracy and government capacity affect policy areas in distinct manners. Education, 
for example, has been shown to be a particularly effective tool by which to broaden 
political bases of support (Brown 1999), and therefore may reflect that democracy 
influences this policy area differently than healthcare or sanitation. 
Because democracy is expected to have a curvilinear relationship with service 
inequalities, as discussed in the previous chapter, the squared term of democracy is 
included in the model. Both low-scoring and high-scoring democracies are expected to 
be correlated with low service inequalities. In addition to democracy, government 
capacity measured as rule of law and the logged GDP are included in the model. GDP is 
included in order to control for the influence of wealth on service provisions. Wealthier 
countries simply may be able to afford to more evenly distribute public services than 
poorer countries. In sum, model 1 includes the terms democracy, democracy2, rule of 
law, and GDP logged and tests hypothesis 1: Higher quality democracies more equally 
distribute services than lower quality democracies. 
Also to test if government capacity has a conditioning effect on the relationship 
between democracy and public service inequalities, I estimate a model that interacts 
democracy with government capacity measured as rule of law. Again, GDP is included. 
In all, model 2 includes the terms democracy, democracy2, rule of law, democracy-rule 
of law interaction, democracy2-rule of law interaction, and GDP logged; hypothesis 2 is 
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tested: Better government capacity in conjunction with high quality democracy results 
in more equal provision of public services. The next section presents and discusses the 
results of these two models.
Empirical Results: The Robust Association of High Quality Democracy and Low 
Inequalities
The results of Model 1 and Model 2 are presented in Table 1. Hypothesis 1 is 
confirmed, but support for hypothesis 2 is lacking. Democracy demonstrates a 
curvilinear relationship with education and sanitation service inequalities, indicating 
that both low and high quality democracies are associated with low inequalities. 
Government capacity, however, does not exhibit a statistically significant association 
with the dependent variable in any of the models, and capacity does not appear to 
mediate the effect of democracy on service inequalities. Finally, GDP has a negative, 
statistically-significant effect on inequalities for health and education services, 
indicating that more wealthy countries can afford to more widely distribute these 
services.9
                                                          
9 The same models were estimated using The World Bank’s government effectiveness indicator as a 
measure of government capacity as well as a capacity measure based on tax revenue per capita taken 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicators, and the results remained the same. In addition, the 
models were estimated using alternative measures of democracy - Polity and Freedom House. The effect 
of government capacity remained the same, but the correlation of democracy and service inequalities 
was not significant. This reflects that my measure of democracy adequately captures the procedural 
aspects of democracy - political contestation and participation - while Polity fails to measure 
participation and Freedom House problematically reflects aspects of the dependent variable, namely 
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Table 1: The Robust Effect of Democracy on Reducing Service Inequalities
Model 1 Model 2
Education Health Sanitation Education Health Sanitation
democracy 7.82 17.41 44.93 8.78 49.18 53.75
(2.19)** (48.83) (15.98)** (3.62)* (50.70) (19.11)**
democracy2 -3.10 -9.99 -16.79 -3.47 -29.18 -20.76
(0.81)** (22.04) (7.35)* (1.33)* (25.29) (8.35)*
rule of law 0.04 6.05 -0.92 -0.19 -7.54 -15.46
(0.16) (4.77) (2.65) (1.80) (41.54) (12.30)
democracy*rule of law 0.10 46.77 34.43
(2.58) (88.36) (22.27)
democracy2*rule of law 0.04 -29.48 -16.56
(0.92) (42.65) (9.42)
GDP logged -0.14 -11.48 -5.47 -0.15 -11.72 -4.95
(0.11) (3.13)** (1.61)** (0.11) (3.29)** (1.63)**
constant -1.89 103.10 37.56 -2.47 94.23 30.29
(1.77) (30.90)** (14.25)** (2.50) (31.40)** (16.21)
n 42 52 91 42 52 91
R2 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.29
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Democracy
I expect that the quality of democracy to be negatively related to public service 
inequalities; that is, high quality democracies have lower inequalities in basic services. 
The empirical findings offer substantial support of this hypothesis. Quality of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
equality. I also estimated the models with additional controls, including rural population as a proxy for 
the complexity of service delivery and subnational taxes collected as a proxy for decentralization with the 
idea that more decentralized democracies have more equal service distributions; the results are the 
same.
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democracy is significantly related to lower levels of education and sanitation services 
inequalities. 
Figure 6: Quality of Democracy Decreases Service Inequalities
The effect of democracy on service inequalities is best illustrated graphically. 
Figure 6 shows the predicted values of education services and sanitation services across 
the values of democracy2. Note that the left vertical axis corresponds to the range of 
education inequalities, and the right vertical axis denotes the range of sanitation 
service inequalities. Clearly, democracy has a profound impact on the distribution of 
education and sanitation services. Higher quality democracies have much lower service 
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inequalities than poor quality democracies, supporting the theory that healthy political 
competition and participation induce democratic politicians and leaders to more evenly 
distribute services to build electoral bases.10
While education and sanitation services are significantly correlated with 
democracy, health services are not. I conjecture that the null finding of democracy for 
this service area is due to measurement issues. Recall that I measured health services 
as births assisted by health professionals. Unfortunately, this measure is problematic in 
numerous ways. One, births reflect only the female sector of the population. Two, 
assistance by health professional in births entails cultural issues that may make this 
measure different than other more objective measures of health, such as number of 
doctors or clinics. The choice to have a health professional assist a birth is often 
influenced by cultural, religious, and personal factors. Three, it is clear by looking at the
distribution of this measure across democracy and government capacity values that it 
behaves differently than education and sanitation service inequalities (see Figures 5A, 
5B, and 5C). Compared to education and sanitation service inequalities there is less 
variation in government capacity, and smaller inequalities are frequent for mid-range 
                                                          
10 Reverse causality tests were conducted to ensure that the causal arrow runs from democracy to 
service inequality and not vise-versa. To estimate the effect of public service inequalities on democracy, I 
used service inequalities as a “treatment”, regressing democracy time 1 (election prior to service 
inequality measure) interacted with service inequality on democracy time 2 (election following service 
inequality measure). Each service area was examined, and public services inequalities were not 
significant predictors of democracy time 2. This gives us more confidence in the assertion that 
democracy causes service equality. On the other hand, this finding does not lend support to my overall 
theoretical claim that equality should increase the quality of democracy. It may be that the effect of 
service equalities is not visible for many electoral periods. Education equalities, for example, may an 
entire human generation to impact democracy. Future analyses should carefully consider this issue.
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democracies. Moreover, only developing countries are sampled, which may skew the 
results. Further data is needed to explore if health services indeed follow a distinct
pattern or if this particular measure of health services reflects an atypical distribution 
of public services.11
Government Capacity
Although democracy is robustly associated with service inequalities, 
government capacity is surprisingly not. I theorized that government capacity should 
affect the influence of democracy on service inequalities. High quality democracies, I 
expected, require adequate government capacity to implement policies that effectively 
reduce service inequalities. The results of models, however, do not support this 
contention. On one hand, this underscores the importance of quality of democracy in 
                                                          
11 The model was estimated using an alternative measure of health services (inequalities in subnational 
infant mortality rates), and the results were generally the same with no statistical significance of 
democracy or capacity. Clearly, the health service policy area is distinct from education and sanitation 
services. This may be due to the complexity of the policy areas: the higher degree of complexity, the 
more difficult it is to clearly link the service area to electoral payoffs. Therefore, empirically we see a 
sound link between democracy, education and sanitation but not health services. Sanitation services are 
basic and generally a responsibility of local governments. Developing a waste water plant in Municipality 
“X” should have clear benefits for local and regional politicians who supported the project. Education 
services are similar - they are often a shared responsibility of national and subnational governments with 
local government generally taking the lead on the administration of services. It should be clear to voters 
that an improvement in education services is due to the better management of services by local 
politicians. Health services, on the other hand, require a high degree of expertise to develop and 
distribute, and health services are not as clearly designated as sanitation and education areas. Health 
clinics are often tied to both local and regional governments and are generally heavily dependent on 
federal funding, making the electoral connection between services and political support blurred. For 
these reasons, health services may not “behave” like education and sanitation services - the empirical 
link between democracy and this policy area may be weak. More data and analyses are needed to 
explore these conjectures. 
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explaining service inequalities. Even controlling for government capacity, democracy 
accounts for the distribution of basic public services. On the other hand, the results are 
counter-intuitive. Shouldn’t government capacity matter for issues of basic policy 
outcomes like public services? Can politics completely account for the manner in which 
public services are delivered? Further empirical analyses are needed to fully answer 
these questions. 
We must remember that the models I have presented are limited in two critical 
ways that may affect the relationship of government capacity and service inequalities. 
One, they are cross-sectional; only one point in time for each country is represented in 
the data. Therefore, the over-time effect of government capacity may not be fully 
accounted for in the model. It is probable that the effect of government capacity is not 
immediate; results of government capacity in one time period may take multiple time 
units to be realized. Two, the data employed to estimate the models are aggregated at 
the national level. The distribution of basic public services is largely managed at the 
local government level. Consequently, estimating the effect of national government 
capacity on service inequalities may not correctly measure the government capacity 
most closely related to service delivery. I expect that variation in subnational 
government capacity more fully explains patterns of service distribution than the 
capacity of the national government. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that this is 
not the same for democracy, which explains why democracy and not government 
capacity is significant in the models estimated. Policies regarding public services are 
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made by the national government but implemented by lower levels of government. 
Democracy reflects the context in which public service policies are made while local 
government capacity affects their implementation. 
To address these limitations, I examine public service inequalities on the 
subnational level in Mexico for a 5-year time period to test the effect of democracy and 
government capacity over-time. Second, I explore public service delivery on the local 
government level using four case studies of four Mexican municipalities. The results of 
the time-series model are presented in the next section, and the case studies are 
analyzed in the following chapter.
Time-Series Analysis: The Equality of Education Services in Mexico, 2000-2004
Mexico is an excellent case to test the effects of democracy and state capacity 
on public services because there is much variation on the subnational level in terms of 
political party competition, government capacity, and public service outcomes while 
there is sufficient similarity in state institutions so that comparisons are meaningful. 
Mexico is a decentralized federal system with 31 states and a Federal District. The state 
legislatures range from 20 to 75 members. Two-thirds of the seats are elected by “first 
past the post” single-member districts, and the remaining one-third are elected 
through a proportional representation formula (Hecock 2006). In addition to the 
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legislature, each state has a governor who is elected for six years and cannot be 
reelected consecutively. 
While government institutions are consistent across the Mexican states, politics 
vary considerably. Political party competition fluctuated substantially across the states 
during Mexico’s transition to democracy and continues to be heterogenous (Beer 
2003). The variation in political party systems is clearly demonstrated in Figure 7. The 
effective number of parties (ENP) - the number of parties weighted by their seat share 
in the state legislature - is an indicator of party competition and political party system 
stability. Lower ENP indicates that there is less political party competition and that the 
legislature is dominated by just a few parties. Higher ENP reflects greater competition 
among political parties, but also can indicate at extreme values political party system 
fragmentation. Because the range of ENP is below 4 for 2000-2007 for the Mexican 
states, it is reasonable to think of the indicator as party competition. Taken as this, 
Figure 7 shows that political party competition has averaged about 2.5 for the period 
2000-2007 but varied substantially in its minimum and maximum value, indicating that 
party politics diverge across states and time. 
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Figure 7: Variation in Mexican State Political Party Systems
In addition to variation in politics, the Mexican states vary greatly in their 
government capacity. Corruption and disregard for rule of law has dominated politics in 
some states while others have made great strides maintaining or restoring respect for 
the “rules of the game”. The state of Querétaro, for example, has recently tripled police 
salaries, increased police training, and implemented accountability and learning 
systems in efforts to bolster its police force (Mexico Institute 2009). On the other hand, 
the organization Mexican Transparency (2007) reported that the State of Mexico is the 
most corrupt state with the highest incidences of bribery, largely contributing to the 
national toll that cost on average each Mexican home $138 in 2007. 
In all, Mexico offers rich variation on the key explanatory variables in our model 
and, therefore, allows us to rigorously test the effects of democratic quality as 
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mediated by government capacity on public service equality. The following section 
outlines the measurement of the variables used in this test. Following that, the findings 
of the estimation are presented and discussed.
Measurement of Key Variables
I adopt the same model used in the previous regression analysis to estimate the 
effect of democracy and state capacity on public service equality over time and 
subnationally. While the first analysis examined education, health, and sanitation policy 
areas, we are limited to education services in this model. Data indicating the 
distribution of health and sanitation services across the Mexican states and across time 
units were simply not available. Therefore, this analysis focuses on education services 
as predicted by the quality of democracy, state capacity, the interaction of democracy 
and capacity, and state GDP. The construction and sources for the primary variables are 
discussed below. (Note that the data for GDP was taken from INEGI.) (Descriptive 
statistics may be found in Appendix D.) 
Equality of Education Services
To assess how democracy and capacity affect the distribution of public services, 
I adopt a measure of education services taken from the United Nations Development 
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Programme (UNDP) Report (2005) on Mexico that estimates the equality of education 
services. The UNDP indicator is calculated based on the percentage of each state’s adult 
population that is literate and the percentage of students that complete primary school 
(matriculation). This indicator reflects the distribution of education services across the
state. Higher values indicate that more of the state’s population has access to and has 
benefited from education services while lower values reflect that disparities within the 
state in the distribution of educational goods. The indicator is measured on a 0 to 1 
scale. 
Due to the measurement of this variable, I expect a linear relationship between 
democracy and education service equality. Unlike the equality measure used in the first 
regression analysis, lower values do not indicate more equality. Rather, lower values 
simply indicate less of the population has access to and benefits from education 
services. Therefore, a clear linear relationship is expected where higher levels of 
democracy are correlated with higher equality in education services.
Democracy
To measure democracy, I focus again on political contestation and participation. 
Using data taken from the National Electoral Institute (Instituto Federal Electoral), I 
created a democracy measure that is the additive index of party competition for state 
senate seats and voter turnout for the same elections. Party competition is estimated 
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as the margin of victory, calculated as the difference between the percentage of votes 
for the winning party and the percentage of votes for the second-place party. This is 
similar to Cleary’s (2007) measure of political competition for Mexican municipalities. 
The margin of victory is then reversed so that higher values indicate greater 
competition. For example, a margin of victory of 60% winning party votes to 40% 
second-place party votes is 0.2. A margin of victory of 75% winning party to 25% 
second-place party votes is 0.5. The reversed value of the first is 0.8 and the second is 
0.5. Clearly, we can see that the 60% to 40% scenario is a context of greater political
competition, which is reflected by the higher value (0.8) of the reversed margin of 
victory index. This value is then added to voter turnout to create an index that ranges 
from 0 to 2, with higher values indicating higher quality of democracy. Appendix E 
presents figures that indicate the values of democracy for each state for the years 
2000-2004. 
State Government Capacity
A clear indication of a state’s capacity and respect for rule of law is tax 
collection. States that have higher levels of tax revenue have respected the law by 
enforcing tax collection and have populations that in turn respect the law by paying 
taxes. States with low tax revenue do not have similar respect for the law. Therefore, I 
measure state government capacity as the taxes collected by the state government. 
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The data is taken from INEGI. The amount of taxes collected is representative of respect 
for rule of law by abiding by tax regulations. 
Model
To estimate the effect of democracy and state capacity on education services, I 
use a pooled cross-sectional time-series dataset that consists of 31 Mexican states over 
the five years from 2000 to 2004. Studies employing data of this type generally adopt 
the method of regression with panel-corrected standard errors as suggested by Beck 
and Katz (1995, 1996) to correct for heteroskedasticty. However, Beck and Katz also 
caution that this method should not be used if the time components are less than 10. 
Therefore, I cluster by state to correct for any unequal variance across the panels.12 No 
corrections are included in the model for autocorrelation because diagnostics did not 
indicate the need for this. 
Results
Table 2 presents the results of the regression estimating the effects of 
democracy and state capacity on education service equality. The results indicate that 
both democracy and state capacity work on the subnational level across time to 
                                                          
12 Alternative models were estimated, including fixed effects and random effects. The results were 
unchanged.
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positively affect the equality of education services. Higher levels of democracy coupled 
with greater state capacity increase the distribution of education services across the 
state population even while controlling for state wealth, measured as gross domestic 
product. 
Table 2: Analysis of Equality of Education Services in Mexico, 2000-2004
Dependent variable: education index (higher values = greater equality of services across the state)
democracy -0.03
(0.004)**
state capacity -2.56E-11
(0.002)**
democracy*capacity 2.44E-11
(0.000)**
GDP per capita 1.14E-10
(0.000)**
constant 0.85
(0.009)**
n 155
number of groups 31
R2 within .67
R2 between .02
R2 overall 0.03
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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To illustrate how democracy and state capacity interact to effect education 
services, let’s examine the marginal effects plots (Figure 8). The first graph shows the 
marginal effect of democracy on education services across levels of state capacity, 
measured as state taxes collected. We can see that democracy positively affects the 
equality of public services in states with lower state capacity and very high state 
capacity. The second graph shows the marginal effect of state capacity on education 
services across the quality of democracy. State capacity has a significant positive effect 
on the equality of education at the highest levels of democracy. 
Figure 8: Marginal Effects
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Figure 8: Continued
These findings indicate that high levels of democracy are needed for gains in 
equality of education services. Democracy in this specific context seems to compensate 
for low levels of state capacity. In states with high levels of political contestation and 
participation, low state capacity is not a barrier to leveling education equalities. On the 
other hand, state capacity is only effective at increasing education service equality at 
high levels of democracy. It is clear that equality is primarily driven by democratic 
politics, but state capacity is needed to see real gains in education for all the 
population.
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Conclusion
This chapter set out to test the first part of the virtuous cycle running from 
democracy to equality. Specifically, we tested the effect of quality of democracy on 
public service inequalities. We also examined the role of government capacity in this 
relationship. Overall, the empirical analyses supported the contention that higher 
quality democracies are associated with lower service inequalities; however, limited 
empirical support was found for the expected mediating effect of government capacity. 
The first empirical analysis tested the link between quality of democracy and 
service inequalities for three policy areas: education, healthcare, and sanitation. I 
expected, and the findings support, that democracy has a curvilinear relationship with 
service inequalities. The highest and lowest quality democracies are correlated with 
low service inequalities in the areas of education and sanitation. Healthcare was not 
significantly correlated with democracy in any estimations of the model. Government 
capacity, measured as rule of law, was also not significantly related to service 
inequalities. 
To further explore the role of government capacity, the second empirical 
analysis tested the same hypotheses on the subnational level and overtime using data 
on the Mexican states from 2000-2004. This analysis also offered empirical support for 
the relationship between high quality democracy and service equality, but also 
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provided evidence that government capacity plays a mediating role in this relationship 
in the context of high quality democracies. 
In all, the empirical analyses show that high quality democracies are correlated 
with lower service inequalities, and government capacity aids high quality democracies 
in reducing inequalities. These findings underscore that reducing public service 
inequalities is largely dependent on a highly competitive political environment as well 
as a highly capable government. Unfortunately, high capacity cannot substitute for low 
democratic incentives in the distribution of public services. Electoral incentives are 
needed to compel politicians to equally dole out service benefits, and this can only be 
achieved when there is the government capacity to spread these benefits equally. 
The following chapter further unpacks the complex relationships between 
democratic quality, government capacity, and service equalities at the local 
government level through four case studies. It is important to study service delivery at 
this level because it is where public services are distributed. The fieldwork cases 
confirm many of the findings of this chapter but also offer a more nuanced story of 
service delivery that more fully informs our understanding of how democracies 
distribute goods.
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CHAPTER IV
LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND CAPACITY:
ANALYSIS OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN FOUR MEXICAN MUNICIPALITIES
As a result of decentralization policies undertaken in the past decades, 
municipal governments all over the world have been assigned the responsibility of 
public services, ranging from the complex task of education to more minor public works 
such as city lighting. Responsibility entails not only the distribution of these works but 
also the building of infrastructure, the employment of workers, the training of 
technicians, and the management of these services. One Mexican municipal official I 
interviewed emphasized the breadth of this responsibility stating, “Municipalities 
provide everything. When the state congressman comes and says ‘in the next year we 
are going to give you a new bridge’ - who is going to build it? We are going to build it, 
not the state, not the federal government. The masons are going to be from our 
people, the services to that company are going to be provided from us, and the 
immediate political management is going to be ours.” 
Local governments not only have the task of administering public services for 
their populations, but also are the most proximate representatives of government that 
citizens encounter. Municipalities, therefore, have the duty to provide for the political, 
social, and economic well-being of their community. This involves the development of 
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democratic institutions and practices to create a more accountable and accessible local 
government (Grindle 2000; Oxhorn, Tulchin, and Selee 2004; Cheema and Rondinelli 
2007) as well as the careful examination of community needs and the subsequent 
execution of municipal resources to achieve “better levels and quality of life in a 
sustainable way” (Carrera Hernández 2006: 2). Citizens look to municipalities to deliver 
the goods they expect of government, including public services and democratic 
practices (Grindle 2000). 
The previous chapter empirically demonstrated that the quality of democracy 
positively affects service equalities on the national level and that government capacity 
mediates this relationship on the subnational (state) level for the case of Mexico. To 
further explore how democracy and government capacity work together, we now turn 
to analysis of public services on the municipal level. Through case studies of four 
Mexican municipalities built on interviews with municipal officials and government 
records, we will see that democracy and capacity indeed work together in providing the 
incentives and capabilities municipal governments require to broadly distribute public 
services to their populations. This chapter provides a critical piece of the puzzle by 
unpacking how the quality of municipal democracy and local government capacity 
affects the pattern of public service delivery on the most basic level it occurs. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline my hypotheses and explain the 
choice of Mexico as a test case. Second, the history of public service provision in 
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Mexico is discussed. Third, I outline the research design, followed by, fourth, an 
elaboration of the data and methods used in the analysis. Fifth, the analysis is 
presented beginning with discussion of quality of democracy, then municipal capacity, 
and ending with public service outcomes. Each case is reviewed in the following order: 
Tulancingo, Hidalgo; Calnali, Hidalgo; Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon; and Aramberri, 
Nuevo Leon. Sixth, I discuss the generally findings of the case studies, and, seventh, 
offer concluding thoughts.
Expectations
Like the previous chapter, this analysis tests hypothesis 1 and 2, which may be 
summarized as: Higher quality democracies with greater government capacity 
distribute public services more equally than do lower quality democracies. I expect to 
find a positive correlation between democracy, government capacity, and public 
service equality.  Specifically, I expect to find more equality of public services in 
municipalities that are high quality democracies and maintain a high level of 
government capacity. Municipalities where democracy and/or capacity are lacking are 
unwilling or unable to equally distribute services.
There are four possible pairings of quality of democracy and municipal 
government capacity if we consider each on a categorical scale ranging from medium-
high to low.  I chose to couple the medium and high categories together because it is 
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often more evident “what is not” (ie low category) than “what is” (ie medium to high 
category). While there are distinctions between the cases ranked as medium-high and 
high, it is theoretically unclear what effects these grades of democracy or capacity have 
on public service distributions. On the other hand, it is very clear that a lack of 
democratic quality or government capacity is negatively associated with equalities in 
public services. Therefore, there are four pairings between democracy and capacity: 1.) 
medium-high democracy and medium-high capacity; 2.) medium-high democracy and 
low capacity; 3.) low democracy and medium-high capacity; and 4.) low democracy and 
low capacity. 
My expectations for each pairing are summarized in Table 3. In the case of high 
levels of democracy coupled with high degrees of government capacity, I expect high 
equality in service delivery. Municipal governments should be motivated by electoral 
incentives to provide services broadly and have the ability to deliver them. On the 
other extreme in the case of low levels of democracy and low levels of capacity, I 
expect to find low equality in public services. Municipal governments of this type have 
little incentive or capability to evenly distribute public services. In the median cases, I 
expect medium-high levels of democracy but low degrees of capacity as well as low 
democracy and medium-high capacity to produce unequal service delivery. In the 
former case, democratic incentives to expand service distribution may be present, but 
the municipal government is limited in its capacity to actually deliver services. In the 
latter case of low democracy and medium-high capacity, municipalities have little to no 
85
incentives to broadly distribute services, and, therefore, public services may be doled 
out as patronage goods targeted at specific populations. 
Table 3: Expectations of Municipal Service Delivery
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To test these expectations, I turn to an in-depth examination of four Mexican 
municipalities. Mexico is an excellent country to test the effect of democracy and 
government capacity on public service equality because its municipalities are 
substantially varied in terms of political, technical, and economic attributes while being 
structurally similar so that comparisons are meaningful. The following section describes 
the role of Mexican municipalities in public service provision, making the case that the 
municipal level is an important part of the overall puzzle because it is the party 
responsible for delivering basic services to the public.
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History of Municipal Public Services in Mexico
Mexico is a federalist nation with three levels of government: federal, state, and 
municipal. There are over 2,400 municipalities across 31 states. The Mexican 
municipality is comprised of numerous dependent localities and has a principal locality 
- the cabercera municipal - similar to a county seat where the municipal government 
presides. Municipal governments are headed by a municipal president and council -
both elected for 3 year terms - and supported by various appointed officials overseeing 
municipal functions. 
Article 115 of the 1917 federal Constitution designates that the “free 
Municipality” (municipio libre) is the basis of the territorial division of the federation.  
While Article 115 gave municipalities territorial autonomy, it wasn’t until the 1983 
amendment of the same article that municipal governments were given the 
constitutional right to raise revenue and formulate budgets (Carrera Hernández 2006). 
This amendment also established clearly, for the first time, municipal public service 
responsibilities (including the administration and funding of): potable water; sewage 
systems; public safety and traffic, including local road maintenance and road safety; 
street lighting; public cleaning and maintenance, including trash collection and the 
maintenance of parks, gardens, and cemeteries; and supervision of slaughterhouses 
(Rodriguez 1997). Municipalities also assist state and federal governments in the 
provision of education, healthcare, and emergency fire services. Funding for these 
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services comes from the federal government but is supplemented by municipal 
governments. For example, teacher salaries are funded by the federal government but 
the municipal government pays for and oversees the painting and repair of the school 
houses.  In all, funding of services is a mix of federal, state, and local government 
assignments with municipal governments responsible for the administration and 
management of the following services:
 Water and sanitation services
 Road cleaning and maintenance
 Public lighting
 Trash collection
 Education (administration only - funded by federal government)
 Healthcare (administration only - funded by federal government)
The 1983 reform to Article 115 gave municipalities greater fiscal and service 
responsibilities, but municipal governments were not economically or technically 
equipped to handle these new assignments. Municipalities turned to state 
governments for help with the collection of taxes and the delivery of local public 
services (Carrera Hernández 2006). Fiscal support for municipalities was expanded with 
the 1997 federal budget reform, called Ramo 33, that assigned economic resources for 
education, health services, and safety services as well as public infrastructures. The 
funds required coordination with state governments, but it was made clear that the 
transfers of funds would not be subject to political control (Grindle 2007). Further 
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reforms to Article 115 in 2000 gave municipalities the right to impose property taxes on 
parastatal organizations and to assess property values. It also designated municipalities 
as “an order of government,” not just an arm of the administration, which gave local 
governments greater policy-making autonomy (Grindle 2007). 
Today Mexican municipal governments are varied in their administrative and 
fiscal autonomy and capacity. Some are largely dependent on federal and state 
transfers in financing their operations while others generate a large portion of their 
own revenue. INEGI reports that in 2007, municipal revenue from property, income, 
and sales tax ranged from 50 pesos to 800,000,000 pesos. Certainly, municipal 
populations vary greatly as well - the smallest being a few more than 100 and the 
largest totaling over 1.5 billion (INEGI). Nonetheless, the sheer magnitude of the gap 
between taxes collected demonstrates the diversity of government capacity on the 
municipal level in Mexico. 
Research Design
To examine municipal level quality of democracy and local government capacity, 
I conducted interviews with municipal government officials and gathered local archival 
data in four Mexican municipalities.13 I selected Mexico as the focus of this study 
because it offers rich variation of both quality of democracy and municipal government 
                                                          
13 See Appendix F for the set of open-ended interview questions. 
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capacity. Historically there is a divide between the Northern and Southern states of 
Mexico with the North being more wealthy, industrialized, and democratic. 
To capitalize on the difference between the North and South that exists in 
Mexico, I selected the Northern state of Nuevo Leon and the Southern state of Hidalgo. 
Nuevo Leon has close to 4 million inhabitants while Hidalgo has a population of 2 
million (INEGI). In 2004, Nuevo Leon had the highest Human Development Index of all 
32 Mexico states with a score of 0.85 while Hidalgo ranked 27th with a score of 0.76, 
indicating that its life expectancy, literacy rate, and gross domestic product are well 
below that of higher scoring states (UNDP 2005). Highly industrialized, Nuevo Leon has 
strong agri-industry and export manufacturing sectors. In comparison, Hidalgo’s 
economy relies heavily on mining, mineral extraction, and agriculture. And like many 
other Northern states, Nuevo Leon saw turnover of the Institutional Revolution Party’s 
(PRI) dominance with the election of National Action Party (PAN) candidate Fernando 
Canales Clarion in 1997 for governor. Hidalgo has yet to elect a governor outside the 
PRI. Considering these characteristics, Nuevo Leon is representative of the Northern 
states of Mexico and Hidalgo the Southern states. More broadly, Nuevo Leon is 
representative of politically and economically progressive governments in developing 
regions while Hidalgo is similar to poorer, less democratic governments.
In both states, I chose a large and small municipality to study. The size of the 
municipality is an important consideration because large and small municipalities face 
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different supplies and demands for services. Municipalities with a large urban 
population have a greater demand for services but typically also have a greater supply 
of revenue for services produced from larger amounts of federal and state aid and 
business tax revenue than smaller municipalities. While small municipalities may have 
less supply and demand than larger municipalities, the small municipalities face a 
challenge in managing rural populations. Dispersed rural populations makes the 
delivery of services difficult when revenue for resources limited. 
In Nuevo Leon, I picked Santa Catarina as the large case and Aramberri as the 
small case. Santa Catarina is located near the capital city of Monterrey and is the 6th
largest municipality with a population of 259,896. Aramberri, with a population of 
14,692, is a rural locality located 200 miles from Monterrey. In comparison to these 
cases, I chose Tulancingo as the large case in Hidalgo and Calnali as the small case. Like 
Santa Catarina, Tulancingo is located near the capital city of Pachuca. Calnali is located 
100 miles north of the capital city. While Tulancingo, the second largest municipality in 
Hidalgo, has a population of 129,935, Calanali is a rural municipality with a population 
of 16,705 inhabitants. By selecting cases that are similar in proximity to the capital city 
and population size, I am able to more confidently say that any variation in their service 
delivery is a product of local quality of democracy and municipal government capacity. 
The capital city of each state is avoided as a case because these municipalities may be 
exceptional as a result of their capital status.
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In addition to the North-South split and municipal size, I also selected cases to 
be representative of each of the major parties that exist in Mexico in order to avoid 
sample bias towards one party. The two major parties in Mexico are the historically-
dominant PRI and the more right-leaning PAN. Despite advances in political 
competition, these two parties are still the most influential parties in Mexico. I selected 
a PRI and PAN small and large case from both the Northern and Southern state (see 
Table 4) My PRI cases are: Tulancingo 2008 municipal administration (large Southern 
case) and Aramberri 2006 municipal administration (small Northern case). My PAN 
cases are: Calnali 2005 municipal administration (small Southern case) and Santa 
Catarina 2006 municipal administration (large Northern case). Choosing mixed pairs of 
North-South and large-small ensures that ideology or party influence is controlled for in 
my research design. 
Table 4: Control for Political Party of Municipal Administration
Southern State: Hidalgo Northern State: Nuevo Leon
Large case:
Tulancingo
Small case:
Calnali
Large case:
Santa Catarina
Small case:
Aramberri
1999 PAN PRI 2000 PAN PRI
2002 PRI PAN 2003 Coalition(PRI) Coalition (PRI)
2005 PRD PAN 2006 PAN Coalition (PRI)
2008 Coalition (PRI) Convergencia 2009 PAN PRI
Notes: Administrations shown in bold are those that were interviewed. The label “Coalition” indicates that a 
coalition of parties won office, and the primary party is listed in parentheses. The difference in years for 
Hidalgo and Nuevo Leon cases reflects the difference in election cycles.
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In all, my research design takes into account development - both political and 
economic - as well as public service supply and demand. I also incorporate political 
ideology. Controlling for wealth, industrialization, democratization (historical), revenue 
for services, demand for services, and political ideology gives us confidence that 
democracy and government capacity are the mechanisms that produce a change in the 
equality of public services. The next section outlines how I have measured these key 
variables. 
Data and Methods
In each municipality I interviewed politicians and bureaucrats to assess their 
municipality’s quality of democracy and government capacity.14 In these interviews, I 
used the same set of open-ended questions in each municipality to gain insight into the 
local government’s capacity as well as the extent of local democracy from the 
perspective of the governing administration. To supplement these interviews, I 
gathered information from state records supplied by INEGI regarding municipal service 
coverage and municipal economic conditions. Also, I collected data on elections, 
including victory party, percentage of the votes gained by each party, and voter 
turnout, from the Federal Institute of Elections.
                                                          
14 In Tulancingo, Hidalgo, I interviewed a total of 6 appointed municipal officials and 3 elected officials; in 
Calnali, Hidalgo - 6 appointed and 1 elected; in Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon - 7 appointed and 3 elected; 
and in Aramberri, Nuevo Leon - 4 appointed and 2 elected. 
93
To assess local quality of democracy, I focused again on political contestation 
and participation, evaluating municipal political competition and participation as 
indicated by electoral records.15 I also carefully considered interview questions asking 
about political motivations as well as citizen input into municipal government affairs. 
Like previous analyses, quality of democracy can be thought of as a scale with low and 
high ends. More politically competitive municipalities with government officials 
motivated by public service are high quality democracies. On the other extreme, 
municipalities dominated by one party and experiencing low voter turnout in 
conjunction with politicians motivated by patronage gains are considered low quality 
democracies. Electoral competition is a strong motivator in Mexican politics despite the 
fact that there is no immediate reelection. In my own research, I encountered 
politicians aiming for higher state offices from the mayoral position. It is critically 
important for them to maintain strong party ties through good performance as mayors. 
I also found that unelected municipal officials were motivated to please their political 
party because they often took up the same or similar appointed post in a different 
municipality when their party lost office.
To measure municipal government capacity, I turned to more nuanced 
indicators than the previous chapter that focused on rule of law. While rule of law 
                                                          
15Mexico has a history of electoral fraud, particularly under PRI political dominance. The information I 
use in this chapter regarding voter turnout and votes won by each party were taken from the Federal 
Election Institute (IFE). This institute carefully considers electoral fraud and discards votes (and voting 
records) from polling sites that are found to be in violation of electoral rules. Therefore, we can be 
confident in the electoral results presented in this chapter - there should not be misrepresentations of 
turnout or competition.
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adequately captures how a government “does business”, there are more detailed 
indicators that reflect the capabilities of administrations. Specifically, I evaluate 
municipal technical and resource capacities. Municipalities with more technically adept 
employees, more technologically advanced facilities and equipment, as well as greater 
fiscal resources have higher levels of government capacity. These municipalities are 
better able to deliver public services to broader segments of their population. To assess 
municipal government capacity, I relied on interviews questions and financial records. 
With municipal officials, I discussed their experience in government, political ambitions, 
and past work that has prepared them for local government leadership to assess the 
technical capacity of their administration. To tap into resource capacity, I also asked 
about local government resources allocated for public services, the problems related to 
resources, and the manner in which funding is distributed. These questions were 
supplemented with municipal revenue records.
Finally, to evaluate the equality of municipal public services, I evaluated 
education, health, and sanitation service records. I also asked municipal officials to rank 
the quality of their public services and to discuss the distribution of services in general, 
paying particular attention to how certain segments of the municipal population such 
as rural citizens are affected by municipal services.  I also discussed general public 
works such as trash collection and paving streets with municipal officials. While basic 
these services affect the daily lives and well-being of citizens and are indicative of the 
municipal administration’s efforts to improve the quality of public services.
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The following section presents the case findings. I first discuss the quality of 
democracy, focusing on specific aspects of local democracy that foster higher political 
competition and citizen participation. Second, I outline municipal government capacity, 
specifically evaluating each municipality’s fiscal and technical resources. Third, I assess 
the equality of public services in each case, examining in turn education, health, and 
water/sanitation services. Public works projects are also considered. Finally, I conclude 
with a discussion of the findings that synthesizes the most critical themes of the case 
studies.
Quality of Local Democracy 
To assess the quality of democracy, I again turn our attention to political 
contestation and participation. Like the previous analyses, I measure contestation as 
electoral competition and participation as voter turnout. To more deeply explore these 
components I also consider electoral incentives and citizen input into the public service 
delivery process. In all, three categories are examined: 1.) political 
contestation/participation, 2.) electoral incentives, and 3.) citizen input. Table 5 breaks 
down each component into measurable pieces that were considered in interviews or 
answered with municipal records. This table also presents the quality of democracy 
rankings of each case on a scale of high to medium-low.
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Table 5: Quality of Democracy Ratings
Southern State/ Less Developed Northern State/ More Developed
Large Municipality Small Municipality Large Municipality Small Municipality
PRI PAN PAN PRI
Tulancingo,
Hidalgo
Calnali, 
Hidalgo
Santa Catarina, 
Nuevo Leon
Aramberri, 
Nuevo Leon
Political 
contestation/
participation
Are there numerous parties to chose 
from? 
High High High Low
Real alternation of political parties in 
power (not just coalition name 
changes)? 
Is voter turnout high?
Electoral 
incentives
Are public service promises part of 
campaigns? 
High Low High High
Do non-elected municipal officials 
perceive fulfilling electoral promises 
(for better/ increased public services) 
as an important part of their job?
Are incentives beyond electoral 
payoffs evident (i.e. making the 
community better)?
Citizen input into 
public service 
delivery process
Is there an institutionalized outlet for 
citizen input? 
High High High Low
How is input/participation 
characterized? Is it 
constructive/community based (as 
opposed to individual solicitation of 
municipality as a patron)? 
Do citizens actively engage in 
community-based public service 
projects?
Overall Rating: High Medium - High High Low
Note: For each category a high rating is given if the answer to 2 of 3 of the questions is “yes”; low rating given if “no” was predominant. For overall quality of democracy, a high 
rating is given if high is fulfilled in all 3 categories; medium-low if high is assigned in 2 of 3 categories; and low rating if low is given in 2 of 3 categories.
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The four municipalities studied vary substantially in the quality of each 
component of democracy. For example, while both Santa Catarina and Tulancingo may 
be considered high quality democracies, Tulancingo’s democracy is limited in terms of 
citizen input into the service delivery process. In all, Santa Catarina, Tulancingo, and 
Calnali are ranked as high quality democracies while Aramberri is ranked as a low 
quality democracy. The following sections detail these rankings. 
Tulancingo, Hidalgo
Tulancingo may be characterized as a high quality democracy. Electoral 
competition and popular participation in elections is healthy. Municipal elections are 
close, and there are meaningful, distinct parties from which to choose. There is a clear 
electoral link betweenpoliticians and citizens with campaigns often built around public 
service issues. Politicians feel motivated to deliver services as a result of this, and 
appointed municipal officials generally cite betterment of the community as their 
motivation to increase the quality and breadth of services. In addition to these 
democratic practices, Tulancingo has a center of citizen input to incorporate 
communities into their decision-making process. However, municipal officials say more 
citizen participation is needed in the process of public services.
Electoral competition is high in Tulancingo. The 2008 election was a close race 
with the coalition of PRI and Nueva Alianza, called “Más por Hidalgo”, winning 36% of 
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the vote and the PRD with 34%. This election was the most competitive election on 
record in Tulancingo since 1999. Not only is electoral competition high in Tulancingo, 
the alternation of political parties in power has been good. In 1999, the PAN won the 
municipal government, followed by the PRI in 2002 and the PRD in 2005. Municipal 
election voter turnout was about 40% in 2008. 
Electoral incentives are mixed in the Tulancingo municipal administration. Those 
officials who are appointed see that public services are important for elections or, in 
their words, are “banners that are waved” during electoral periods, however, electoral 
pressures are generally absent from their daily work. As one official put it, “We work 
because we are citizens from here, we know the people and the people know us.” 
Certainly that does not mean that politics are absent from the process of public 
services in which appointed officials are involved, but it means that the personal 
motivations of appointed functionaries are not focused on elections. 
On the other hand, for those elected officials, including the municipal president 
and the city council members, electoral pressures to address public services are 
evident. Campaigns focus on water, sewer systems, education, and health services, 
among other things. In addition to campaign promises, electoral periods are an 
important time for the current administration to develop public works and services 
prior to elections. On this one official comments, “Here in Tulancingo you can feel the 
release of money from the federal and state governments when elections are coming, 
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and we live in the hope of an election. Because you have elections you have more 
resources to work, you can do many things that in other situations you couldn’t 
develop.”
While electoral incentives and competition is high in Tulancingo, citizen 
participation is somewhat lacking. There are centers located in the municipal building 
for citizen input where individuals may officially submit a complaint or suggestion 
related to public services, specifically, and municipal affairs in general. Beyond this, 
however, citizens typically do not take an active role in politics or in the process of 
public services. This is particularly evident in the areas of water, education, and health. 
Beyond complaints, there is little input from citizens regarding these services, according 
to municipal officials. While feedback is important because it provides guidance to 
municipal officials seeking improvements in service delivery, demands for better 
services do not get things done. Citizen organizations and grassroot movements are 
missing from Tulancingo; as one municipal official put it, “Tulancingo lacks a 
participatory culture.” Another noted, “The community is unwilling to participate, they 
participate thinking, criticizing, but not saying I give this or participate like this.” In all, 
citizen input into the process of public services in largely that of negative feedback. To 
improve services, some officials believe a movement on the part of the citizens to 
proactively organize and address community problems is needed. The problem is that 
this requires resources, and these resources both in terms of economic and human 
capital are lacking from communities. Most communities in Tulancingo are lower 
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middle/working class, and many are rural, poor communities. To meet the needs of a 
community school, for example, is beyond the means of these citizens; free time, extra 
money, or even extra building supplies are not available to citizens with extremely 
limited household budgets.
Calnali, Hidalgo
The quality of democracy in Calnali is good largely due to electoral competition 
and citizen participation. Elections are competitive and progressive - surprisingly so for 
this rural municipality. Moreover, citizens actively participate in elections and 
community organizations. The quality of democracy is limited in the way that the 
municipality relates to the public and incorporates citizen input into policymaking.
Political party competition is thriving in Calnali since the end of PRI dominance. 
In 2002 and 2005 the PAN won municipal elections, and in the most recent elections 
held in 2008, a new party called Convergencia made state history by winning its first 
local seats. Similarly, voter turnout and citizen participation is vibrant in Calnali. Citizens 
have a high turnout record for municipal elections - 45% in 2008 - and have higher than 
state and national turnout levels for federal elections (64% turnout in Calnali versus 
58% nationally and in the state of Hidalgo for 2006). Moreover, community committees 
routinely meet to discuss service issues. The problem is that historically municipal 
officials are not responsive to citizens.
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While the levels of party competition and popular participation clearly indicate 
a healthy democracy, the municipal administration limits how these democratic 
practices are translated into policymaking. Interviews with the 2005-2008 
administration did not indicate that electoral incentives were strong motivators for 
municipal politicians and appointed officials. While every individual interviewed 
claimed that the betterment of the community is an important priority for them, there 
was the general implication that the improvement of public services was not possible 
due to limited resources. Promises may be made in campaigns for improved services, 
but in practice the administration believed substantial progress was simply beyond the 
scope of their abilities. It appeared that true electoral incentives - a fear that not 
delivering on promises made in campaigns will entail political costs - were not evident.
Most municipal officials interviewed agreed that public input has little bearing 
on local government decisions, including those related to services. Therefore, the 
limited scope of political openness in Calnali has not been a product of citizen failure to 
participate, but the result of closed local government doors. Being from an outside 
party, the newest municipal government has political incentives to change this pattern 
of involvement by incorporating citizen input into the service process. This would align 
municipal government practices with the democratic processes of electoral 
competition and citizen participation and offer the promise of improving the quality of 
democracy.
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Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon
Santa Catarina is the most democratic of all the cases. Electoral competition is 
high, and electoral incentives are evident. Also, citizen participation is a critical part of 
the municipal administration’s approach to managing public services. There are several 
programs that have created institutions and outlets to incorporate citizens into the 
process of public services ranging from call centers to file a complaint or suggestion to 
community organizations that contribute to the maintenance and building of public 
infrastructures.
Santa Catarina municipal elections have been tightly contested in the past 
decade. The PAN has dominated the municipal government since 1997, losing only the 
2003-2006 administration to a coalition comprised predominantly of the PRI. Generally 
elections have been two-party competitions - that of the PAN and the PRI (or a coalition 
of parties lead by the PRI) - with the exception of the 2006 election where three parties 
were in tight competition. The most recent election was the most competitive with the 
PAN winning by a margin of less than 1%. Voter turnout for municipal elections is about 
40% in Santa Catarina.
Public services play a more limited role in electoral campaigns than in 
Tulancingo but maintain a central place in campaign rhetoric. Health services are 
among the services most mentioned, according to municipal officials, with promises to 
build new clinics emerging during electoral periods. Other basic services are not as 
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prevalent in campaign rhetoric because the majority of the population has access to 
water, electricity, and sanitation in their homes. Also, the state of Nuevo Leon has laws 
officially limiting specific types of campaigning. Nonetheless, public services are always 
part of the citizen electoral calculations. As one municipal functionary put it, “People 
are going to judge you if there is lighting in their house.”
Citizen participation is an important part of the service delivery process. The 
2006-2009 administration created several new programs that specifically incorporate 
citizens into the delivery of public services. A project called “the Program of Common 
Action” (PAC) was initiated to involve all localities in the development of public works in 
their communities. PAC’s are committees comprised of elected representatives - a 
president, secretary, and treasurer - that coordinate the participation of their 
community to work with the municipal government on projects like painting schools, 
planting trees, cleaning of public areas and abandoned properties, and developing 
parks and gardens. There are 172 PACs in Santa Catarina. 
Other programs were established to address citizen complaints and petitions 
related to public services. One program initiated is “Citizen Attention Centers”. These 
are information booths centrally located in municipal buildings that provide 
information to citizens about services and direct individuals to the appropriate office to 
file a complaint or speak to someone to address a need. In addition to these 
information centers, the administration founded a program called “Direct Line” where 
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the municipal president and secretaries go to communities twice a month to attend to 
individual and/or community petitions. In compliance with the program, the municipal 
government addresses the petitions in less than five days, informing those who filed 
the petition if the service or program requested will be funded or not. 
Aramberri, Nuevo Leon
Aramberri is the least politically developed case of the four studied. 
Paternalistic politics continue to be the way business is done. The PRI has won every 
municipal election for over a decade, and there was evidence in interviews that 
municipal positions were largely used for patronage handouts. Citizen participation also 
followed a patron pattern with most popular input taking the form of individuals 
soliciting the mayor for specific services or goods.16
Citizen participation is predominantly in the form of solicitation of services. 
Individual citizens frequently visit the municipal president’s office to verbally request 
particular services, and written requests submitted by individuals or a group of citizens 
are common. Requests for services and projects are handled differently in the rural 
                                                          
16 Building on the work of Kitschelt (2007), ideally I would test if patronage handouts in the form of public 
services are linked to the vote share of the incumbent party. Unfortunately this data is not currently 
available. With the release of the 2010 INEGI census, data on services by locality will be accessible. This 
information can then be matched with electoral data to test if the municipal administration favors 
certain localities over others based on voter support. This study could be expanded to include all of 
Mexico, although it would be a time-consuming project considering that there are over 2,400 
municipalities with numerous localities each. 
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areas. There, municipal officials are required by state and federal regulations to 
carefully consider each request and prioritize those that promote employment in order 
to prevent migration of rural families to larger cities. While the municipal 
administration gathers these requests and studies them, they are only able to address a 
few - 40 requests were fulfilled of 400 last year. Also, select citizens serve on project 
committees, such as the committee for the new health clinic, or area committees, for 
example, the committee of sustainable rural development. It was implied that these 
citizens are selected from the political elite, not elected. 
Because addressing service needs is one of the primary functions of the 
municipal government from the perspective of the citizens, elections often focus on 
public services. In the last election, campaigns were forged on health services, among 
others. The president commented that he promised to build a new health clinic during 
his campaign for the presidential position, which he was able to accomplish with the 
participation of the state government and federal agencies. 
Although services are an important part of elections, they have not created 
electoral competition. Since 1997, every election has been won by the PRI or a coalition 
of parties comprised predominantly of the PRI. In the past election, electoral 
competition was the highest, with the PRI winning only 52% of the vote share; in 
previous elections the party had won 75% to 92% of votes. In addition to limited 
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electoral competition, voter turnout for municipal elections is low. For the 2006 
municipal election, about 30% of the population voted.
In all there is evidence that the municipality has preserved paternalistic politics. 
Citizens view the municipal administration as a patron, looking for the provision of 
specific services to specific individuals or communities. There is no alternation in 
political power. The PRI has maintained control of the municipal government for 
decades, and as one citizen put it, “Even when there are new [party] coalitions, it is 
always the same people”. Also, it appears that the political elite utilize the municipal 
government as a source of patronage jobs. When asked about future ambitions and the 
possibility of serving again in the municipal administration, many officials replied that 
there is the expectation to permit others in their party and community the opportunity 
to work in the municipal government.  One official commented, “We know that the 
rows of the citizens are many that are expecting an opportunity to work in a municipal 
administration; because in the municipality we don’t have many jobs…We have to leave 
the position so that someone has the same opportunity.” Another noted, “In my case 
one must understand that they already gave us the opportunity and that there are 
companions behind us.” In all, local democracy in Aramberri is limited. Traditional 
patronage politics remains the standard in this rural community.
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Municipal Government Capacity
To evaluate municipal government capacity, I focused on two aspects of 
capacity: technical expertise and fiscal management. To effectively implement policy, 
municipal governments must have experienced, trained individuals as well as adequate 
resources and sound financial management. I examined each of these aspects in 
interviews and through municipal financial records.
Table 6 outlines the questions I focused on to rate each case on its municipal 
government capacity.  I relied on interviews to gain insight into the technical expertise 
of the municipal officials, including questions regarding the recruitment of individuals 
to appointed positions, the education and training of these officials, as well as their 
experience in their respective fields and prior municipal administrations. To assess the 
fiscal resources of municipalities, I used both financial records and interview evidence. 
Specifically, I examined data with regards to revenue sources and tax collection records 
and considered interviews detailing tax collection efforts as well as innovations in 
revenue-raising. 
In all, the cases were not as varied as with the quality of democracy. The smaller 
municipalities of Calnali and Aramberri are rated as low capacity while the larger 
municipalities are rated as high. The small-large split can be explained as an issue of 
revenue, access to technology, and labor pool limitations (Grindle 2007). Smaller 
municipalities have large rural populations that typically evade tax collection, limiting 
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Table 6: Municipal Government Capacity Ratings
Southern State/ Less Developed Northern State/ More Developed
Large Municipality Small Municipality Large Municipality Small Municipality
PRI PAN PAN PRI
Tulancingo, 
Hidalgo
Calnali, 
Hidalgo
Santa Catarina, 
Nuevo Leon
Aramberri,
Nuevo Leon
Technical expertise of 
municipal officials
Are officials experienced in field of 
work?
High Low High Low
Do officials have prior experience 
working for municipal 
governments?
Does the mayor actively recruit 
experienced individuals to fill 
municipal government positions 
(or are jobs handed out on 
patronage basis)?
Fiscal management 
and resources
Does the municipality generate a 
large portion of its own income 
(or does it rely heavily on 
federal/state transfers)?
High Low High Low
Is there evidence of substantial 
local tax collection efforts?
Is there evidence of innovation in 
finding revenue sources?
Overall Rating: High Low High Low
Note: For each category a high rating is given if the answer to the majority of the questions (2 of 3) is “yes”; low rating given if “no” was predominant. For overall quality of 
democracy, a high rating is given if high is fulfilled in all 2 categories; a low rating otherwise.
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their revenue sources, while larger municipalities have big urban populations with 
much local business revenue to tax. Moreover, the small administrations I interviewed 
indicated that they do not heavily pursue tax evaders because they do not have the 
money to pay taxes. Therefore, both tax base and tax effort is lacking in the small 
municipalities.
Further limiting their capacity, the small municipalities I studied had problems 
with attracting qualified, technically-adept individuals to hold appointed positions. 
Officials I interviewed mentioned numerous times that generally inexperienced and/or 
untrained individuals are the only ones willing to take up these posts. In the larger 
municipalities I studied, lack of expertise was the exception among appointed officials; 
most had considerable education, training, and experience in their respective fields. 
Tulancingo, Hidalgo 
Tulancingo’s municipal administration’s capacity is high. This is largely due to 
the technical expertise of the individuals occupying appointed positions as well as 
considerable efforts made to boost tax collection. Despite these advances, Tulancingo 
largely depends on federal transfers for funding.
The government officials comprising the municipal administration have been 
handpicked by the municipal president for their expertise. While the municipal 
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president is a professional politician with ambitions for state congressional office, his 
administration is made of doctors, lawyers, and engineers with education and training 
obtained from institutions outside of Tulancingo and the state of Hidalgo. All of the 
municipal officials handling the management of education, health, water, and public 
works have substantial experience in the respective fields, and none of the officials 
express a desire for further political offices; on the contrary, all have taken their posts 
at the request of the president and plan to return to their respective industries and 
fields upon completion of their term. Only a few of the officials have held prior 
municipal government posts.
While the technical expertise of Tulancingo’s municipal administration is strong, 
they struggle with managing fiscal resources largely due to the lack of municipal 
revenue. The municipal government has few economic resources by which to 
administer public services, relying predominantly on federal and state transfers for 
funding - over 70% of the municipality’s income comes from federal and state sources 
(INEGI 2009). Local taxes and income from other sources like licenses and surcharges 
are limited. Municipal officials admit that local tax and fees collection is poor, citing 
that enforcement efforts need improvement in cases where citizens avoid paying 
property taxes, business licenses and water surcharge fees. However, improved 
enforcement of tax and fee laws is not enough. Tulancingo is a traditional society 
rooted in paternalistic practices in which citizens expect public works and services to be 
given to them without cost. It is essentially a free rider problem for which there is not a 
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simple solution. To combat these cultural expectations, the local water agency has 
launched a campaign to promote the social acceptance of payment for services. While 
these efforts are a good start, much more needs to be considered to improve the 
collection of municipal sources of income and combat the problem of nonpayment. For 
example, the creation of subsidy programs targeted at those who truly cannot afford to 
pay for usage fees is needed. 
Considering that there are few resources to work with in the delivery of 
services, local government officials make considerable efforts to raise revenue. One 
way they generate additional income is through the solicitation of funding by state 
government for specific public works projects. For example, Tulancingo is currently 
proposing a 23 million dollar project related to trash and sanitation treatment. The 
municipality has not managed a project of this scope in the past but is looking to 
generate additional funding for needed projects even if the proposal is somewhat risky 
due to the amount of money requested. 
Another way the municipal administration seeks additional funding is through 
the solicitation of financing by international organizations and association. For example, 
proposals are underway to cover the costs of lighting the municipal cathedrals by 
historical associations. And grant proposals are being considered by international 
environmental agencies on the basis of municipal efforts to reduce and eliminate 
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carbon emissions and contamination. This type of funding has not been pursued by 
other municipalities in Hidalgo, according to the director of planning. 
Calnali, Hidalgo
The capacity of Calnali’s municipal administration is low. Individuals holding 
appointed positions have little experience or training in their respective fields. Few 
have held prior municipal government posts. In addition, Calnali is extremely 
dependent on federal funding and has a poor record of local tax collection.
Calnali’s municipal officials are not career politicians and lack prior government 
experience, which coupled with insufficient funding means the municipal government 
has very little capacity with which to deliver quality public services. The municipal 
government of Calnali is comprised of the elected municipal president, appointed 
directors of specific service areas, and elected city council members. These officials had 
little to no experience in their respective duties and plan to return to their jobs as 
ranchers, teachers, and private industry engineers. None of the municipal government 
officials, with the exception of one, had prior experience in the municipal 
administration, specifically, or in government/politics in general. 
In addition to lack of expertise, there is a large lack of municipal fiscal resources 
for public services. The municipality of Calnali predominantly relies on federal and state 
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government financing with a very small percentage of its income generated locally. In 
2007, federal and state funding comprised 96% of the municipality’s income. Less than 
1,200,000 pesos or $110,000 (USD) was generated from local taxes, usage fees, and 
licenses. Considering that spending that same year on public works totaled over 
10,000,000 pesos, it is clear that the municipality is highly dependent on higher levels 
of government for the administration and delivery of basic public services and works. 
Not only does a lack of municipal investment in public works, education, and healthcare 
mean fewer resources for the delivery of services, it also means that the municipal 
government has little autonomy in the execution of service programs and policies. In 
other words, with the majority of funding for resources being federal or state, the 
municipal is obligated to carry out federal and state objectives with respect to public 
services. There is limited room for innovation and the implementation of projects and 
programs tailored to the municipality.
Significant improvements are needed in the recruitment of qualified, 
experienced individuals for the municipal administration posts and the generation of 
municipal revenue for public service investment. The former requires a better labor 
pool, which may not be obtainable in a relatively isolated, rural community. The latter 
requires considerable efforts on the part of the municipality to enforce the collection of 
taxes and fees as well as to submit proposals to federal and state governments for 
funding of special projects, which is difficult with such limited administrative expertise. 
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Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon
Santa Catarina’s municipal administration is highly capable. The individuals 
holding municipal appointed position generally have both experience in their field as 
well as in prior government positions. This translates into effective administration of 
public services as well as success at securing additional funding for public works 
projects. Resources are sufficient in Santa Catarina largely due to the impressive tax 
collection efforts of the municipal government.
Santa Catarina’s municipal administration is comprised of officials that have 
considerable experience in their respective fields as well as prior experience in 
municipal government. Many have served in previous administrations and have even 
held government positions in other municipalities, including Monterrey, or in state 
agencies and party organizations. Their expertise is impressive, and it is clear they 
understand how to get things done because they have done it before. In the case of 
financial resources - they know how to write proposals, with whom to negotiate 
funding, and which companies can get the job completed. They are highly skilled and 
innovative, which has resulted in improvements and advances in municipal public 
services. 
Santa Catarina has sufficient resources to administer public services, according 
to municipal government officials. A little over half of municipal income comes from 
federal and state sources (INEGI 2008). The rest is primary made of property taxes, 
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licenses, and fees that the municipality collects not only from individuals but more 
importantly from businesses. Collection of property taxes has greatly improved -
municipal officials claim that double the homes now pay taxes than those that paid 
taxes three years ago. Administrators credit increased confidence in the municipal 
government for the increase in taxes paid. One official explains, “They [citizens] say it is 
not worth paying if the government is going to steal the money. But when the people 
see that you begin to work, they begin to pay.” But individual family tax income is not 
enough because most of the municipality is comprised of lower-middle class families 
with little taxable property. Neighboring municipalities with larger middle and upper 
class populations have more tax revenue at their disposal. Businesses make up for the 
lack of property tax income on the part of families. Businesses - restaurants, stores such 
as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, and factories - generate substantial property tax, 
license, and fee revenue for the municipality.  Recognizing the importance of business 
for the municipality’s fiscal health, the municipal administration established pro-
business policies and programs that decrease the financial barriers of entrance on new 
businesses and help citizens start micro-businesses such as bakeries.
In addition to tax income, the municipality is adept at securing state and federal 
funding for special projects such as those mentioned above, including wind energy 
plants and methane gas factories. Proposals for public works projects begin with the 
public works office. There the technical plan for the work is devised, laying out the 
exact details of how the project will be executed. The plan is then sent to the municipal 
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president who delivers the proposal to state and federal offices and negotiates with 
politicians and government bureaucracy to convince them of the feasibility of the 
project and secure funding. Additional revenue gained to finance specific public works 
not only increases municipal income but also can save money in the future for the 
municipality if planned right. For example, the wind energy plan is expected to save 
Santa Catarina 23% on energy bills. 
In addition to revenue sources, the municipal administration places importance 
on the administration of municipal resources. Competent and trustworthy individuals 
are sought out to manage municipal finances. A good fiscal administrator, treasurer, 
and comptroller are essential to the fiscal health of the municipality, according to 
municipal officials. 
Aramberri, Nuevo Leon
Aramberri, like Calnali, is a small municipality suffering from a lack of 
government capacity. The individuals holding the appointed positions of the 
government have little technical expertise and prior experience in their line of work or 
in prior administrations. Resources are extremely limited in Aramberri, and the 
municipal government is heavily dependent on federal funding.
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Aramberri’s municipal administration generally lacks technical expertise. Very 
few municipal officials have worked in previous a municipal administration. Only the 
municipal president and director of planning have served in government position; the 
president was the previous president’s secretary, and the director of planning serving 
in the same position in the last administration. While one official had prior private 
business experience in his administrative area, all others were generally lacking in prior 
experience or expertise in their field. This lack of expertise affects the ability of the 
municipal government to not only do everyday business but also to innovate. Without 
the technical knowledge of how the municipal government operates, particularly in 
conjunction with higher levels of government with respect to public works and services, 
the municipal administration is limited in its ability to propose new projects and secure 
additional funding for public services. Supplemental resources are important to 
advancing the municipality’s delivery of public services, and as the next section 
elaborates, Aramberri greatly needs additional financial support.
Aramberri relies heavily on state and federal resources to provide public 
services. INEGI reports that in 2007 91% of municipal income was generated from state 
and federal sources. Municipal officials blame limited resources on the economic 
capabilities (or lack of) of Aramberri’s population. The predominant economic activity is 
agriculture, which yields little income for families. Also, there is the problem of 
compliance with tax laws. Property taxes, business licenses, and vehicle registrations, 
for example, are ways that the municipality can raise revenue, but avoidance of these 
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taxes and fees by the majority of the population decreases the independent income of 
the municipality.
Public Services
To evaluate the equality of public services, I carefully weighed municipal 
education, health, water, and sanitation records with interviews of municipal officials. I 
considered if the service reached most all of the municipal population and if efforts 
were explicitly being made by the municipal administration to expand services. Also, I 
assessed if services were delivered to historically disenfranchised populations, 
particularly rural or outlying communities as well as women. The specific factors I 
evaluated for each public service area, including education, health, and 
water/sanitation, are listed in Table 7. 
The rankings for each municipality are also shown in Table 7. Overall, Tulancingo 
and Santa Catarina are ranked as cases with high equality of basic services, and Calnali 
and Aramberri are ranked as low. A cursory glance at municipal records shows the 
disparity among the large municipal cases and the smaller ones. Adult literacy rates, 
percentages of homes with plumbed water, and percentage of homes with sewer 
systems are most evenly distributed among the municipal population in Tulancingo and 
Santa Catarina, as shown in Figure 9. The following sections detail the rankings of each 
case.
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Table 7: Equality of Municipal Public Services
Southern State/ Less Developed Northern State/ More Developed
Large Municipality Small Municipality Large Municipality Small Municipality
PRI PAN PAN PRI
Tulancingo,
Hidalgo
Calnali, 
Hidalgo
Santa Catarina, 
Nuevo Leon
Aramberri, 
Nuevo Leon
Education Is over 90% of the adult 
population literate?
High Low High Low
Are there operating schools in 
rural areas or do rural students 
commonly attend centrally-
located schools?
Are there efforts to expanding 
education services (i.e. 
buildings, technology) to meet 
municipal needs?
Health Is medical care easily available 
to rural populations?
Low Low High Low
Are there enough doctors and 
medical staff to attend to the 
medical needs of the 
municipality?
Are there efforts to address 
women’s health issues?
Water and 
Sanitation
Do over 90% of homes have 
sanitation drainage?
High Low High Low
Do over 90% of homes have 
plumbed water?
Are there efforts to expand and 
improve water and sanitation 
services?
Overall Rating: Medium - High Low High Low
Note: For each category a high rating is given if the answer to the majority of the questions (2 of 3) is “yes”; low rating given if “no” was predominant. For overall quality of 
democracy, a high rating is given if high is fulfilled in all categories; a medium- high if high is given in 2 of 3 categories; and a low rating otherwise.
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Figure 9: The Distribution of Basic Services across Four Mexican Municipalities
Tulancingo, Hidalgo
Public services in Tulancingo are sufficient and generally equally distributed to 
the overwhelming majority of the population, however, many improvements are 
needed. The municipal population continues to grow, placing increasing demands for 
services on local government. Moreover, the equipment, buildings, and technology 
related to basic public services are in need of expansion and replacement to continue 
to broadly distribute adequate services to the municipal population.
Education in Tulancingo reaches most all citizens. INEGI (2008) reports the 
municipality’s adult literacy rate is 93%. While education is sufficient, the municipal 
government is involved in efforts to expand education services, including plans for the 
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building of eleven schools in the next 2 years. There are currently 275 schools in the 
municipality, including preschool, primary, secondary, technical, and university (INEGI 
2008). Although there is an average of 25 students per teacher in preschool and 
primary levels and 17 students per teacher in secondary and university classes (INEGI 
2008), officials managing education services consider increasing the number of 
teachers a priority. Teachers, particularly in rural schools, are often charged with the 
instruction of multiple grade levels. Although there may be only a total 20 students, 
managing multiple grade levels across several teaching areas overburdens the teacher 
and decreases the personal attention students receive from instructors. 
There is also a lack of human capital in health services in Tulancingo, according 
to municipal health officials. INEGI reports that the municipality has a little over 200 
medical professionals (INEGI 2008), but there is not enough staff to handle all patients 
and medical problems. There is also a lack of up-to-date equipment that enables 
specialty services. Patients with serious medical issues are sent to Pachuca, the capital 
of Hidalgo, or Mexico Distrito Federal. Citizens also utilize private clinics located in 
Tulancingo because they have equipment that public clinics do not. And individuals 
seeking medical attention in rural areas have to travel to the urban center of the 
municipality or wait for traveling medical clinics - there are two in the municipality - to 
reach them. In all, health services in Tulancingo need expansion and improvement, 
cites municipal officials, particularly the hiring of more doctors and nurses and the 
modernization of health equipment. 
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While 93% of homes in Tulancingo have water available from the municipal’s 
supply and system (INEGI 2008), municipal water services need much improvement. 
Equipment, particularly pumps and pipes, is old, corroded and in need of replacement, 
and treatment plants need expansion. The municipal administration is currently in the 
process of replacing equipment but funds are limited to expand treatment plants. And 
as one municipal official pointed out, it is difficult to invest considerable money and 
manpower into water treatment when neighboring municipalities linked to your water 
sources contaminate the system with sewage and trash. In addition to the physical 
needs that must be addressed to improve water services, the municipality has placed 
much emphasis on addressing social concerns as well. The municipal water authority 
has launched a water campaign aimed at educating citizens about the process of water 
service, including proper disposal of trash and payment for services - a big problem for 
the municipality. 
Public works have been an immediate priority of the municipality. At the date of 
the interviews, the municipal administration had been in office less than one year and 
sought to remedy issues that were immediately manageable. Topping the list was trash 
collection and street paving. Municipal trash collection has improved with more regular 
service, and the local government has repaved many streets in the municipality. Also, 
construction of new highways is planned, and some construction projects are 
underway. Public works officials considering the improvement of transportation within 
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the municipality important not only for citizens but also imperative for business and 
industry transport in the area. 
Calnali, Hidalgo
Public services in Calnali are not equally distributed throughout the 
municipality. The municipality’s considerable rural population and mountainous terrain 
pose problems to delivering adequate education, health, and sanitation services to 
rural residents. Beyond rural issues, health, water, and education services are not of 
high quality. The administration’s development plan cites that health services are “not 
sufficient” and that improved water supplies are a “permanent demand of society” 
(Plan de Desarrollo Municipal, Calnali, 2006). And while there are numerous schools, 
they generally lack quality teachers and modern technology. 
Education services are of poor quality in Calnali. Schools in Calnali are not up to 
modern standards, and quality education services are not found in rural areas. This is 
reflected in Calnali’s adult literacy rate of 76% (INEGI 2008).  There are numerous 
schools - 79 in 2006 as compared to 53 in 1994 - but the majority of the schools lack 
libraries and computers and are in need of repair (INEGI; Plan de Desarrollo Municipal, 
Calnali, 2006). Moreover, the quality of the local teachers is an issue. As one municipal 
official notes, teachers sent to rural communities are generally those that are young 
and inexperienced, those given the job as a favor, or those being punished for some 
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reason by the education higher-ups and bureaucracy; in short, rural teachers are 
generally lower quality teachers and this has negative consequences on the quality of 
education in that school. Therefore, rural students in this area are not receiving equal 
education services.
Health services are also lacking in Calnali. There are only 19 public health 
professionals in the municipality, and public clinics are not equipped with the 
technology or expertise to handle serious medical problems. To receive medical 
attention beyond basic care, citizens must travel to Pachuca, the state’s capital city. 
Rural residents have to travel even further. Municipal officials recognize these grave 
issues, but comment there are not sufficient fiscal resources to make improvements. 
One of the largest problems in Calnali is water and sewage. INEGI reports that 
21% of homes in Calnali did not have plumbed water and 26% did not have sewer 
systems (INEGI 2008). Because the municipality is rural and situated in mountainous 
terrain, constructing water and sanitation lines to reach all localities is difficult. 
However, even those localities receiving public services frequently experience water 
outages and dirty plumbed water. In addition, wastewater is an issue. The municipality 
needs a water treatment plant to filter sewage before it is drained into the river but 
lacks the resources to build it (Plan de Desarrollo Municipal, Calnali, 2006).
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Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon
Santa Catarina’s public services are sufficient to reach nearly all citizens, and the 
administration has made great efforts to deliver basic services such as mobile health 
clinics to outlying communities not located near the center of the municipality. Santa 
Catarina faces a challenge many municipalities must manage - a growing population. 
According to one government official, the municipality’s population increased by 
30,000 inhabitants during 2005-2008. As a result new communities without basic 
infrastructure are popping up on the edges of the municipality. These communities 
place demands on the municipal government for water, maintenance of public spaces, 
trash collection, and for education services and medical attention. 
Education services are of good quality in Santa Catarina. The adult literacy rate 
is 95% (INEGI 2008). There are 264 schools in the municipality, including three technical 
schools and six universities (INEGI 2008). There are about 27 students per teacher in 
preschools and primary schools, and 17 students per teacher in upper levels (INEGI 
2008). The municipal government is responsible for the running of schools as well as 
the maintenance and repair of these buildings.
The municipal administration has introduced several new programs to better 
distribute education services. Faced with limited resources, the administration created 
a cooperative funding program that involves local communities and parents in raising a 
portion of funds for specific education projects. For example, to pay for new computers 
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for the primary school, parents raise a third of the total funds and the municipality 
provides the remainder. Programs like these enable the local government to fund more 
projects. In addition to this program, the municipal administration has reached out to 
older populations by offering adult education classes and computer classes to stay-at-
home-moms.
Health services in Santa Catarina are basic but developing. There are several 
medical clinics and units equipped with x-ray technology and exam rooms that provide 
general health services. The municipality also has an ambulance service and recently 
implemented a program to provide medical services to communities with few 
resources through mobile medical units. These mobile units visit 17 localities within the 
municipality and offer general medical and dental attention as well as specialized 
services such as cardiograms. Most of these services are free with a few charging a 
recovery cost of less than 30 pesos - about the cost of 3 coca-colas. In addition to 
providing subsidized medical care to these communities, individuals without insurance 
are treated in municipal clinics, and many travel from other municipalities to receive 
medical attention. Also, the municipality hosts a monthly health fair, providing medical, 
gynecological, and dental services. These fairs are targeted to women that do not or 
cannot travel to the municipal clinics for medical care. 
While health services in Santa Catarina provide basic care and take medical 
services to those in need, municipal healthcare needs improvement. There is a need for 
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a large hospital equipped with the facilities and technology to conduct surgeries. 
Currently, the municipality sends emergency surgeries to neighboring municipalities. In 
addition, more resources are needed to expand healthcare to rural and disabled 
citizens.
Water and sewer services reach 95% and 97% of the municipality’s population, 
respectively. Beyond these basic services, the municipal government also works in 
conjunction with state agencies to distribute potable water to the most rural and 
developing areas. Ensuring that 100% of the municipal population has drinking water is 
an important priority for the administration.
During the municipal government’s administration, much work was 
accomplished and planned in the area of public works. Two overpasses and a 
development center were constructed. This specific development center consists of six 
buildings arranged in a plaza; each building has a specific function - preschool and 
library, for example - and there is a soccer court located in the plaza. These types of 
centers are an integral part of communities, explained municipal officials, because they 
offer easily accessed centers of learning and recreation for families. 
Security is another area of public works that the administration has worked 
diligently to improve. Much like the federal government scene, the municipal 
administration struggles to control organized crime and drug trafficking. These issues 
became urgent when the current administration took office three years ago. In the first 
128
month of the administration, one city council member and the secretary of security 
were killed. The municipal president heavily invested in security measures, pouring 30% 
of that year’s budget into security expenses, including more than doubling the police 
force and purchasing new arms and equipment for security personnel. 
While the municipal government has made substantial improvement to public 
works and security, they have also undertaken innovative environmental programs. 
Santa Catarina is the first Mexican municipality to construct a wind energy plant. Also,
plans are being made to construct a tire recycling factory in order to reduce the 
emission of poisonous gases from burning rubber and to be able to reuse or sell the 
recycled rubber. Another project underway is a methane gas factory run on trash. 
Landfills are covered with soil and the trash underneath produces methane gas that can 
be used for an energy source. Programs like these exist in Toronto, Canada and in Los 
Angeles, California. 
Aramberri, Nuevo Leon
The municipal government of Aramberri is primarily concerned with the delivery 
of basic services and the development of the municipality’s infrastructure. Roads, 
public lighting, sanitation facilities, and piped water are some of the basic services that 
the municipal administration struggles to deliver to the most rural areas of its territory. 
In addition to these, healthcare is a concern for the entire municipality. While strides 
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have been made to provide more services to more localities during the past three 
years, many homes are without electricity and water, and  many families must travel 
far to receive basic health services. 
Aramberri has an impressive number of schools - 175 - and a very low student 
to teacher ratio - 10 students per teacher. However, these statistics mask the fact that 
the quality of education is poor. In the small rural localities that comprise much of the 
municipality, schools lack electricity, water, and sanitation facilities. Without electricity, 
computers cannot be used, and the lack of potable water and bathrooms adversely 
affect student health. Moreover, teachers are responsible for instructing multiple grade 
levels in the majority of schools, even those located in the most developed areas of the 
municipality.  The municipal administration has made some advances in education with 
the building of eight classrooms with sanitation facilities in the past year as well as 
combining efforts with higher levels of government to electrify some rural schools. 
Strides are also being made to improve health services.  The opening of a new 
health clinic is planned for later this year. The new clinic will be equipped with the 
technology for x-rays, laboratory analysis, and consults with specialist doctors through 
the internet. These services will ease the municipality’s use of neighboring clinics; 
Aramberri residents have been traveling 40 minutes or more to use other municipality’s 
clinics because their one clinic did not offer adequate health services. Rural residents 
rarely seek needed medical attention if possible, according to one municipal official.
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In the area of public works, the municipal government of Aramberri is 
responsible for very few services, including public lighting, maintenance of public areas, 
and sanitation facilities. The federal government is responsible for electricity, and the 
state of Nuevo Leon has a separate, autonomous municipal agency in charge of water 
services. All levels of government struggle to provide these basic services to 
Aramberri’s rural population, but the municipal government has the worst record. 
While 83% of homes have electricity and 77% have plumbed water, only 36% of homes 
have sanitation facilities that dispose of sewage (INEGI 2008). Municipal officials claim 
that delays in service delivery are due to the geography of the municipality, stating, “In 
the case of mountains the most urgent problem we have is roads and electricity. In 
some semi-desert communities the problem is water; we have to transport water from 
long distances.” The rural areas of the municipality are diverse in terms of geography, 
creating different obstacles for infrastructure development. In the mountainous rural 
communities, it is difficult to build roads and electrical power lines. In the desert 
communities, the lack of water sources makes it challenging to provide potable water 
and sanitation facilities.
Discussion of Findings
The case findings support my expectation that municipalities characterized by 
high quality local democracy and high local government capacity distribute basic public 
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services more equally, reaching the overwhelming majority of their populations. The 
two large municipality cases, Santa Catarina (North) and Tulancingo (South), 
demonstrated a high level of local democracy and government capacity as well as a 
more equal distribution of public services than the other cases. Here high quality 
democracy and greater government capacity were coupled with lower inequalities of 
services. On the other hand, the smaller cases, Aramberri (North) and Calnali (South), 
were characterized by low quality democracy, poor government capacity, and high 
inequalities in service delivery.  While local democracy in Aramberri is of poor quality, 
Calnali’s quality of democracy is good and shows signs of further development. Voter 
turnout in Calnali historically has been high, and the most recent election was very 
competitive, ushering in a new party to power that has the potential to change the way 
services are delivered. 
Returning to my expectations, the cases fit as shown in Table 8. The only cell left 
remaining is the low democracy - high capacity case. While my fieldwork cases do not 
fit this scenario, I believe that the expectation would hold that a local government 
exhibiting low democracy - high capacity would have unequal service distribution with 
specific populations or groups targeted. I expect that a more wealthy country with 
pockets of authoritarianism would provide an example of such a case. 
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Table 8: Findings of Municipal Service Delivery
Democracy
MEDIUM - HIGH LOW
G
ov
er
nm
en
t C
ap
ac
ity
MEDIUM -
HIGH
Santa Catarina
Tulancingo
Medium to high 
equality in the 
distribution of 
services
Low equality in the 
distribution of services 
with services targeted 
at specific populations
LOW
Calnali
Low equality of the 
distribution of 
services 
Aramberri
Low equality of the 
distribution of services
We can conjecture that Aramberri might fulfill the high capacity - low 
democracy cell if it had more fiscal resources at its disposal. Increased municipal 
funding could give the administration the capital needed to attract more technically-
adept individuals for the appointed positions, which would increase the overall capacity 
of the municipal government. Increased capacity would give the administration the 
needed tools to distribute more goods and services to citizens. We have to ask, then, 
would the pattern of patronage politics that Aramberri and similar governments follow 
be a “bad thing” if it resulted in greater goods and services? The answer is no if goods 
and services reach those segments of the population that are in need. Unfortunately, it 
is unlikely that marginalized groups such as rural citizens would be targeted as 
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beneficiaries. Why? Simply because they yield very little political clout. The patrons in 
power are not dependent on marginalized groups for votes. Often these groups have 
lower voter turnout rates for the very same reasons basic services do not reach them -
limited resources and geographical obstacles like traversing deserts and mountains. 
Therefore, even in the face of improved capacity - greater resources and technical 
abilities - we would not see more equality in public service delivery because democratic 
incentives drive political behavior to increase equality. 
Beer (2003) in her study of institutional change in Mexico adds another 
complementary explanation: the lack of electoral competition keeps bureaucrats rather 
than politicians in control of policy-making. Beer argues that “increasing electoral 
competition will shift policy-making control from unaccountable bureaucratic actors to 
elected officials…this happens because politicians selected in competitive election face 
incentives to extend their influence over greater policy domains in order to meet the 
demands of their own constituents” (Beer 2003: 120). It may be that in Aramberri, the 
lack of democracy means that bureaucrats will continue to dictate policy-making in a 
patron fashion and fail to evenly distribute goods.  
Democratic incentives are the key to expanding equality. Politicians are 
motivated by electoral incentives to distribute public services broadly. This fieldwork 
has shown that even in the case of no reelection, politicians are motivated by party 
benefits to seek equality in basic public service delivery. But why the broad distribution 
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of services and not just improved delivery to constituents - those that voted you into 
power? In the face of very high political competition, as in the cases of Santa Catarina 
with less than 1% margin of victory and Tulancingo with a margin of victory of 2%, 
politicians and government officials perceive the entire municipality as their base of 
support. It takes convincing the majority of citizens through your performance in 
government to vote for your party in the next election. Never did I hear in the 
interviews I conducted mention of “our party’s constituency” or “our voters”. The cases 
I studied demonstrate that vibrant democracy in the form of high political party 
competition and high voter turnout creates incentives for politicians to expand 
equality. These incentives are supported by sufficient government capacity to ensure 
the policies to increase equality are actually implemented.
This analysis clearly points to the need of government capacity for democratic 
incentives to be translated into public service equalities. The cases studied underscore 
that government capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to reducing service 
inequalities. Government capacity in developing contexts such as the ones presented in 
this chapter largely hinges on fiscal resources. The high capacity cases I studied 
highlighted the importance of tax revenue and fiscal innovation. While much of the 
funding and operation of public services is dictated by state and federal governments 
and is highly formulaic, municipal governments have the opportunity to innovate on 
the fringes. For example, Tulancingo pursued funding for specific public works with 
international agencies, and Santa Catarina has successfully secured additional federal 
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funding for numerous special public works projects. Grindle (2007) in a study of 30 
medium-sized Mexican municipalities finds that policy innovation is the norm for these 
governments. The creation of programs to better assess property taxes and of agencies 
to manage city events and celebrations, for example, resulted in increased municipal 
government revenue. Such innovation is not limited to the context of large and 
medium sized municipalities. Similar institutions and practices could be adopted by 
smaller local governments. All require little to no financial capital to implement, and 
should be encouraged by state and federal governments for adoption by municipalities. 
There is the issue of sustainability of these innovations, as Grindle (2007) points out, 
and municipalities must formally institutionalize successful initiatives for long-term 
benefit.
Conclusion
Local governments have the responsibility to deliver basic public services. Their 
performance is largely dependent on local democracy and capacity. Local governments 
that have healthy political competition and participation as well as an adequate pool of 
resources - both fiscal and technical - successfully deliver services to the majority of 
their population. In these contexts, politicians have the incentives to broadly distribute 
services and the capacity to do so. Municipalities lacking the capacity to deliver services 
to all their population tend to have poor services despite the quality of their 
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democracy, making it clear that capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
reducing service inequalities. While this type of local government must struggle to 
develop politically and fiscally, municipalities that have a high level of democracy 
coupled with sufficient capacity still face challenges. In the developing world where 
patronage politics have historically been the rules of the game, municipalities must 
“transform the traditional vision that sees them as institutions that are inefficient, 
corrupt, and subordinate to actors central in the promotion of the development of their 
communities” (Carrera Hernández 2006: 2). And all municipalities regardless of their 
legacy should aspire to become a “source of processes and resources that…can 
contribute to the not only local, but national development” (Carrera Hernández 2006: 
2).  When municipalities rise to these challenges, democracy truly begins to function 
from the bottom-up and substantially contribute to citizen well-being.
This chapter has unpacked democracy and capacity on the local level in four 
Mexican municipalities. The findings support the previous chapter’s conclusion that 
governments with high quality democracy coupled with sufficient capacity more 
equally distribute public services. These two chapters have examined the first part of 
the virtuous cycle running from quality of democracy to equality of public services. The 
findings have underscored that democracy is multifaceted, functioning to promote 
equality primarily through electoral incentives. We have seen that higher electoral 
competition has been correlated with more equality in public services. Moreover, these 
chapters have shown that high quality democracies must be supported by adequate 
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government capacity for electoral incentives to be translated into policy outcomes. 
Without sufficient resources and technical expertise, no amount of political 
competition can induce policies that expand equality. Democracy alone is not enough 
to reduce inequalities.
The second part of the virtuous cycle asserts that equality contributes to the 
further development of democratic quality by expanding political participation. In the 
context of public services, we should see greater equality producing higher levels of 
political participation. Basic public services including education, healthcare, and 
sanitation enable individuals with the education, health, and political skills needed of 
active democratic participants. This participation deepens democracy by enlarging the 
political sphere to include previously marginalized individuals. The next chapter tests 
these claims.
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CHAPTER V
COMPLETING THE VIRTUOUS CYCLE:
PUBLIC SERVICES INCREASE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Political participation is a critical component of building stable and meaningful 
democracies. Citizen participation in politics is not only an input device signaling the 
needs and demands of society to government leaders, but also a mechanism by which 
to hold politicians accountable. Without political participation, democracy would lack 
the civic base it requires to function and to improve in quality. However, without 
sufficient education and healthcare, individuals lack the capabilities to effectively 
participate in politics. Basic public services expand the political opportunities of 
individual citizens by enabling them to be active participants in politics. While the 
previous two chapters explored the first part of the virtuous cycle, dissecting the 
moving parts of the democracy-equality link, this chapter turns to the reverse, asking -
how does equality contribute to the improvement of democratic quality? Specifically, in 
this chapter we test how public services contribute to democracy by increasing 
individual political participation. 
Before diving into empirical tests, it is important to review our theoretical 
foundation. The first section of this chapter revisits the virtuous cycle theory, discussing 
the mechanisms that link equality of public services to improving democracy. Second, 
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we explore how public services should have a different effect in developing versus 
developed contexts and outline specific expectations regarding both. Third, the model 
used to test this relationship is outlined, including specifications of variable 
measurement, hypotheses, and methods. Fourth, the results of the estimations are 
presented and interpreted. And finally, I offer some conclusions regarding the findings.
Revisiting the Theoretical Framework
According to the virtuous cycle theoretical framework, democracy expands 
equality which in turn deepens democracy. Specifically in the context of public services, 
greater equality in public service provision enhances the quality of democracy through 
political participation. Basic public services expand the political opportunities available 
to citizens by enabling them with the skills and capacities needed to be active 
democratic participants. As a result, greater political participation enlarges the electoral
arena, feeding political competition and expanding the overall quality of democracy 
from the bottom-up.
Why are public services so important for individual political participation? Sen 
asserts that the arrangements society makes for basic services “are important not only 
for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding a preventable 
morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in 
economic and political activities” (1999: 39). Consumption of public services equips 
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citizens with the health and skills needed to participate politically. Basic healthcare, 
clean water, and adequate sanitation facilities ensures that individuals are physically 
capable to participate. Although these services seem so basic that they should have 
little impact, consider that at any given time more than half of the poor in the 
developing world are ill from causes related to hygiene, sanitation and water supply 
(Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council 2008). We can imagine such 
sickness prevents these individuals from political activities such as walking to the voting 
polls to cast their ballot or taking part in a community meeting to solve local problems. 
The provision of basic public services is absolutely essential to the physical health and 
well-being of citizens in the developing world. 
While healthcare, water and sanitation services physically enable individuals to 
participate, education cultivates the skills needed to be politically active. As Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone put it, “…education imparts information about politics and cognate 
fields and about a variety of skills, some of which facilitate political learning”. They go 
on to say, “Schooling increases one’s capacity for understanding and working with 
complex, abstract, and intangible subjects, that is subjects like politics” (1980: 18). 
Clearly, we can see that basic services are essential to improving the physical 
and cognitive abilities of citizens. Particularly in the developing world, these capacities 
are needed to participate politically. The expansion of the distribution of basic services 
enlarges political opportunities and participation in this context. However, in developed 
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nations, basic public services should not affect political participation because average 
citizens have the needed capacities to participate. In the developed world, inequalities 
of basic services are generally smaller and typically involve better quality rather than 
access to services.  
In other words, the starting point for developing and developed countries is 
different. While public services increase political participation in the former, 
improvements in the equality of services should have little effect in the latter.  
However, if we were to trace developed countries back to their period of advancement, 
we would be able to apply this theoretical framework with the expectation that 
expanded equality in public services improved participation and deepened 
democracy.17 The next section further teases out these theoretical expectations with 
regards to a country’s level of development in terms of quality of democracy and 
government capacity. 
Theoretical Expectations
Development may be couched in terms that we have used throughout this study 
- democratic quality and government capacity. Developed nations are generally high 
quality democracies that have a high degree of government capacity while developing 
nations are most typified by their lack of government capacity and vary in their quality 
                                                          
17 Historical analyses of this sort are simply beyond the scope of this project.
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of democracy. Considering the same quality of democracy-government capacity 
pairings presented in the previous chapter examining public services in Mexican 
municipalities (see Table 3), we may assign specific theoretical expectations to four 
scenarios: 1.) medium to high quality democracy- medium to high government 
capacity; 2.) medium to high quality of democracy-low government capacity; 3.) low 
quality democracy- medium to high government capacity; and 4.) low quality 
democracy-low government capacity. Table 9 presents the hypothesized effect of these 
contexts on political participation. 
Assuming that high quality democracy coupled with high levels of government 
capacity represents a developed political context, we know from the analyses 
presented in the previous two chapters that such governments are correlated with high 
equality of basic public services while the other three democracy-capacity pairings are 
associated with lower equality. Therefore, we should not expect public services to 
impact political participation in high quality democracies with high government 
capacity. In this context, individual capacities should be beyond the point that 
expansion of basic services influences political opportunities. This may be why we see 
declining levels of participation in high quality democracies. In other words, the 
virtuous cycle of basic public services may run its course; the expansion of other forms 
of equal opportunities and outcomes such as income inequalities or expansion of gay 
and lesbian rights may positively affect democratic quality in this context. If high quality 
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democracy-high capacity scenarios are not affected by public services, where do we 
theoretically expect their influence?
Table 9: Theoretical Expectations of Political Participation
Democracy
HIGH MEDIUM - LOW
G
ov
er
nm
en
t C
ap
ac
ity
HIGH
No effect of public 
services on 
participation due to 
“developed” starting 
point
No effect of public 
services on 
participation due to 
lack of democratic 
incentives
MEDIUM -
LOW
Effect of public 
services due to 
“developing” starting 
point and presence of 
democratic incentives
No effect of public 
services on 
participation due to 
lack of democratic 
incentives
Returning again to our findings of the previous chapters, we know that high 
quality democracy produces strong electoral incentives for the equal distribution of 
public services but that low government capacity limits these motivations from being 
translated into actual policy outcomes. Therefore, we may expect that public services 
influence individual political participation in this context because the political 
environment is one that is responsive to citizens. This gets to citizen motivation for 
participation; incentives for participation are simply absent in the context of political 
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non-responsiveness. Even if one has the capacity to participate, there is little 
motivation to do so when politicians disregard citizen input. Public services, therefore, 
should not have a noticeable effect on political participation in medium to low quality 
democracies regardless of government capacity. 
To summarize, basic public services expand individual capacities to participate. 
Therefore, we should see an increase in political participation with public service 
provision. However, this relationship is expected only in a developing context where 
democratic political incentives exist but government capacity is limited.  In this context, 
politicians have electoral incentives to be responsive, and voters, therefore, are 
motivated to participate. Moreover, the baseline of individual well-being is so low that 
basic public services have a large positive impact on the capabilities of citizens, not only 
motivating them but also enabling them to participate. The next section presents a 
model of individual-level political participation with public services as the focus.
Modeling Participation as a Result of Public Services: Variables, Hypotheses, and 
Methods
While the previous two chapters have examined public service equalities with 
governments as the units of analysis, we now turn to the individual citizen. Because 
consumption of public services and political participation varies individual to individual, 
it is important to examine these processes on this level. It is also important to couch 
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the individual within the larger political system. Therefore, I use survey data to capture 
individual-level factors and model them nested in the democracy-capacity pairings 
presented in the previous section. 
I use the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Political Culture Surveys 
and the Afrobarometer to test how public services affect political participation in Latin 
America and Africa. The LAPOP survey was conducted in 2006 and covers 13 countries: 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.18 The Afrobarometer survey was
conducted in 2005 and covers 15 countries: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia. In all, this analysis draws on a total of 28 countries from the 
developing world with over 70,000 respondents. 
The countries included in the analysis offer cases of each democracy-capacity 
pairing. Figure 10 illustrates where the cases fall with regards to the four democratic 
quality and government capacity categories. There are a substantial number of 
countries in the  low quality democracy-low capacity category (LL), fewer in the low 
quality democracy- medium to high capacity category (LH), and a good amount in the 
medium to high quality democracy-low capacity category (HL). The medium to high 
quality democracy- medium to high government capacity category (HH) is limited to 
                                                          
18 Bolivia is excluded because it was oversampled. 
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Quality of Democracy (electoral competition)
Country Codes:
1 Benin 6 Ecuador 11 Kenya 16 Mozambique 21 Peru 26 Uruguay
2 Botswana 7 El Salvador 12 Lesotho 17 Namibia 22 Senegal 27 Venezuela
3 Chile 8 Ghana 13 Madagascar 18 Nicaragua 23 South Africa 28 Zambia
4 Colombia 9 Guatemala 14 Malawi 19 Nigeria 24 Tanzania
5 Costa Rica 10 Honduras 15 Mexico 20 Panama 25 Uganda
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Figure 10: Democracy-Capacity Case Pairings
147
one case: Costa Rica.19 However, because we are examining individual-level behavior, 
we have a sufficient number of responses to adequately examine political participation 
in this scenario.20
To study political participation, I examine individual-level incidences of voting 
and protest. Each survey asks respondents if they have voted in the last presidential 
election or ever participated in a demonstration or public protest. Both measures are 
dichotomous variables (yes/no). For full variable descriptions and coding information, 
see Appendix G. For descriptive statistics, see Appendix H. The following paragraphs 
summarize the individual-level factors I expect to influence the choice to vote and 
protest.
Foremost, I expect public services to affect political participation. Greater 
availability and consumption of basic services expand opportunities to participate as 
individuals gain the capabilities needed to be active democratic participants. On the 
other hand, poor services hinder participation. To measure availability and 
                                                          
19 I categorized those cases with electoral competition greater than 0.85 to be “high quality” 
democracies. A positive value of rule of law categorized cases as “high” government capacity; “low” was 
assigned to negative values. The country cases were categorized as follows: HH - Costa Rica; HL -
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Benin, Zambia; LH - Chile, Uruguay, 
Botswana, South Africa; LL - Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda. Sensitivity tests were run moving the 
threshold of 0.85 for “high quality” democracy up and down by 0.5 to 0.8 and 0.9. The results of the 
models were generally the same.
20 Note that Costa Rica has one of the lowest reported service inequalities of the cases studied. In the 
case of plumbed water, the difference between urban and rural residents reporting access is 9% in 
comparison to 50% in Nicaragua, 65% in Zambia, and 85% in Zimbabwe. This supports our assumption 
that “developed” can be represented by high quality democracy-high government capacity. Certainly, 
developed countries have low service inequalities similar to Costa Rica’s.
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consumption of services on the individual-level, I rely on survey questions that ask 
respondents to evaluate basic public services. A good evaluation arguably indicates that 
the respondent has access to and benefits from consumption of the service. A bad 
evaluation reflects that the respondent either has limited access to or benefit from the 
service. 
Simple cross-tabulations of service evaluations and access to clean water 
indicate that this is a valid assumption. For the African countries sampled, 68% of those 
individuals that rate public services as “bad” also have no access to a community water 
system, and 63% of respondents that evaluate services as “good” have access to piped 
water. For Latin Americans, the “good” ratings are similar, but the “bad” ratings are less 
supportive of my assumption. In the Latin American countries sampled, 81% of 
individuals rating services as “good” have piped water in their home while 22% of those 
saying services are “bad” do not have piped water in their homes. The low overlap of 
“bad” services and no access to water for Latin Americans may be the result of the 
survey question. As elaborated below, the question asks about services in general, not 
just water. Regardless of the reason behind it, the overall cross-tabulations 
demonstrate that evaluations of public services are related to access, consumption, and 
personal benefit. 
To measure public services I use the LAPOP question that asks, “Would you say 
that the services the municipality is giving to the people are very good, good, not good 
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or not bad, bad, or very bad?” The Afrobarometer asks, “How well or badly would you 
say the current government is handling the following matters: Improving basic health 
services? Addressing educational needs? Delivering household water?” I have collapsed 
the responses to a 1 to 3 scale with 1 indicating a “bad” evaluation, 2 indicating an 
“average” rating, and 3 indicating a “good” evaluation. I expect good public service 
evaluations to be positively related to political participation. Those individuals 
benefiting from public services have the capabilities and incentives to politically 
participate while those lacking access to or benefit from services do not have the 
means or motivation to participate. 
Moving on from public services, there are numerous other individual-level 
factors related to political participation. Studies of political behavior have underscored 
the importance of economic conditions and government evaluations. Research has 
shown that national economic evaluations (sociotropic) have a strong effect on political 
participation (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck 1986; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
2000). Although this research focuses predominantly on vote choice, I include national 
economic evaluations in the model to test if economic conditions influence the choice 
to participate in politics. I expect those with positive evaluations of their economic 
situation to participate politically in order to see continued positive outcomes and 
check government leaders who manage the economy. To measure evaluations of the 
national economy I use survey questions that ask respondents to rate the national 
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economy on a 5 point scale (1 = very bad; 2= bad; 3= neither good or bad; 4= good; 5= 
very good).
In addition to economic evaluations, assessments of the government are 
influential to political participation. I measure government evaluations in terms of 
individual perceptions of democracy, corruption, and crime. If individuals perceive their 
democracy as a farce, believe that government corruption is widespread, or fear crime, 
they have less confidence in democracy and rule of law and are less likely to take part 
in politics (Booth and Seligson 2009). To measure perceptions of democracy I use the 
survey question that asks respondents how satisfied they are with the way democracy 
works in their country (1= very dissatisfied; 2= dissatisfied; 3= satisfied; 4= very 
satisfied). To measure corruption perceptions, I use the survey question that asks 
respondents to evaluate the level of corruption of government officials on a 4 point 
scale with higher values indicating more perceived corruption. To capture crime 
perceptions, I use survey questions that ask respondents how secure they feel in their 
home and neighborhood, measured on a 4 point scale with higher values indicating 
greater insecurity and fear of crime. I expect that positive evaluations of democracy are 
associated with higher levels of participation, and I hypothesize individuals with lower 
perceptions of corruption and crime participate more than those with perceptions that 
corruption and crime are rampant.
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Political behavior studies have also underscored the importance of political
interest (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Jackman & Miller 1995; Blais 
2000 ). Individuals with higher levels of political interest participate more. To measure 
political interest, I use a survey question that asks respondents to rate their own 
political interest. The measure ranges from 1 to 4 with 1 indicating “not interested at 
all” and 4 “very interested”.
I also control for demographic characteristics that effect political behavior, 
including age, gender, education, employment status, and income. Studies of the 
United States have found that more educated, older and wealthy individuals participate 
in politics more (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Jackman & Miller 1995; 
Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Blais 2000). More educated individuals possess civic 
skills required to participate, and individuals of a higher socio-economic status are 
more likely to participate than those with fewer resources because they typically have 
the time, energy, and resources to do so. Age represents both generational differences 
and life-cycle effects, and older individuals have experience with the political system. In 
all, education, wealth, and age reduce the transactional costs of voting. 
To measure education I use a 9 point scale that reports levels of education 
completed, ranging from no formal education to completion of primary school to post 
graduate work. To measure wealth I created a measure that records the number of 
major possessions the individual has, including a vehicle, television, radio, and 
152
telephone. This measure is appropriate for the developing world where fiscal resources 
and capital flows are limited. Higher values indicate greater wealth.21 Age is measured 
in years. Employment status and gender are also controlled for in the model. 
In all, I model political participation on the individual-level as a correlate of 
evaluations of public services, the economy, and the government. I also take into 
account the personal characteristics of political interest, age, gender, education, 
employment status, and income. These variables constitute the “baseline” model. To 
capture country-level effects on individual behavior, I estimate the model for each 
category of democracy-capacity. 
To capture the country-level political context, I return to the quality of 
democracy and government capacity measures used in Chapter III with few 
modifications. To measure quality of democracy, I limit the measure to electoral 
competition and exclude voter turnout so that there would not be any empirical issues 
with predicting political participation with a measure incorporating political 
participation. Electoral completion is measured on a 0 to 1 scale with higher values 
indicating more competition. The measure was constructed from two indicators taken 
from the Database of Political Institutions. I took the margin of majority indicator (of 
the legislature) and standardized it by the legislative fractionalization indicator so that 
                                                          
21 See Booth and Seligson (2009) for a similar income measure.
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we could fully capture the political competition.22 High margins of majority indicate 
that the governing party holds a higher proportion of the legislative seats, and, 
therefore, political competition is lower. However, politicians in more highly 
fractionalized legislatures face high electoral competition because the number of 
parties in the system is greater. Therefore, it is important to incorporate the two 
measures. 
To measure government capacity, I used the same measure as in Chapter III -
rule of law. The variable is taken from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators dataset. 
I matched each democracy-capacity pairing with individual observations based on 
country. Note that the democracy-pairing was lagged two years with the idea that 
variance in these political and resource contexts take time to be felt by the general 
public.  
To estimate the models I use ordered logit analysis. I pool the LAPOP and 
Afrobarometer surveys and include country fixed effects to account for any unobserved 
country-level variation. I also cluster by region. Estimations of the model by country are 
presented in Appendix I. 
                                                          
22 Specifically, I took the margin of majority measure, multiplied it by (1 - fractionalization), then 
subtracted this value from 1 to create the electoral competition variable. 
154
Results: Evidence of a Virtuous Cycle
The results of the models are presented in Table 10. The results provide strong 
support for the virtuous cycle, showing that public services are correlated with political 
participation in the context of high quality democracy-low capacity, as expected. The 
following explores these findings, beginning with discussion of the effect of public 
services across the democracy-capacity pairings then moving onto the effects of 
individual-level perceptions and characteristics on political participation. 
Democracy-Capacity Pairings
The effect of public services is only evident in the high quality democracy-low 
government capacity models, supporting our expectation that basic public services 
improve individual capacities and expand opportunities to participate only in the 
context of developing, highly politically competitive democracies. Basic public services 
are theoretically irrelevant to political participation in high quality democracies with 
high government capacity because basic services have long been delivered to the 
majority of the citizens. And public services do not affect participation in medium-low 
quality democracies because there are little to no incentives for individuals - even those 
endowed by basic services with the capacity to participate - to be active in a 
nonresponsive political environment. In all, the findings support our theoretical 
expectations (see Table 9). 
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Table 10: The Effect of Public Services on Political Participation
VOTE PROTEST
pooled HH HL LH LL pooled HH HL LH LL
public service evaluation 0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 0.04 0.01
(0.004)** (0.047) (0.005)** (0.097) (0.029) (0.026) (0.053) (0.007)** (0.129) (0.030)
democracy evaluation 0.11 0.26 0.03 0.28 0.11 -0.04 -0.15 -0.04 0.02 -0.06
(0.022)** (0.046)** (0.006)** (0.059)** (0.028)** (0.059) (0.055)** (0.037) (0.070) (0.124)
corruption evaluation 0.02 0.15 0.04 -0.16 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.14 -0.02
(0.030) (0.038)** (0.009)** (0.021)** (0.087) (0.033) (0.048) (0.040) (0.025)** (0.009)*
crime evaluation -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 0.09 0.03 0.05
(0.004)** (0.031) (0.000)** (0.070) (0.001)** (0.012)** (0.036) (0.016)** (0.016) (0.021)*
national economy 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 0.10 0.02
(0.029) (0.037)** (0.014) (0.016)* (0.055) (0.017) (0.042) (0.017)** (0.033)** (0.041)
political interest 0.30 0.36 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.17 0.39 0.44 0.33
(0.036)** (0.036)** (0.017)** (0.088)** (0.117)** (0.022)** (0.037)** (0.005)** (0.061)** (0.039)**
age 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.004)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.026)** (0.020)** (0.007) (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.006) (0.017)
female 0.14 0.36 0.17 0.12 -0.06 -0.37 -0.39 -0.54 -0.33 -0.10
(0.145) (0.073)** (0.019)** (0.226) (0.162) (0.124)** (0.083)** (0.037)** (0.068)** (0.094)
income 0.11 0.37 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.11
(0.011)** (0.043)** (0.014)** (0.063) (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.055)** (0.015)** (0.054) (0.010)**
employed 0.40 0.31 0.50 0.21 0.36 0.16 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.31
(0.033)** (0.073)** (0.017)** (0.179) (0.072)** (0.102) (0.083)* (0.009)** (0.002)** (0.147)*
education 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.08
(0.024)** (0.019)** (0.006)** (0.045) (0.047) (0.065)* (0.018)** (0.016)** (0.180) (0.073)
n 70,308 5,608 36,418 9,088 19,194 70,334 5,604 36,149 9,085 19,496
R2 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.25 0.11 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.27
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; country dummies excluded for presentation purposes; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%; HH= high quality democracy and high government capacity; HL= 
high quality democracy and low government capacity; LH= low-medium quality democracy and high government capacity; LL= low-medium quality democracy and low government capacity
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The findings indicate that public service evaluations increase the likelihood of 
voting. Individuals evaluating public services as “bad” have an 81.5% probability of 
voting while those with “good” perceptions of services have an 83.2% likelihood of 
voting. While this increase seems small, it is the largest gain in the probability of voting 
of all the government evaluation variables, as illustrated in Figure 11. 
Figure 11: The Effect of Government Evaluations on Voting
Protest participation, unlike voting, is negatively related to public service 
evaluations. Individuals with “good” evaluations of public services have a 16.7% 
probability of protesting. Respondents reporting “bad” evaluations of public services 
have a 19.6% likelihood of protesting. 
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Why does protest behavior exhibit a negative relationship with democracy while 
voting is positively associated with democracy? We know that not all political 
participation is equal. Some types of participation require more sophisticated skills such 
as organizing a community group to solve a neighborhood problem, and others demand 
more resources, including time and money, such as working for a political campaign 
and contributing monetarily to a political party. While this is true of political 
participation in general, we cannot make the broad assumption that voting requires a 
different skill set or more resources than protesting - not when we are considering the 
developing world. In developed countries, voting does require more education, 
particularly the ability to read and write, than protest, which requires that you have the 
physical ability to show up to the demonstration site and take part in the activities. But, 
high levels of education are not necessarily required to vote in most of the developed 
world. Ballots are often colored-coded to correspond to political parties so that even 
the illiterate may cast a vote. Therefore, we cannot say that the difference between 
voting and protest lies with the form of participation. So what underlies a positive 
correlation of public service evaluations with voting and a negative association with 
protest?
Previous studies have found that voting is generally motivated by satisfaction 
while protest is driven by dissatisfaction (Bean 1991; Booth 1991; Foley 1996; Norris 
1999; Canache 2002; Norris 2002; Booth 2006). If we consider that the public service 
measure used in the analysis also captures satisfaction with public services, the 
158
negative association of service evaluations and protest is reasonable. In this sense we 
can think about the service evaluation variable as reflecting quality of public services. 
Individuals that perceive the quality of their services to be lacking tend to protest more 
than those satisfied with public services. Dissatisfaction with democracy, crime, and the 
national economy are also associated with protest behavior, as shown in Table 10. The 
next section further discusses the individual level perceptions and characteristics that 
are correlated with political participation. 
Individual Perceptions and Characteristics
The individual correlates of political participation are mixed across the 
democracy-capacity pairings. To more easily interpret these results, we can estimate 
and compare predicted probabilities. Note, however, that these should be interpreted 
in terms of magnitude only because we are comparing across different models. A 20% 
likelihood of voting in low quality democracy-low capacity countries, for example, 
should not be understood as the same as a 20% probability of voting in the high quality 
democracy-low capacity cases. Nonetheless, we can use the predicted probabilities to 
identify patterns across models and interpret changes within models. For example, in 
the high quality democracy-low capacity scenario, a move from the minimum to 
maximum value of crime evaluations increases the probability of protest by 4% while 
the same move from minimum to maximum national economic perceptions decreases 
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the likelihood of protest by 6%. We can say that in this context, economic evaluations 
have a larger effect than crime perceptions on protest behavior.
Democracy evaluations have a significant, positive effect on voting and a 
negative effect on protest for citizens in the high quality democracy-high government 
capacity cases. An individual in this political context that is “very dissatisfied” with the 
functioning of democracy has a 66% probability of voting while a citizen “very satisfied” 
with democracy has an 80% likelihood of voting. Regarding protest participation, 
dissatisfied individuals have a 19% probability of protesting, and satisfied citizens have 
a 13% likelihood of protesting. Similarly, evaluations of government corruption have a 
positive effect on the likelihood of voting in all high democracy cases but a negative 
influence on the probability of voting in the low quality democracy-high government 
capacity type as well as a positive effect on protest behavior in all low quality 
democracies. 
Crime evaluations decrease the likelihood of voting but increase the probability 
of protest in low government capacity countries. In low quality democracy-low 
government capacity countries, “very insecure” individuals fearing crime in their homes 
have a 79% probability of voting while “very secure” citizens have an 83% likelihood of 
voting.23 “Very secure” citizens have a 16% likelihood of protesting in high quality 
                                                          
23 The effect of crime on voting in the high quality democracy-low government capacity model is also 
negative and significant, but the magnitude of the effect is marginal, decreasing the probability of voting 
by less than 1% with a move from the minimum to maximum value. 
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democracies with low government capacity while the same type of citizen has a 40% 
probability of protesting in low quality democracies with low capacity. “Very secure” 
individuals have a 20% likelihood of protesting in high quality democracy-low capacity 
cases while respondents who share the same perceptions of crime in low quality 
democracy-low capacity countries have a 43% probability of protesting. 
Moving on to the effect of individual characteristics on political participation, 
political participation has the most robust influence on the likelihood of voting and 
protest. Regardless of the democracy-capacity type, more interested individuals are 
more likely to participate. In the context of high quality democracy-low capacity, “very 
interested” individuals have an 89% probability of voting while respondents with no 
interest have a 79% likelihood of voting. In the same context, “very interested” 
respondents have a 33% likelihood of protest while individual with no interest in 
politics have a 13% probability of protest. 
Females are more likely to vote while males are more likely to protest. 
Individuals with higher levels of education and older citizens are more likely to vote and 
protest with the exception of citizens in low quality democracies. Employed and 
wealthier individuals are more likely to participate with the exception of citizens in low 
quality democracy- high government capacity countries.
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Conclusion
This chapter has tested the second part of the virtuous cycle that runs from 
equality back to democratic quality. Specifically, we have examined how public service 
equality contributes to the improvement of democracy via political participation. 
Analyses testing the effect of public service evaluations on political participation have 
shown that public services increase the likelihood of voting in the context of high 
quality democracy-low government capacity. In the same context, public service 
evaluations were negatively associated with protest behavior. In addition, the empirical 
analyses demonstrated there are numerous individual-level factors related to 
participation including perceptions of democracy, corruption, and crime as well as 
political interest, age, gender, education, employment status, and income. 
The finding that public services positively increase political participation in the 
context of high quality democracy-low government capacity has important policy 
implications. Foremost it underscores the importance of improving public services as a 
way to expand political opportunities in the developing world. Considering that 52% of 
individuals in the high quality democracies with low capacity studied rated their public 
services as “average”, there is huge potential for improvement of basic services that 
can reap political rewards for politicians in the short-run and substantial gains for the 
development of democracy in the long-run. The concluding chapter elaborates on the 
policy implications of this study as well as the previous chapters’ analyses.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The quality of democracy is a complicated concept - both in abstract and real 
terms. Scholars disagree what constitutes democracy and how we may assess the 
quality of democracy, and average citizens have diverse ideas of what democracy 
means and how it may improve. But regardless of this lack of consensus and parsimony, 
we have an obligation to study democratic quality. Most of the world is democratic in 
some way, shape or form, and many of these countries are struggling - struggling to 
hold free and fair elections, to keep Parliament intact, to build transparent practices, to 
keep the national economy afloat, to combat natural disasters, and to alleviate poverty. 
The study of democratic quality can help us to better understand how these struggling 
countries may improve democracy so that the challenges they face do not threaten to 
derail democracy as the form of governance. 
I have approached the study of democratic quality in a comprehensive manner, 
considering both what scholars and citizens deem important. Consolidating these ideas, 
I stripped democratic quality to its bare bones, focusing solely on procedure and 
substantive outcomes in broad terms. I constructed a theoretical framework termed 
“the virtuous cycle” built on the vast scholarship examining democratic quality, and we 
traced one substantive outcome - equality of public services - through this cycle. The 
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following outlines what I consider to be the contributions of this theoretical framework. 
A summary of the findings are discussed, and I present policy implications grounded in 
the findings of this study. Finally, I end with a few concluding thoughts and mention of 
some avenues of future research based on this work.
Merit of the Virtuous Cycle Framework 
The virtuous cycle is an attempt at a conceptual framework for better 
understanding how we may improve the quality of democracy. Certainly other more 
esteemed scholars (O’Donnell, Vargas Cullell, and Iazzetta 2004; Diamond and Morlino 
2005) have offered theories with the similar intention of assessing the quality of 
democracy. I believe my theoretical framework contributes to this scholarship and 
moves the study of democracy forward by outlining quality of democracy as a simple 
system between procedure and substance. I purposively separate procedural aspects of 
democracy from its substantive outcomes so that the causes and consequences of 
democratic quality are not confused, theoretically or empirically. Considering that one 
of the largest divides in the scholarship on democratic quality focuses on the “too 
much” or “too little” argument, this framework has the potential to bridge the divide 
between procedural and substantive scholarly approaches. 
In addition, this theoretical framework has the merit of being empirically 
testable. Because I have outlined the procedural and substantive components of 
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democratic quality in broad, basic terms, the framework is easily applied to a variety of 
contexts. I have given a clear way to measure equality as the difference of the 
distribution of benefits across subnational units. Moreover, the framework may be 
explored across various units of analysis. I tested it using national, state, and local 
government data as well as using individual-level concepts. Also, although I apply the 
framework to the specific context of public services, a variety of equality outcomes may 
be examined, including income inequality as well as women’s and/or minority groups’ 
political and civil rights and liberties.
Finally, the virtuous cycle framework is accessible to non-academics because of 
its simplicity and grounding in measurable, but real, outcomes. Politicians and policy-
makers alike will be able to trace the effects of democratic institutions and practices as 
well as the political ramifications of expanded equality. This may aid in policy 
formulation and implementation. In this sense the framework is most valuable as it has 
the potential to affect the daily lives of marginalized citizens all over the world. 
The next section summarizes the findings of my application of this theoretical 
framework to the context of public services. In all, I found evidence that a virtuous 
cycle indeed exists between the quality of democracy and equality in public services. 
High quality democracies are robustly associated with lower inequalities of basic public 
services. 
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Summary of Findings
This project tested the virtuous cycle using three separate but related studies. 
The first analysis drew on global data to test the correlation of democratic quality, 
measured as an additive index of electoral competition and voter turnout, on public 
service equality in three policy areas - education, healthcare, and sanitation. This study 
also explored the mediating role of government capacity. The second analysis 
examined the same relationships in the context of local governments using data from 
four Mexican municipalities. The final study explored the relationship between public 
services and political participation on the individual level using survey data from Latin 
America and Africa.
The tests of the first part of the virtuous cycle, examining the relationship 
between democracy and equality as well as the mediating role of government capacity, 
robustly supported the association of democracy and equality but provided limited 
evidence of the mediating effect of capacity. The global analysis of education and 
sanitation showed that high quality democracies are associated with lower inequalities 
in these areas. Healthcare inequalities were not significantly related to democratic 
quality. Also, government capacity was not significantly related to service inequalities in 
these estimations. Conjecturing that the insignificance of government capacity may be 
due to measurement and empirical issues, an additional analysis was presented using 
data from the Mexican states for the years 2000-2004. This estimation demonstrated 
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that capacity does mediate the effect of democratic quality; higher quality democracies 
bolstered by higher levels of government capacity have lower inequalities in education 
services. To further investigate the correlations of democratic quality and government 
capacity with service inequalities, we examined public service distribution in four 
Mexican municipalities. 
The case studies supported the findings of the previous analyses but provided 
more a nuanced story of public service provision. Again, the higher quality democracies 
coupled with good government capacity had the lowest service inequalities, but we 
were able to unpack democratic quality and government capacity to see what 
mechanisms motivated more equal service coverage in these cases. We found that 
intense electoral competition coupled with strong party ties provided incentives to 
politicians to distribute municipal goods broadly in order to build voter support for 
their party in the next election. We also found that participatory budgeting practices, 
community committees that worked in conjunction with the municipal government,
and municipal centers of citizen input were democratic innovations, to borrow Smith’s 
(2009) term, that engaged citizens more fully with service provision and resulted in 
more equal and efficient delivery of basic services. With regards to government 
capacity, we found that municipal revenue was an important source of autonomy in 
policy-making and resource pool to fund local public service projects beyond that of 
federal transfers. Technical expertise also emerged as a critical element of government 
capacity. Those municipalities with highly trained and experienced officials were much 
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better at delivering services. We also found that the lack of government capacity could 
not be compensated for by high levels of democratic quality. Only in the context of high 
quality democracy and high government capacity were services delivered equally. This 
underscores that government capacity provides the means to achieve what democratic 
incentives set out to accomplish. Capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
reducing inequalities; likewise, democracy is necessary but not sufficient. The two must 
be coupled together to achieve the expansion of equality in substantive terms.
The final empirical analysis moved on to test the second part of the virtuous 
cycle running from equality back to democracy. We examined the correlation of public 
service evaluations on political participation using individual level survey data. We 
found that individuals reporting “good” public service evaluations were more likely to 
vote in the context of high quality democracies with limited government capacity. This 
finding offers evidence that public service provision in a developing context where 
democratic incentives are present is distinctive, and such patterns of provision provide 
individuals with the skills they need to actively participate in politics. 
Taken together, these three studies support that a virtuous cycle exists between 
democratic quality and public service equality. High quality democracies coupled with 
high levels of government capacity were found to more equally provide basic services. 
As a result of the expansion of service provision , individuals are equipped with the 
capacity needed to participate in politics. High quality democracy results in expanded 
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equality, and in turn, expanded equality opens new opportunities for participation and, 
therefore, contributes to the improvement of democratic quality. 
While these findings speak directly to high quality democracies, they are also 
applicable (and most usefully applied) to lower quality democracies. Countries seeking 
to improve their democracy can take the results of these studies to identify areas in 
which they may improve democratic practices and/or government capacity in order to 
better distribute public services. From there, public services should expand the 
collective opportunities available to their population and build democracy from the 
bottom-up through increased political participation. This assumes, however, that 
politicians and reformers indeed welcome increased citizen input into the policy 
process. The following section outlines ways to improve democracy and government 
capacity with particular attention paid to the service delivery process. 
Policy Implications 
Two key factors were shown in the analyses of this project to increase policy 
responsiveness, generally, and public service equality, specifically: democracy and 
government capacity. In particular, the global analysis and case studies pointed to 
strong electoral competition as a significant attribute of high quality democracies, and 
the political participation models demonstrated high electoral competition provides 
incentives for citizens to engage in politics as they know politicians will be responsive. 
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Also the case studies underscored the importance of institutionalized channels of 
citizen input. In addition, the Mexican time-series analysis demonstrated that 
government capacity in terms of taxes collected is critical to public service delivery, and 
the case studies showed that technical expertise and experience were characteristics of 
municipal administration with high capacity.
These findings point to specific institutions and policies that may be 
implemented to bolster democracy and government capacity. While electoral 
competition is largely dependent on the nature of the party system, there are some 
institutional designs that foster greater competition than others. Decreasing the costs 
of entry into the political party system is one way governments can encourage healthy 
competition. However, in combination with other political, social, and economic 
conditions, low barriers to entry may lead to instability and fragmentation of the party 
system, which could make competition meaningless if the party system is in chaos 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1997). Another way to increase competition is to allow 
incumbents to run for reelection. A recent study of Brazilian municipal elections shows 
that competition steeply rose in those races where incumbent mayors ran for office 
(Chamon, Mello, Firpo 2009). Finally, electoral districting rules may be reassigned to 
increase competition in cases where old boundaries are consolidating too much power 
in the hands of one party or another (Gelman and King 1994).
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Institutionalized channels of citizen input are another way to strengthen 
democracy. The case studies analyzed accomplished this in numerous ways, including 
municipal offices and phone hotlines of citizen input where individuals can file an 
official complaint or request regarding municipal services, citizen community 
committees that work in conjunction with municipal administration to maintain 
community buildings and parks as well as manage public works related to the 
neighborhood, and participatory budgeting where citizens raise part of the funding for 
public works projects and the municipality funds the rest. Institutional innovations like 
this (see Smith 2009) are ways the governments may increase non-traditional forms of 
citizen input and participation, which enhances democracy by further incorporating the 
people.
The issue with such innovations is their sustainability, as Grindle (2007) points 
out. While they achieve greater participation for a few years while the administration 
that put the institution in place governs, it is typical for the next administration, 
especially if the rival political party, to suspend the practice altogether or rename and 
revamp it, losing continuity with citizens. It is imperative that such institutions are 
formalized so that they have a more long-term impact on democracy. 
Strengthening government capacity involves increasing government revenues as 
well as technical expertise of bureaucrats, according to the findings of the Mexican 
state analysis and case studies. Granted these results are in the context of the 
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developing world, but for that reason alone, they seem to capture needed 
improvements in resource-constrained environments. Increasing government 
revenues, particularly that of local governments where services are distributed, is 
important because it allows municipal administrations to tailor public service programs 
to fit the needs of the community. In other words, it allows innovation on the fringes. 
Such programs like participatory budgeting are not possible if the municipality cannot 
fund public works projects (i.e. new computers for the primary school in Barrio “X”) 
beyond basic services. 
To increase revenues, it is critical that governments collect taxes and user fees. 
Tax collection is difficult in communities where residents have little income. To meet 
this challenge, local governments, in particular, must provide incentives for paying 
taxes. One clear way to motivate individuals to pay fees is to provide good services. But 
often this is not enough when patronage legacies have created a culture of giving 
services in return for political support. Therefore, it is important that the municipality 
educates citizens as to how to pay for services and why services must be funded by 
each individual home. For example, in Tulancingo, Hidalgo, the municipal government 
has launched a water campaign to teach citizens about water services and proper 
handling of the water system in homes. This campaign is largely aimed at combating a 
“culture of social beneficiaries”, as one municipal official that I interviewed put it.  
While campaigns such as these may prove to be helpful at changing viewpoints 
regarding public services, governments must back these with action. Acting like a true 
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business where payment is given for services rendered is necessary. However, 
governments also have the responsibility of setting up a program (and enforcing it 
strictly) that meets the needs of the poorest homes in the community - those that truly 
cannot afford services. Working out a subsidy plan using local funds seems unlikely 
because municipalities have few resources with which to work, but it seems reasonable 
that federal governments could devise a subsidy program with state and local 
governments to provide basic services for the marginalized. 
Local governments may also increase revenues through the solicitation of 
funding for special projects. In my fieldwork, I found Santa Catarina, Nuevo Leon to be 
very successful at securing additional funding from federal programs that target specific 
projects. Much of their funding success was due to their innovation on projects like 
wind energy. But certainly funding is also targeted at public works projects that are 
more basic in poorer municipalities that cannot afford to undertake, for example, the 
building of a new water treatment plant. Such programs are typical of the Latin 
America region; Schady (2000) notes the Peruvian Social Fund specifically targeted the 
poorest provinces with the intent to redistribute funding to improve access to social 
services. 
Just as important as fiscal resources are technical resources for building 
government capacity. Technically-adept individuals are needed to fill bureaucratic 
positions in order to implement policies effectively. This means seeking qualified 
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individuals and paying them adequately to keep them. It also entails continuing training 
and education of bureaucrats to keep them up-to-date on technology and other policy 
area-specific changes. In addition, for countries like Mexico, this may mean that 
turnover of key bureaucratic positions with every election should be changed. It is 
costly to invest in the training of individuals occupying posts that will turnover in three 
years. Moreover, it is difficult to find experienced professionals willing to take such a 
short-term job. 
Building the technical expertise of bureaucrats should not only be a priority for 
local governments, but for state and national governments as well. The lack of skilled 
bureaucrats in municipal administrations severely hampers any federal and state 
investment in local infrastructure. For example, in one small rural municipality I 
studied, federal primary schools were empty and in disrepair because the municipal 
administration lacked bureaucrats who would go through the necessary channels to 
recruit rural students for school and enforce truancy laws. This underscores that 
infrastructure building from above by governments or non-governmental agencies 
must be coupled with technical training of the bureaucrats that oversee public works 
and services. This has serious implications for countries like Iraq where billions of 
dollars are being spent to build basic infrastructures. Resources should also be spent on 
building adept bureaucracies to manage these if long-term success is to be achieved. 
174
Concluding Thoughts
In all, this project has been an effort to bring together divergent scholarship on 
and meanings of democratic quality into a singular theoretical framework that can 
trace democratic quality through substantive outcomes of equality. This framework has 
the potential to be applied to a myriad of political and policy areas, including but not 
limited to minority rights, women’s equality, and income equality. It offers us a tool by 
which to historically and contemporarily dissect how democracy develops, separating 
out the procedural aspects from the substantive contributions. In this sense, it also 
provides us real policy answers for struggling democratic regimes. It is my hope that the 
virtuous cycle framework may be fruitfully studied and applied as a way to improve the 
quality of democracy.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR GLOBAL REGRESSION, CHAPTER III
minimum maximum mean std. deviation
education inequality 0.41 3.42 1.60 0.71
health inequality 3.30 66.80 30.97 19.84
sanitation inequality 0.00 80.00 26.88 17.73
democracy 0.00 1.89 1.29 0.41
rule of law -2.07 1.95 -0.25 0.90
GDP logged 4.94 10.51 7.10 1.48
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APPENDIX B
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC QUALITY VARIABLE
The measure of democratic quality that I constructed is an additive index of political 
contestation and political participation. I use the political competition measure from 
the Database of Political Institutions that indicates the legislative margin of majority (in 
seats) and subtract it from 0.5 to gauge the distance between the government party’s 
fraction of the seats and a perfect balance between ruling and opposition parties. I 
then take the absolute value and multiple it by 2 and subtract from 1 in order to make 
the scale range from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating a nondemocratic balance of legislative 
power (the ruling party holds all seats) and 1 indicating a perfect balance of power 
between the government’s party and the opposition party or parties. Finally I add this 
to voter turnout for legislative elections. 
Democratic quality = 1- ( |0.5 - legislative margin of victory | * 2 ) + voter turnout
EXAMPLE: URUGUAY 2005
Step: margin of 
majority
subtract 
from 0.5
absolute 
value
multiply 
by 2
subtract 
from 1
voter 
turnout
quality of 
democracy 
score
Description: fraction 
of seats 
held by 
governing 
party
distance 
from 
equal 
balance of 
governing 
and 
opposition 
parties
remove 
any 
negative 
values
make 
scale 0 
to 1
flip scale to 
reflect 
political 
competition
legislative 
elections
0 to 2 
scale
Value: 0.525253 -0.02525 0.025253 0.050505 0.949495 .8962 1.85
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APPENDIX C
COUNTRY YEARS INCLUDED IN ANALYSES, CHAPTER III
Education Regression:
Albania 1998 Finland 2000 Moldova 2006
Albania 2002 France 2006 Morocco 2007
Algeria 2002 Ghana 2007 Nigeria 2000
Argentina 2006 Great Britain 2006 Poland 2005
Australia 2005 Hungary 1998 Romania 1998
Bangladesh 2002 India 2006 Romania 2005
Brazil 2006 Indonesia 2006 Slovenia 2005
Bulgaria 2006 Iran 2007 Spain 2000
Burkina Faso 2007 Italy 2005 Sweden 2006
Canada 2000 Malaysia 2006 Thailand 2007
Chile 2000 Mali 2007 Trinidad 2006
Chile 2005 Mexico 2000 United States 2006
Cyprus 2006 Mexico 2005 Venezuela 2000
Egypt 2000 Moldova 2002 Vietnam 2006
Healthcare Regression:
Armenia 2000 Guinea 2005 Morocco 2003
Armenia 2005 Haiti 2000 Mozambique 2003
Azerbaijan 2006 Haiti 2005 Namibia 2000
Bangladesh 2004 Honduras 2005 Namibia 2006
Benin 2006 India 2005 Niger 2006
Bolivia 1998 Indonesia 2002 Nigeria 2003
Bolivia 2003 Jordan 2002 Pakistan 2006
Burkina Faso 1998 Jordan 2007 Peru 2000
Burkina Faso 2003 Kenya 2003 Philippines 1998
Cambodia 2000 Lesotho 2004 Philippines 2003
Cameroon 2004 Liberia 2007 Senegal 2005
Chad 2004 Madagascar 2003 Tanzania 2004
Egypt 2000 Malawi 2000 Turkey 1998
Egypt 2005 Malawi 2004 Uganda 2000
Ghana 1998 Mali 2006 Uganda 2006
Ghana 2003 Mauritania 2000 Ukraine 2007
Guatemala 1998 Moldova 2005 Zambia 2007
Zimbabwe 2005
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Sanitation Regression:
Albania 2000 Guinea 2000 Nigeria 2000
Algeria 2000 Guinea-Bissau 2000 Pakistan 2000
Armenia 2000 Guyana 2000 Panama 2000
Australia 2000 Haiti 2000 Papua New Guinea 2000
Austria 2000 Honduras 2000 Paraguay 2000
Azerbaijan 2000 Hungary 2000 Peru 2000
Bangladesh 2000 India 2000 Philippines 2000
Benin 2000 Indonesia 2000 Romania 2000
Bolivia 2000 Iran 2000 Russian Federation 2000
Botswana 2000 Jamaica 2000 Senegal 2000
Brazil 2000 Japan 2000 Sierra Leone 2000
Bulgaria 2000 Jordan 2000 Solomon Islands 2000
Burkina Faso 2000 Kazakhstan 2000 South Africa 2000
Cambodia 2000 Kenya 2000 Sri Lanka 2000
Cameroon 2000 Lebanon 2000 Sweden 2000
Canada 2000 Lesotho 2000 Switzerland 2000
Central African Rep. 2000 Liberia 2000 Tajikistan 2000
Chad 2000 Madagascar 2000 Tanzania 2000
Chile 2000 Malawi 2000 Thailand 2000
Costa Rica 2000 Mali 2000 Trinidad & Tobago 2000
Cyprus 2000 Mauritania 2000 Tunisia 2000
Djibouti 2000 Mexico 2000 Turkey 2000
Ecuador 2000 Moldova 2000 Uganda 2000
Egypt 2000 Mongolia 2000 Ukraine 2000
El Salvador 2000 Morocco 2000 United States 2000
Equatorial Guinea 2000 Mozambique 2000 Uruguay 2000
Finland 2000 Namibia 2000 Uzbekistan 2000
Gambia 2000 Netherlands 2000 Venezuela 2000
Ghana 2000 Nicaragua 2000 Yemen 2000
Guatemala 2000 Niger 2000 Zambia 2000
Zimbabwe 2000
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APPENDIX D
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MEXICAN STATE REGRESSION, CHAPTER III
minimum maximum mean std. deviation
education inequality 0.72 0.88 0.82 0.03
democracy 1.12 1.71 1.44 0.16
government capacity 1.96+e07 2.42+e09 3.95+e08 4.86+e08
GDP 2.64+e07 6.60+e08 1.46+e08 123+e08
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APPENDIX E
DEMOCRACY IN THE MEXICAN STATES, 2000-2004
Note: Democracy score = margin of victory + voter turnout (for legislative elections). Democracy values listed on the following page for each state.
1 Aguascalientes 7 Coahuila 13 Jalisco 19 Oaxaca 25 Sonora
2 Baja California 8 Colima 14 México 20 Puebla 26 Tabasco
3 Baja California Sur 9 Durango 15 Michoacán 21 Querétaro 27 Tamaulipas
4 Campeche 10 Guanajuato 16 Morelos 22 Quintana Roo 28 Tlaxcala
5 Chiapas 11 Guerroro 17 Nayarit 23 San Luis Potosí 29 Veracruz
6 Chihuahua 12 Hidalgo 18 Nuevo León 24 Sinaloa 30 Yucatán
31 Zacatecas
Democracy 0 - 2Democracy Score 
Range: 0-2
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State Code Year Democracy Score
1 2000 1.5509
1 2001 1.5509
1 2002 1.5509
1 2003 1.2586
1 2004 1.2586
2 2000 1.4588
2 2001 1.4588
2 2002 1.4588
2 2003 1.2141
2 2004 1.2141
3 2000 1.6004
3 2001 1.6004
3 2002 1.6004
3 2003 1.2327
3 2004 1.2327
4 2000 1.5083
4 2001 1.5083
4 2002 1.5083
4 2003 1.6002
4 2004 1.6002
5 2000 1.3467
5 2001 1.3467
5 2002 1.3467
5 2003 1.1289
5 2004 1.1289
6 2000 1.5046
6 2001 1.5046
6 2002 1.5046
6 2003 1.2499
6 2004 1.2499
7 2000 1.5465
7 2001 1.5465
7 2002 1.5465
7 2003 1.1987
7 2004 1.1987
8 2000 1.6629
8 2001 1.6629
8 2002 1.6629
8 2003 1.55
State Code Year Democracy Score
8 2004 1.55
9 2000 1.4871
9 2001 1.4871
9 2002 1.4871
9 2003 1.1281
9 2004 1.1281
10 2000 1.6147
10 2001 1.6147
10 2002 1.6147
10 2003 1.3065
10 2004 1.3065
11 2000 1.3842
11 2001 1.3842
11 2002 1.3842
11 2003 1.366
11 2004 1.366
12 2000 1.473
12 2001 1.473
12 2002 1.473
12 2003 1.3047
12 2004 1.3047
13 2000 1.4757
13 2001 1.4757
13 2002 1.4757
13 2003 1.1483
13 2004 1.1483
14 2000 1.5381
14 2001 1.5381
14 2002 1.5381
14 2003 1.5387
14 2004 1.5387
15 2000 1.5178
15 2001 1.5178
15 2002 1.5178
15 2003 1.2785
15 2004 1.2785
16 2000 1.5481
16 2001 1.5481
16 2002 1.5481
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State code Year Democracy score
16 2003 1.4657
16 2004 1.4657
17 2000 1.421
17 2001 1.421
17 2002 1.421
17 2003 1.1215
17 2004 1.1215
18 2000 1.5646
18 2001 1.5646
18 2002 1.5646
18 2003 1.3857
18 2004 1.3857
19 2000 1.4008
19 2001 1.4008
19 2002 1.4008
19 2003 1.129
19 2004 1.129
20 2000 1.6187
20 2001 1.6187
20 2002 1.6187
20 2003 1.266
20 2004 1.266
21 2000 1.5626
21 2001 1.5626
21 2002 1.5626
21 2003 1.514
21 2004 1.514
22 2000 1.5997
22 2001 1.5997
22 2002 1.5997
22 2003 1.1899
22 2004 1.1899
23 2000 1.6105
23 2001 1.6105
23 2002 1.6105
23 2003 1.4098
23 2004 1.4098
24 2000 1.3236
24 2001 1.3236
State code Year Democracy score
24 2002 1.3236
24 2003 1.1466
24 2004 1.1466
25 2000 1.5884
25 2001 1.5884
25 2002 1.5884
25 2003 1.522
25 2004 1.522
26 2000 1.5837
26 2001 1.5837
26 2002 1.5837
26 2003 1.2964
26 2004 1.2964
27 2000 1.6101
27 2001 1.6101
27 2002 1.6101
27 2003 1.2223
27 2004 1.2223
28 2000 1.5696
28 2001 1.5696
28 2002 1.5696
28 2003 1.3057
28 2004 1.3057
29 2000 1.5617
29 2001 1.5617
29 2002 1.5617
29 2003 1.4027
29 2004 1.4027
30 2000 1.7139
30 2001 1.7139
30 2002 1.7139
30 2003 1.3607
30 2004 1.3607
31 2000 1.465
31 2001 1.465
31 2002 1.465
31 2003 1.2558
31 2004 1.2558
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APPENDIX F
OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
A. La Información de la Posición del Gobierno Municipal
1. ¿Ha trabajado usted en otros puestos de la administración municipal? Y 
si ese es el caso, cuántos años en total ha estado usted trabajando en el 
gobierno municipal?
2. ¿En el futuro, cuáles son sus aspiraciones profesionales?
B. Los Servicios Municipales  
1. ¿Qué servicios en la cuidad son  responsabilidad de su gobierno? 
2. ¿Cuánta autonomía del nivel estatal y federal tienen para tomar 
decisiones con respecto a los servicios públicos? ¿Usted cree que existe 
mucho control estatal sobre la forma de proveer servicios públicos? Sin 
hay un plan estatal y uno municipal, cual tiene prioridad?
3. ¿Cómo calificaría usted la calidad de sus servicios de la ciudad? 
4. ¿Qué servicios locales necesitan mejorar? 
5. ¿Cree usted que los funcionarios públicos se sienten presionados para 
proporcionar servicios públicos por motivos electorales? 
6. ¿Cómo cambiado la competencia electoral en los ultimos pasados?
7. ¿Usted tiene la impresión de que los partidos políticos  se preocupan 
por los servicios públicos? ¿Qué importancia tienen los servicios públicos  
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para su partido? ¿Los ciudadanos le expresan a los partidos la necesidad 
de mejores servicios públicos? ¿Cómo?
C. La Capacidad del Recurso del Gobierno Municipal
1. ¿Cuál es la fuente de los recursos económicos de la ciudad para financiar 
los servicios municipales? ¿Cómo ha cambiado esto con el tiempo? 
2. ¿Su ciudad tiene muchos o pocos recursos para los servicios 
municipales? ¿Cómo ha cambiado esto con el tiempo? 
3. ¿Cuál es el problema más grande entre los recursos económicos  
municipales que reciben para proveer los servicios públicos? 
4. ¿Es eficiente la recaudación fiscal de la ciudad?
5. ¿En una escala de 1-10 donde 1 es la menor y 10 es la mayor, cuánta 
autonomía tiene el gobierno municipal para administrar los servicios 
públicos? ¿Y para recaudar los impuestos? 
6. ¿Cómo se establecen las prioridades sobre los servicios públicos que se 
deben proveer?
D. La Interacción entre el gobierno municipal y los ciudadanos
1. ¿Cómo interactúa el gobierno municipal con el ayuntamiento?
2. ¿Cómo participan los ciudadanos en el proceso de la entrega de 
servicios? 
3. ¿Tienen los ciudadanos la oportunidad de solicitar los servicios 
específicos? ¿Cómo?
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4. ¿Piensa usted que la mayoría de ciudadanos está satisfecha con los 
servicios de la ciudad? 
5. ¿Aproximadamente cuántas organizaciones del ciudadano existen? 
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APPENDIX G
CHAPTER IV VARIABLE CODING
Individual level variables are listed below with their corresponding survey questions 
and recoded values. Values were chosen to maintain consistency between the two 
surveys and reflect the expected relationship among the variables. Please see the 
LAPOP and Afrobarometer codebooks for original values, available at: 
www.lapopsurveys.org and www.afrobarometer.org. 
Vote
LAPOP: Did you vote in the 2005 presidential elections?
Afrobarometer: Did you vote in the most recent national election?
Coding: 1= yes; 0=no
Protest
LAPOP: Have you participated in a demonstration or public protest? 
Afrobarometer: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each 
of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during 
the past year. Attended a demonstration or protest march?
Coding: 1= yes; 0= no 
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Public service evaluation
LAPOP: “Would you say that the services your municipality provides the people are 
excellent, good, average, bad, or very bad?”
Afrobarometer: “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling 
the following matters: Improving basic health services? Addressing educational needs? 
Delivering household water?” (mean of health, education, and water evaluations)
Coding: 1= bad; 2= average; 3= good
Democracy evaluation
LAPOP: In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works in your country?
Afrobarometer: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your 
country?
Coding: 1= very dissatisfied; 2= dissatisfied; 3= satisfied; 4= very satisified
Corruption evaluation
LAPOP: From your own experience or what you have heard, is the corruption of 
government officials very widespread, widespread, somewhat widespread, or not 
widespread?
Afrobarometer: How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption: The President/Prime Minister and officials in his office? Members of 
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Parliament? Elected local government councilors? National government officials? Local 
government officials? (mean)
Coding: 1= not widespread/none; 2= some/ somewhat widespread; 3= most/ 
widespread; 4= all/ very widespread
Crime evaluation
LAPOP: Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and think of the possibility of 
becoming a victim of assault or robbery, do you feel secure, somewhat secure, 
somewhat insecure, very insecure?
Afrobarometer: Over the past year, how often (if ever) have you or anyone in your 
family feared crime in your own home? Never, once or twice, several to many times, or 
always?
Coding: 1= very secure/ never; 2= secure/ once or twice; 3= insecure/ several to many 
times; 4= very insecure/ always
Political interest
LAPOP: How much interest do you have in politics?
Afrobarometer: How interested would you say you are in public affairs?
Coding: 1= none; 2= not very interested; 3= somewhat interested; 4= very interested
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National economic evaluation
LAPOP: In general, how would you qualify the economic situation of the country?
Afrobarometer: In general, how would you describe: The present economic conditions 
of this country?
Coding: 1= very bad; 2= bad; 3= neither good nor bad; 4= good; 5= very good
Age
Respondent age in years
Female
Respondent gender
Education
0 = no formal schooling
1 = some primary 
2 = completed primary
3 = some secondary 
4 = completed secondary
5 = completed technical
6 = some university
7 = completed university
8 = post graduate
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Employed
Respondent employment status (1=employed)
Income
LAPOP: Do you own a car? TV? Telephone (not cellular)?
Afrobarometer: Do you own a car? TV? Radio?
Coding: 0= do not own a car, tv, telephone/radio; 1= own 1 of three; 2= own 2 of three; 
3= own all 3 (or multiples of all three)
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APPENDIX H
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PARTICIPATION MODELS 
HH HL LH LL
mean std 
dev
min max mean std 
dev
min max mean std 
dev
min max mean std 
dev
min max
VO
TE
 M
O
D
EL
S
vote 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.78 0.42 0 1 0.75 0.43 0 1 0.78 0.41 0 1
public service eval 1.91 0.72 1 3 2.08 0.70 1 3 2.08 0.62 1 3 2.04 0.60 1 3
democracy eval 2.59 0.70 1 4 2.32 0.72 1 4 2.68 0.76 1 4 2.53 0.89 1 4
corruption eval 3.33 0.81 1 4 3.31 0.86 1 4 2.78 0.84 1 4 2.92 0.96 1 4
crime eval 2.43 1.04 1 4 2.40 0.96 1 4 2.26 1.00 1 4 1.94 1.00 1 4
economic eval 2.35 0.90 1 5 2.32 0.87 1 5 3.01 0.96 1 5 2.66 1.11 1 5
political interest 2.00 0.99 1 4 1.98 0.94 1 4 2.25 1.10 1 4 2.52 1.09 1 4
age 40.17 16.48 18 90 37.61 14.69 18 97 41.17 15.72 18 92 35.57 13.68 16 95
female 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
income 2.14 0.77 0 3 1.55 0.83 0 3 1.83 0.88 0 3 1.41 0.88 0 3
employed 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
education 2.71 2.02 0 8 3.08 1.93 0 8 3.38 1.75 0 8 2.67 1.87 0 8
PR
O
TE
ST
 M
O
D
EL
S
protest 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
public service eval 1.91 0.71 1 3 2.08 0.70 1 3 2.08 0.62 1 3 2.04 0.60 1 3
democracy eval 2.59 0.70 1 4 2.32 0.72 1 4 2.68 0.76 1 4 2.53 0.88 1 4
corruption eval 3.33 0.81 1 4 3.31 0.86 1 4 2.78 0.84 1 4 2.92 0.96 1 4
crime eval 2.43 1.04 1 4 2.40 0.96 1 4 2.26 1.00 1 4 1.95 1.00 1 4
economic eval 2.35 0.90 1 5 2.31 0.87 1 5 3.01 0.96 1 5 2.66 1.10 1 5
political interest 2.00 0.98 1 4 1.98 0.94 1 4 2.25 1.10 1 4 2.50 1.10 1 4
age 40.16 16.48 18 90 37.59 14.69 18 97 41.18 15.72 18 92 35.39 13.71 16 95
female 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.53 0.50 0 1 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1
income 2.14 0.77 0 3 1.55 0.83 0 3 1.83 0.88 0 3 1.41 0.88 0 3
employed 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1
education 2.71 2.02 0 8 3.08 1.93 0 8 3.38 1.75 0 8 2.66 1.86 0 8
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APPENDIX I
COUNTRY MODELS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Dependent variable = vote
Benin Botswana Ghana Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal South Africa
public service eval -0.084 -0.033 -0.224 0.526 -0.269 -0.52 -0.364 0.139 -0.068 0.075 0.238 0.312
0.404 0.233 0.271 0.300* 0.303 0.52 0.179** 0.228 0.237 0.114 0.34 0.142**
democracy eval 0.058 0.068 0.148 0.088 -0.082 0.358 0.22 0.073 0.331 0.203 0.012 0.25
0.165 0.086 0.131 0.108 0.13 0.142** 0.106** 0.128 0.122*** 0.065*** 0.113 0.072***
corruption eval -0.327 0.052 -0.152 -0.109 -0.362 -0.199 -0.148 -0.15 0.117 0.125 -0.059 -0.291
0.173* 0.136 0.19 0.149 0.234 0.189 0.145 0.179 0.134 0.078 0.15 0.094***
crime eval 0.005 0 0.202 0.098 -0.009 -0.255 -0.009 -0.214 0.013 -0.193 -0.046 0.204
0.149 0.098 0.15 0.082 0.141 0.135* 0.146 0.133 0.136 0.059*** 0.132 0.063***
economic eval -0.03 0.021 0.103 -0.115 -0.138 -0.029 0.034 0.219 -0.045 0.01 -0.278 0.043
0.172 0.073 0.102 0.074 0.104 0.127 0.091 0.121* 0.091 0.043 0.129** 0.054
political interest 0.267 0.159 0.118 0.133 0.3 0.363 0.17 -0.152 0.235 0.342 0.157 0.281
0.128** 0.082* 0.115 0.084 0.136** 0.127*** 0.098* 0.127 0.123* 0.051*** 0.096 0.061***
age 0.081 0.055 0.005 0.095 0.063 0.082 0.087 0.063 0.106 0.064 0.11 0.047
0.016*** 0.009*** 0.009 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.006***
female 0.073 0.122 -0.354 -0.689 0.069 -0.41 0.25 -0.338 -0.642 -0.169 -0.178 -0.364
0.306 0.169 0.25 0.170*** 0.282 0.243* 0.212 0.312 0.207*** 0.103* 0.222 0.131***
employed 0.749 -0.122 -0.355 0.438 0.158 0.114 0.26 0.381 0.923 0.548 0.222 0.093
0.319** 0.193 0.26 0.179** 0.372 0.244 0.385 0.306 0.235*** 0.109*** 0.247 0.137
income -0.073 0.153 0.146 -0.05 0.479 0.182 -0.369 0.042 -0.165 0.147 0.35 0.103
0.209 0.099 0.153 0.124 0.185*** 0.169 0.177** 0.164 0.118 0.062** 0.135*** 0.071
education -0.067 0.029 -0.075 0.026 0.044 0.012 -0.024 0.201 0.224 0.002 0.038 0.11
0.093 0.063 0.076 0.059 0.102 0.091 0.093 0.097** 0.086*** 0.031 0.062 0.048**
n 660 790 658 853 430 556 641 524 831 2101 578 1700
Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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APPENDIX  I: CONTINUED
Dependent variable = vote
Tanzania Uganda Zambia Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico
public service eval -0.233 -0.544 0.229 -0.071 -0.008 0.021 0.097 0.077 -0.055 0.099 -0.149
0.517 0.234** 0.229 0.06 0.043 0.047 0.041** 0.039** 0.105 0.060* 0.102
democracy eval 0.301 0.142 0.062 0.3 0.188 0.256 0.012 0.009 0.101 0.151 0.088
0.258 0.09 0.109 0.060*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.042 0.043 0.109 0.061** 0.105
corruption eval 0.518 -0.022 0.092 -0.142 -0.053 0.145 0.075 -0.101 0.425 0.188 0.108
0.39 0.129 0.147 0.046*** 0.036 0.038*** 0.039* 0.031*** 0.094*** 0.049*** 0.075
crime eval -0.319 -0.047 -0.063 -0.071 -0.002 -0.024 0.029 -0.062 -0.045 -0.131 -0.072
0.246 0.081 0.092 0.041* 0.03 0.031 0.031 0.028** 0.079 0.042*** 0.074
economic eval 0.175 0.287 0.02 0.486 0.241 0.362 0.147 0.324 0.714 0.577 0.368
0.256 0.078*** 0.089 0.046*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.087*** 0.052*** 0.076***
political interest -0.238 -0.032 -0.179 0.009 0.062 0.117 0.034 0.017 -0.277 0.093 0.135
0.232 0.067 0.078** 0.05 0.036* 0.037*** 0.037 0.035 0.085*** 0.048* 0.085
age 0.149 0.166 0.071 0.116 0.033 0.02 0.066 0.049 0.064 0.03 0.084
0.032*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.007***
female 0.203 -0.179 -0.204 0.401 0.037 0.357 0.052 0.157 0.239 0.304 -0.081
0.492 0.169 0.174 0.084*** 0.063 0.073*** 0.059 0.063** 0.141* 0.096*** 0.153
employed 1.139 0.69 0.558 0.377 0.294 0.307 0.079 0.328 0.826 0.63 0.715
0.508** 0.157*** 0.216*** 0.082*** 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.104 0.063*** 0.205*** 0.096*** 0.219***
income 0.852 0.127 0.37 0.178 0.137 0.371 -0.138 0.099 -0.041 0.142 0.246
0.369** 0.128 0.119*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.084 0.051*** 0.087***
education 0.044 -0.047 0.085 -0.047 0.153 0.146 0.196 0.102 0.188 0.102 0.131
0.247 0.056 0.069 0.029 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.045***
n 256 1306 754 5320 5152 5608 10664 6296 1322 4916 1466
Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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APPENDIX I:CONTINUED
Dependent variable = vote
Nicaragua Panama Peru Uruguay Venezuela
public service eval 0.08 0.129 0.18 -0.293 0.003
0.09 0.069* 0.091** 0.169* 0.065
democracy eval -0.16 -0.243 -0.032 0.594 0.103
0.089* 0.060*** 0.086 0.186*** 0.061*
corruption eval 0.074 0.183 0.381 -0.146 0.12
0.076 0.044*** 0.061*** 0.145 0.056**
crime eval -0.086 -0.064 0.058 0.374 0.017
0.065 0.048 0.065 0.122*** 0.044
economic eval 0.307 0.319 -0.124 0.034 0.47
0.064*** 0.049*** 0.065* 0.11 0.049***
political interest 0.086 0.062 -0.133 0.191 0.076
0.075 0.049 0.079* 0.146 0.052
age 0.036 0.061 0.036 0.089 0.047
0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.004***
female 0.021 0.577 0.506 -0.248 0.076
0.137 0.087*** 0.119*** 0.232 0.087
employed 0.715 1.147 1.01 0.725 -0.11
0.150*** 0.091*** 0.120*** 0.276*** 0.087
income 0.197 0.235 0.148 0.254 -0.056
0.090** 0.060*** 0.079* 0.145* 0.057
education 0.173 0.113 0.344 0.215 0.105
0.045*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.075*** 0.023***
n 1568 4732 5372 1278 3976
Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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APPENDIX I: CONTINUED
Dependent variable = protest
Benin Botswana Ghana Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mozambique Namibia Nigeria Senegal South Africa
public service eval 0.07 0.25 0.044 -0.317 -0.713 -0.478 -0.009 -0.153 0.229 0.082 0.249 0.312
0.249 0.245 0.195 0.299 0.362** 0.768 0.195 0.225 0.196 0.105 0.298 0.142**
democracy eval 0.278 -0.124 -0.064 -0.033 -0.253 0.088 0.045 0.334 0.244 0.031 0.248 0.25
0.105*** 0.089 0.099 0.106 0.161 0.213 0.114 0.124*** 0.101** 0.059 0.099** 0.072***
corruption eval -0.31 -0.069 0.069 0.249 -0.716 0.066 0.033 -0.042 -0.006 0.115 -0.175 -0.291
0.107*** 0.137 0.138 0.149* 0.289** 0.299 0.158 0.183 0.111 0.072 0.13 0.094***
crime eval -0.216 0.087 0.036 -0.031 -0.127 -0.1 0.028 -0.108 -0.265 0.112 0.168 0.204
0.091** 0.101 0.096 0.081 0.177 0.209 0.158 0.129 0.108** 0.056** 0.129 0.063***
economic eval 0.454 0.141 0.177 0.407 0.617 0.138 0.053 -0.057 0.408 0.3 0.27 0.281
0.080*** 0.084* 0.082** 0.083*** 0.159*** 0.194 0.114 0.124 0.104*** 0.047*** 0.083*** 0.061***
political interest 0.017 0.138 0.156 0.092 -0.108 0.269 -0.058 0.173 -0.164 -0.005 -0.048 0.043
0.104 0.075* 0.070** 0.074 0.128 0.198 0.098 0.121 0.077** 0.04 0.11 0.054
age 0.017 0.04 0.032 0.064 0.054 0.052 0.01 0.032 0.038 0.032 0.007 0.047
0.006** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.009 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.007 0.006***
female -0.141 -0.064 -0.295 0.381 -0.389 0.345 -0.297 -0.155 0.919 -0.41 0.26 -0.364
0.189 0.173 0.181 0.170** 0.368 0.369 0.234 0.303 0.166*** 0.095*** 0.197 0.131***
employed 0.33 0.201 0.44 0.358 0.017 0.143 0.064 0.061 0.523 0.701 -0.023 0.093
0.216 0.2 0.178** 0.179** 0.464 0.377 0.405 0.278 0.175*** 0.098*** 0.213 0.137
income 0.012 0.099 -0.185 -0.103 0.248 0.42 -0.22 -0.046 0.112 0.197 -0.166 0.103
0.125 0.101 0.108* 0.122 0.223 0.254* 0.199 0.155 0.094 0.058*** 0.12 0.071
education -0.091 -0.074 -0.005 -0.118 -0.313 -0.19 0.049 -0.101 -0.14 0.074 -0.002 0.11
0.061 0.064 0.053 0.058** 0.116*** 0.131 0.108 0.09 0.063** 0.028*** 0.052 0.048**
n 659 787 662 853 430 557 640 521 827 2083 576 1700
Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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APPENDIX I: CONTINUED
Dependent variable = protest
Tanzania Uganda Zambia Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico
public service eval -1.245 -0.037 0.371 -0.012 -0.056 -0.058 -0.139 -0.04 -0.225 -0.042 0.037
0.489** 0.242 0.215* 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.036*** 0.064 0.121* 0.058 0.112
democracy eval -0.477 -0.072 -0.043 0.126 -0.324 -0.153 0.116 -0.329 -0.408 -0.187 -0.336
0.276* 0.092 0.102 0.057** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.037*** 0.070*** 0.131*** 0.060*** 0.116***
corruption eval -0.602 -0.295 0.046 -0.117 0.001 0.045 0.056 0.251 0.324 0.088 0.283
0.328* 0.130** 0.137 0.044*** 0.045 0.048 0.038 0.060*** 0.125*** 0.053* 0.093***
crime eval 0.228 0.079 0.036 0.012 0.073 -0.036 0.04 0.016 -0.137 0.013 -0.182
0.254 0.086 0.087 0.039 0.037* 0.036 0.027 0.047 0.095 0.042 0.084**
economic eval 0.591 0.336 0.405 0.447 0.378 0.17 0.41 0.637 0.314 0.138 0.196
0.229*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.084*** 0.043*** 0.082**
political interest 0.195 -0.055 -0.164 0.068 -0.098 -0.041 -0.087 -0.409 0.032 0.032 -0.074
0.212 0.068 0.073** 0.046 0.043** 0.042 0.033*** 0.063*** 0.102 0.047 0.092
age 0.021 0.076 0.038 -0.004 0.013 0.008 -0.011 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.029
0.018 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.006 0.003** 0.006***
female 0.291 0.026 -0.064 -0.423 -0.466 -0.392 -0.899 -0.947 0.413 -0.242 -0.026
0.445 0.173 0.162 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.083*** 0.052*** 0.107*** 0.180** 0.090*** 0.172
employed -1.156 0.43 0.102 0.067 -0.159 0.202 0.015 0.366 0.065 0.12 -0.09
0.436*** 0.161*** 0.197 0.075 0.077** 0.083** 0.088 0.099*** 0.276 0.09 0.247
income 1.285 0.167 -0.043 0.007 0.068 0.209 0.281 -0.006 -0.103 -0.163 -0.123
0.403*** 0.13 0.109 0.047 0.053 0.055*** 0.035*** 0.063 0.101 0.050*** 0.101
education 0.034 -0.089 -0.055 0.321 0.23 0.264 0.138 0.19 0.154 0.255 0.177
0.21 0.056 0.064 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.028*** 0.051*** 0.024*** 0.044***
n 254 1307 754 5316 5152 5604 10536 6300 1292 5248 1392
Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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APPENDIX I: CONTINUED
Dependent variable = protest
Nicaragua Panama Peru Uruguay Venezuela
public service eval 0.07 -0.072 -0.203 -0.179 0.003
0.124 0.067 0.052*** 0.101* 0.065
democracy eval -0.135 0.29 -0.15 0.081 0.103
0.123 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.119 0.061*
corruption eval 0.232 -0.046 0.139 -0.292 0.12
0.119* 0.043 0.044*** 0.094*** 0.056**
crime eval -0.167 0.42 0.067 0.097 0.017
0.093* 0.046*** 0.038* 0.076 0.044
economic eval 0.246 0.466 0.207 0.548 0.47
0.078*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.067*** 0.049***
political interest 0.032 0.109 -0.2 0.267 0.076
0.101 0.045** 0.043*** 0.088*** 0.052
age -0.001 0.007 0.015 0.019 0.047
0.006 0.003** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.004***
female 0.428 -0.354 -0.369 0.228 0.076
0.196** 0.082*** 0.069*** 0.149 0.087
employed 0.249 -0.048 0.18 -0.161 -0.11
0.237 0.082 0.067*** 0.222 0.087
income 0.002 0.016 -0.089 0.166 -0.056
0.115 0.054 0.044** 0.095* 0.057
education 0.21 0.193 0.191 0.3 0.105
0.050*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.040*** 0.023***
n 1558 4708 5356 1278 3976
Notes: Standard errors in shown below coefficients; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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